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ABSTRACT 
 
International law plays an important role in regulating the criminal punishments imposed by 
states, including capital punishment. Although capital punishment is not prohibited by 
international law, the United Nations’ ultimate goal is worldwide abolition of the death penalty.  
The United States of America (‘the US’) retains the death penalty in thirty-one States, the 
federal government, and in the military. The US has a ‘thorny’ relationship with international 
law, which to some extent can be attributed to the theory of ‘American exceptionalism’. This 
theory allows the US to act ‘exceptionally’ simply by virtue of it being a super-power state. 
Despite this, the US does engage with international law through the Universal Periodic Review 
(‘UPR’). The General Assembly of the United Nations (‘UNGA’) created the UPR in 2006 
through Resolution 60/251 to be a universal and intergovernmental peer review process, 
intended to appraise every UN member state’s protection and promotion of human rights. 
To date, no scholar has examined the effectiveness of the UPR in the context of the abolition 
of the death penalty in the US. This thesis contributes to filling that gap in the literature by 
undertaking a qualitative review of the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs, examining the UPR’s role in 
facilitating the abolition of capital punishment in the US. From this analysis, the author has 
identified three broad themes within the US UPR regarding capital punishment. Namely, one, 
the right to a fair trial and due process, two, intellectual disabilities and mental health, and, 
three, the implementation of a death sentence. From this, the author has identified 
recommendations to strengthen the UPR mechanism, both generally, and specifically in the 
context of the abolition of the death penalty in the US. 
The potential impact of this research is three-fold. First, it will assist in ensuring the US is held 
to account to its international obligations whilst it retains the death penalty. Second, it will 
further the Steikers’ ‘blueprint for abolition’, by providing evidence to show the arbitrary 
application of the death penalty in the US in violation of international and domestic laws. Third, 
the strengthening of the UPR will benefit the mechanism generally, for the protection and 
promotion of human rights globally. 
 
Word count: 78,604 
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PART I 
This thesis has three specific aims. First, it intends to ensure the US is adhering to international 
law whilst it retains the death penalty, through the Universal Periodic Review (‘UPR’). Second, 
it seeks to further the eventual abolition of the death penalty in the United States of America 
(‘US’). To do this, it aims to gather evidence to develop the argument that the death penalty 
in the US is arbitrarily applied and is therefore a violation of the prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment. Third, it aims to improve the UPR mechanism through its suggested 
recommendations. 
Chapter one provides the introduction to this thesis. Chapter two then examines the US’ 
relationship with international law. This will facilitate a better appreciation for the US’ 
engagement with the UPR, as it is a global human rights mechanism that is based upon 
international law. The UPR is considered in chapter three, which allows for Part II of the thesis 
to analyse the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs in the context of the death penalty.
14 
 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The Death Penalty in the United States 
Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976 by the Supreme Court of the United States 
(‘SCOTUS’),1 it has provoked significant controversy in the US criminal justice system. Almost 
1,500 people have been executed since 1976 across the US, and, currently in 2018, thirty-
one US states retain the death penalty along with the federal government and the military.2 
The rate of executions has been steadily declining since 1999, which saw a record high of 
ninety-eight. This is due to a number of factors considered later in this thesis.3 However, 2017 
bucked the trend and twenty-three people were executed, three more than in 2016.4 At the 
time of writing, sixteen people have been executed in 2018.5 
The US Constitution regulates the application of the death penalty. The Constitution was 
signed in 1787 and, along with its Amendments, is the supreme law in the US and all State 
and federal laws must be compatible with it.6 The Constitution also established the three 
branches of government – executive, legislative, and judicial. Article I of the Constitution 
outlines the legislative branch of government, the Congress, which is made up of the Senate 
and the House of Representatives.7 Article II provides for the executive power, which is the 
President of the United States (‘POTUS’) and the Vice President.8 Article III provides for the 
power of SCOTUS, as the head of the judicial branch of government, to adjudicate upon the 
interpretation of the Constitution.9 As the US has a federal system of government, each US 
State also has three branches of government, and the States are considered to be 
‘laboratories of democracy’ within the federal system.10 
                                                             
1 Gregg v Georgia 428 US 153 (1976). 
2 Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Number of Executions by State and Region Since 1976’ (2018) 
<https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/number-executions-state-and-region-1976> accessed 24 August 2018; Death Penalty Information 
Center, ‘Facts About the Death Penalty’ (18 July 2018) <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf> accessed 24 
August 2018. Correct as at 24 August 2018. 
3 See, chapters 4, 5, and 6. 
4 Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Executions by Year’ (28 June 2018) <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/executions-year> 
accessed 24 August 2018. 
5 Ibid. Correct as at 24 August 2018. 
6 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the United States (American Law Institute 
Publishers 1987) §111 Comment (a) 43 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Restatement’]; The United States Constitution, Article VI, 
Clause 2 [hereinafter referred to as ‘US Constitution’]. 
7 The United States Constitution, Article I. 
8 Ibid Article II. 
9 Ibid Article III. 
10 New State Ice Co v Liebmann 285 US 262, 311 (1932). 
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The use of capital punishment is expressly acknowledged in the Constitution. The Fifth 
Amendment makes reference to capital crimes and deprivation of life,11 which applies to the 
federal government, and is made applicable to the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment.12 In terms of the regulation of the death penalty, the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments also require due process of law,13 the Sixth Amendment requires competent 
counsel in all cases including capital cases,14 and the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and 
unusual punishment.15 
The interpretation of the Constitution has developed over time. Particularly relevant for the 
death penalty is the changing understanding of the Eighth Amendment. In 1910, SCOTUS 
held in Weems v. United States that the Eighth Amendment is ‘progressive’ and ‘may acquire 
meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice’.16 Furthermore, in 1958, 
in Trop v. Dulles, SCOTUS held that the Eighth Amendment ‘must draw its meaning from the 
evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’.17  
In following this progressive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, in 1972, SCOTUS placed 
a moratorium on the death penalty across the US, because of its cruel and unusual application, 
through the case of Furman v. Georgia.18 However, this was all the five plurality Justices 
agreed upon. The decision was fractured, with each Justice providing their own opinion on 
why the death penalty should be struck down, and no Justices joining another’s opinion. 
Justices Brennan and Marshall found that the death penalty per se was cruel and unusual 
punishment,19 whereas Justices Douglas, Stewart, and White found that it was the current 
administration of the death penalty that violated the Eighth Amendment, not the punishment 
in and of itself.20 
This created the precarious position that, as a principle of constitutional law, the death penalty 
was only suspended rather than abolished, and it was no real surprise when the moratorium 
was lifted four years later in the case of Gregg v. Georgia.21 Following the decision in Furman, 
the States had rallied and amended their capital statutes. As such, SCOTUS ruled in a 7-2 
decision in Gregg, that the death penalty does not automatically violate the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments.22 The Court held that in order for a punishment, in this instance a 
                                                             
11 The United States Constitution, Amendment V.   
12 Ibid Amendment XIV. 
13 Ibid Amendments V, XIV. 
14 Ibid Amendment VI. 
15 Ibid Amendment VIII. 
16 Weems v United States 217 US 349, 378 (1910). 
17 Trop v Dulles 356 US 86, 101 (1958). 
18 Furman v Georgia 408 US 238, 239-40 (1972).  
19 Ibid 305-06, 371. 
20 Ibid 240, 306, 310-11. 
21 Gregg (n 1). 
22 Ibid 168. 
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death sentence, to conform with the Eighth Amendment, it must comport with the evolving 
standards of decency,23 and must have a penological justification, in that it must be 
proportionate to the crime.24 The majority found that the changes Georgia had made to its 
death penalty statute were constitutional, and this reinstated the death penalty across the US, 
insofar as it was consistent with the Gregg decision.25 The modern-day death penalty in the 
US derives from this reinstatement of capital punishment in 1976. 
 
1.2 International Law and the Death Penalty  
International law describes the agreements made between different sovereign governments,26 
and can be traced back to the Treaty of Westphalia.27 According to Article 38 Statue of the 
International Court of Justice, there are four sources of international law. First, treaties or 
conventions, which are codified laws of a bilateral or multilateral nature, the contents of which 
are negotiated and agreed upon between states. Second, customary international law, which 
is not codified, but is agreed upon by tradition. Third, norms of jus cogens, which refers to 
fundamental and non-derogable international laws. Fourth, judicial decisions of the 
international courts.28  
International law is particularly important for human rights and capital punishment. Historically, 
documented rights can be traced all the way back to Magna Carta on 15 June 1215. Modern-
day human rights began to develop following World War II, including through the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’).29 The UDHR set out thirty fundamental principles that 
every human being has the right to, such as the right to life,30 the right to be free from torture 
and cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment,31 the right to equal protection,32 and the right to 
a fair trial.33 Article 3 UDHR sets out the right to life, but nowhere in the UDHR does it make 
reference to the death penalty. The travaux préparatoires show that states disagreed about 
whether the UDHR should call for the abolition of the death penalty or allow it as an exception, 
                                                             
23 Ibid 172-73. 
24 Ibid 182-83. 
25 Ibid 206-07. 
26 This thesis refers only to ‘public international law’. 
27 The Peace of Westphalia (24 October 1648). 
28 Statute of the International Court of Justice 59 Stat 1055 (24 October 1945) Article 38. 
29 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III). 
30 Ibid Article 3. 
31 Ibid Article 5. 
32 Ibid Article 7. 
33 Ibid Article 10. 
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so instead decided it should stay silent on the issue.34 The right to life is a non-derogable 
right,35 although there are limited exceptions, including the death penalty.  
 
1.2.1 The United Nations and the Death Penalty 
The United Nations (‘UN’) was created in 1945 to achieve a number of objectives set out in 
the Charter of the United Nations (‘the Charter’).36 These include to ‘maintain international 
peace and security’,37 ‘develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the 
principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples’,38 and ‘achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian 
character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion’.39 Furthermore, the 
UN was intended to ‘be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of 
these common ends’.40 The UN has six organs: the General Assembly (‘UNGA’), the 
Economic and Social Council (‘ECOSOC’), the International Court of Justice (‘ICJ’), the UN 
Secretariat, the Trusteeship Council, and the Security Council.41  
UNGA is made up of all 193 UN member states and ‘is the main deliberative, policymaking 
and representative organ of the UN’.42 In 1993, UNGA created the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (‘OHCHR’),43 and the Human Rights Council (‘UNHRC’) was 
established in 2006, following the dissolution of the Commission on Human Rights (‘the 
Commission’).44 The UNHRC, through its mechanisms including the treaty bodies, special 
procedures, and UPR, can be used as vehicles to facilitate the abolition of capital punishment, 
particularly through the international death penalty framework. 
 
1.2.2 The International Death Penalty Framework 
Subsequent to the creation of the UDHR, an international death penalty framework began to 
take shape. This framework is now comprised of the International Covenant on Civil and 
                                                             
34 William A Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd edn, CUP 2002) 24. 
35 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Draft General Comment 36’ on ‘Article 6 Right to Life’ (2017) para 2 [hereinafter referred to as 
‘General Comment 36 2017’]. 
36 Charter of the United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS XVI. 
37 Ibid Article 1(1). 
38 Ibid Article 1(2). 
39 Ibid Article 1(3). 
40 Ibid Article 1(4). 
41 Ibid Article 3. 
42 Ibid Article 9, 10; United Nations, ‘Main Organs’ <www.un.org/en/sections/about-un/main-organs/index.html> accessed 24 
August 2018. 
43 UNGA Resolution 48/141 (20 December 1993). 
44 UNGA Resolution 60/251 (3 April 2006).  
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Political Rights (‘ICCPR’) and its Second Optional Protocol, the ECOSOC Safeguards 
Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty (‘Safeguards’) and 
the UN Secretary-General’s reports, and the UNGA Resolutions on a moratorium on the death 
penalty. The framework is regulated by the UN, in particular through the UNHRC and 
OHCHR.45 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
When the ICCPR was adopted in 1966, Article 6 provided for the right to life, but with the 
exception of capital punishment for the ‘most serious crimes’ in Article 6(2).46 The travaux 
préparatoires of the ICCPR show that it took from 1947 until 1966 for the drafting to be 
completed, and the right to life provision, with its death penalty exception, took up most of the 
drafters’ time.47 This was because the drafting states were at odds about whether to include 
the death penalty as an exception or not.48 Uruguay and Colombia wanted Article 6 to 
expressly prohibit the death penalty, but this was disregarded even by other abolitionist states, 
on the basis that it may discourage ratification of the ICCPR by retentionist states.49 Therefore, 
the right to life provision of the ICCPR was adopted with an exception for death sentences for 
the most serious crimes.50 Despite this, two provisions of the ICCPR expressly reference 
‘abolition’, with Article 6(6) noting that ‘[n]othing in this [A]rticle shall be invoked to delay or to 
prevent the abolition of capital punishment’.51 Article 6(2) also provides that the exception to 
the right to life for capital punishment for the ‘most serious crimes’ was only for ‘countries 
which have not abolished the death penalty’.52 
Other provisions of the ICCPR are important for capital punishment, including Article 14 which 
sets out the basics required for a trial to be ‘fair’. The ‘equality of arms’ is a principle referred 
to by the UN and the European Court of Human Rights (‘ECtHR’) in considering that both the 
prosecution and defence should be equal under the right to a fair trial.53 The equality of arms 
principle includes the rights under Article 14(3), such as the right to a public trial without undue 
delay, the right to counsel and to have adequate time to prepare a defence, the right to cross-
                                                             
45 OHCHR, ‘Death Penalty’ <www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/DeathPenalty/Pages/DPIndex.aspx> accessed 24 August 2018. 
46 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 
171 [hereinafter referred to as ‘ICCPR’]. 
47 Schabas (n 34) 46-47. 
48 See, ibid chapter 2. 
49 Ibid 64-5. 
50 ICCPR (n 46) Article 6(2). 
51 Ibid Article 6(6). 
52 Ibid Article 6(2). 
53 See, UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 32’ on ‘Article 14: Right to Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial (2007) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32; Khuseynov and Butaev v Tajikistan Communication No 1263-1264/2004 UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1263-
1264/2004 (2008); Schabas (n 34) 121. 
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examination, and the right to an interpreter where necessary.54 These rights provide vital 
protections for capital defendants. 
In 1989 the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, aiming at the abolition of the death penalty 
(‘Second Optional Protocol’), was enacted.55 There are currently eighty-five state parties to 
the Second Optional Protocol, with two signatories, and 110 countries have taken no action 
on it, including the US.56 All state parties to the Second Optional Protocol agree not to execute 
any person within its jurisdiction,57 and to take measures to abolish the death penalty.58 
ECOSOC Safeguards 
In 1984, ECOSOC adopted its Safeguards.59 They are considered to be the minimum standard 
for states retaining the death penalty, and the UN Secretary-General has noted that ‘[s]tates 
that have not ratified or acceded to the relevant treaties are nevertheless bound by 
international standards, notably those set out in the [S]afeguards’.60 Two further Resolutions 
were passed by ECOSOC in 1989 and 1996, strengthening the initial Safeguards and 
providing further minimum protections.61 
Every five years, the UN Secretary-General provides a report on ‘Capital punishment and 
implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the 
death penalty’ (‘quinquennial report’), drawing upon the UN member states’ administration of 
the death penalty and implementation of the Safeguards. The Secretary-General also provides 
a yearly supplement to the quinquennial report to the UNHRC, also referred to as the report 
on the question of the death penalty, which will focus on a specific aspect of the death penalty. 
For example, in 2017, the yearly supplement focused on equality and non-discrimination within 
capital punishment.62 
 
 
                                                             
54 ICCPR (n 46) Article 14. 
55 Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 15 December 1989, entered into 
force 11 July 1991) 1642 UNTS 414 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Second Optional Protocol’]. 
56 OHCHR, ‘Status of Ratification Interactive Dashboard’ <http://indicators.ohchr.org> accessed 24 August 2018. 
57 Second Optional Protocol (n 55) Article 1(1). 
58 Ibid Article 1(2). 
59 ECOSOC ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ ECOSOC Res 1984/50 (25 
May 1984) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1984’]. 
60 ECOSOC ‘Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing 
the Death Penalty Report of the Secretary-General’ UN Doc E/2015/49 para 61 (13 April 2015) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report 
of the Secretary-General 2015’]. 
61 ECOSOC ‘Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ 
ECOSOC Res 1989/64 (24 May 1989) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1989’]; ECOSOC ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing 
Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ ECOSOC Res 1996/15 (23 July 1996) [hereinafter referred to as 
‘Safeguards 1996’]. 
62 UNHRC, ‘Yearly Supplement of the Secretary-General to his Quinquennial Report on Capital Punishment’ (22 August 2017) 
UN Doc A/HRC/36/26. See, chapter 4.3 for an analysis of racial discrimination and the death penalty in the US within the UPR. 
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General Assembly Resolutions 
The UNGA periodically votes on Resolutions on a global moratorium on the death penalty. 
The sixth and most recent vote took place in December 2016 and saw 117 votes in favour, 
forty against, and thirty-one abstentions, showing a clear majority in favour of abolishing the 
death penalty worldwide.63 The US voted against the Resolution, on the basis that the abolition 
of the death penalty must be decided upon domestically by each member state.64 The US 
provided detailed remarks on why it had voted against the moratorium in 2016 but, following 
the Trump Administration’s election into office, access to these comments on the State 
Department website has been restricted from the public.65 
 
1.2.3 Other Sources of International Law 
Other international and regional agreements are also relevant to the US and the death penalty. 
These include the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, the American 
Convention on Human Rights, the European Convention on Human Rights, and the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
The American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man (‘American Declaration’) pre-dates 
the UDHR by seven months, as it was adopted in May 1948.66 Article 1 provides that ‘[e]very 
human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person’, and provides no 
exception for capital punishment.67  
The American Convention on Human Rights (‘ACHR’) came into force in 1969, and the US 
has signed but not ratified it. The ACHR also provides for the right to life in Article 4(1),68 
although there is an exception to the right to life of the death penalty for the most serious 
crimes in Article 4(2).69 Chapters VI and VII of the ACHR established the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights (‘IACHR’), which oversees the protection of human rights and 
adherence with the ACHR.70 This has included hearing petitions from those on death row in 
the US.71 
                                                             
63 UNGA Res 71/187 (19 December 2016). 
64 US Mission to the UN, ‘Explanation of Vote at the 71st UN General Assembly Third Committee on “Moratorium on the Use of 
the Death Penalty”’ (17 November 2016) <https://usun.state.gov/remarks/7632> accessed 24 August 2018. 
65 Ibid. 
66 American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, OAS Res XXX adopted by the Ninth International Conference of 
American States (1948) reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the InterAmerican System OEA/Ser L V/II.82 
Doc 6 Rev 1, 17 (1992). 
67 Ibid Article I. 
68 American Convention on Human Rights, OAS Treaty Series No. 36; 1144 UNTS 123; 9 ILM 99 (1969) Article 4(1). 
69 Ibid Article 4(2). 
70 Ibid Chapter VI and VII 
71 Francoise Hampson, Claudia Martin, & Frans Viljoen, ‘Inaccessible Apexes: Comparing Access to Regional Human Rights 
Courts and Commissions in Europe, the Americas, and Africa’ (2018) I Con, Vol. 16 No. 1, 161–186, 169. 
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The European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’) came into force in 1950, and Article 2 
provides for the right to life, with an exception for the death penalty.72 However, as society has 
progressed, and the Council of Europe (‘CoE’) has developed, amendments have been made 
to the ECHR, including to the exceptions to the right to life. Protocol 6 to the ECHR was passed 
in 1983, prohibiting the use of the death penalty for all state parties to the ECHR except in 
times of war.73 Furthermore, in 2002, reflecting the abolitionist views of the CoE membership, 
Protocol 13 to the ECHR was enacted, prohibiting the death penalty in all circumstances74 and 
prohibiting any derogation from this.75 
The African Charter on Human Rights and Peoples (‘African Charter’) came into force in 
1981.76 Article 4 provides that ‘[h]uman beings are inviolable. Every human being shall be 
entitled to respect for his life and the integrity of his person. No one may be arbitrarily deprived 
of this right’.77  
The landmark death penalty case of S v. Makwanyane in 1994, wherein South Africa abolished 
the death penalty, compared the South African Constitution to Article 4 ACHR, Article 2 ECHR, 
and Article 4 African Charter.78 This was on the basis that they all provided exceptions to the 
right to life from the death penalty, compared with the South African Constitution which did 
not.79 This was also an important decision as it marked the point where there were more 
abolitionist states than retentionist across the world. Furthermore, when Representative Henry 
B. Gonzalez called for an amendment to the US Constitution abolishing the death penalty in 
1995, he cited the decision in Makwanyane.80 
As evidenced by both international and regional laws, the global community is working towards 
worldwide abolition of the death penalty. Although the right to life has an exception in capital 
punishment, that exception is being relied upon less and less. Whilst the US does not always 
actively engage with these international and regional agreements, they create a corpus of 
case law and principles that inform legal reasoning in the context of the death penalty. 
 
                                                             
72 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as 
amended) (ECHR) Article 2. 
73 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as 
amended) (ECHR) Protocol 6 1983. 
74 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights, as 
amended) (ECHR) 2003, Article 1. 
75 Ibid Article 2. 
76 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (adopted 27 June 1981, entered into force 21 October 1986) (1982) 21 ILM 58 
(African Charter). 
77 Ibid Article 4. 
78 S v Makwanyane and Another (CCT3/94) (1995) ZACC 3 para 36. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Extension of Remarks, 141 Cong Rec E1386-87 (Daily edn 30 June 1995). 
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1.2.4 The Universal Periodic Review and the Death Penalty 
The UPR was created in 2006 by UNGA Resolution 60/251 to be a universal and 
intergovernmental peer review process intended to appraise every UN member states’ 
protection and promotion of human rights.81 Resolution 5/1 clarifies that the UPR is based 
upon the Charter, the UDHR, the human rights treaties to which the state is a party to, 
voluntary commitments and pledges, and international humanitarian law.82 In terms of the 
practicalities of the UPR, each state is to be reviewed in cycles; the first cycle took four years 
to complete, whereas the second cycle was extended to four and a half years.83 The third 
cycle is currently underway and is due to complete in 2020. In order for the UPR to function 
effectively, it encompasses many different stages and requires cooperation from a range of 
actors.  
The death penalty comes under the UPR’s remit as a human rights issue. The UPR can be 
used to further the global abolition agenda of the UN, by raising awareness of problems 
inherent within capital punishment in a transparent forum at the international level. Therefore, 
this thesis provides a qualitative review of the UPR’s effectiveness through an analysis of the 
2010 and 2015 US UPRs in the context of the abolition of the death penalty. From this, the 
author identifies recommendations to strengthen the UPR mechanism, both generally, and 
specifically for the facilitation of the abolition of capital punishment in the US. 
 
1.3 Current Gap in the Research 
The UPR is a relatively new human rights mechanism, as its first cycle only began in 2008. 
Although more research is being conducted on the UPR as the cycles progress, most are 
studies either on one UN state, one specific human rights issue, or one particular aspect of 
the UPR.84 Whilst this thesis does not have a dedicated literature review chapter, the literature 
is reviewed throughout. 
What a review of the literature found was that there is a specific gap in the academic discourse 
regarding an analysis of the effectiveness of the UPR in the context of the death penalty in the 
US. Therefore, in order to fill a lacuna in the scholarship and the policy approaches to the UN, 
this thesis has three specific aims. First, it intends to ensure the US is adhering to international 
law whilst it retains the death penalty, through the UPR. Second, it seeks to further the 
                                                             
81 UNGA Resolution 60/251 (3 April 2006). 
82 UNGA Resolution 5/1 (18 June 2007) para 1. 
83 UNHRC Resolution 16/21 (25 March 2011) para 3. 
84 See, e.g., James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan (eds) The Universal Periodic Review of Southeast Asia (Palgrave Macmillan 
2017); Frederick Cowell & Angelina Milon, ‘Decriminalisation of Sexual Orientation through the Universal Periodic Review’ (2012) 
Human Rights Law Review 12:2, 341-352; Gareth Sweeney & Yuri Saito, ‘An NGO Assessment of the New Mechanisms of the 
UN Human Rights Council’ (2009) Human Rights Law Review 9:2 203-223. 
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eventual abolition of the death penalty in the US. To do this, it aims to gather evidence to 
develop the argument that the death penalty in the US is arbitrarily applied and is therefore a 
violation of the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Third, it aims to improve the 
UPR mechanism through its suggested recommendations. 
 
1.4 Theoretical Framework 
In Gregg v. Georgia, the majority opinion identified the two purposes of capital punishment – 
retribution and deterrence.85 However, these theories do not align with the US’ retention of the 
death penalty, for example, studies have shown that the death penalty is not a deterrent to 
violent crime.86 Therefore, the theory of American exceptionalism is relied upon to explain why 
the US has not yet abolished the death penalty. 
This thesis explores the utility of the theory of American exceptionalism for the US’ retention 
of the death penalty. Although it discusses the differing interpretations of American 
exceptionalism and capital punishment in the US,87 this thesis challenges the reliance upon 
American exceptionalism as a reason for the continued retention of the death penalty. Instead, 
it seeks to further the eventual abolition of the death penalty in the US by using the UPR to 
gather evidence to develop the argument that capital punishment is arbitrarily applied and is 
therefore a violation of the Eighth Amendment and the ICCPR. This can further be achieved 
through Carol and Jordan Steikers’ blueprint for abolition.88 The blueprint for abolition of the 
death penalty in the US utilises the ‘proportionality doctrine’.89 This doctrine is two-fold, 
involving firstly, ‘objective evidence’ and, secondly, SCOTUS’ ‘own judgment’ on Eighth 
Amendment issues.90 
The US also takes an exceptionalist approach to international law, particularly international 
human rights. Although this thesis identifies the exceptionalist attitude to international human 
rights through the US’ engagement with the UPR, Part II argues that this mechanism can be 
used to challenge the US’ approach to international law, if the changes suggested in chapter 
seven are implemented. 
 
 
                                                             
85 Gregg (n 1) 183. 
86 See, Michael L Radelet & Traci L Lacock, ‘Do Executions Lower Homicide Rates?: The Views of Leading Criminologists’ (2009) 
99 J Crim L & Criminology 489. 
87 See, chapter 2.5. 
88 See, chapter 2.5.3 for a detailed analysis of the blueprint for abolition. 
89 Carol S Steiker & Jordan M Steiker, Courting Death: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment (HUP 2016) 271, 278. 
90 Ibid 282, 278. 
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1.5 Methodology 
The methodology utilised for this thesis was predominantly a qualitative, textual analysis of 
the 2010 and 2015 US UPR documents. All reviews are fully recorded on the UN webcast and 
all documents are freely available on the UPR website.91 In order to comprehensively collect 
the UPR data for this research, all of the documents from the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs were 
read, and all references to the death penalty were collated into a spreadsheet. This data was 
then analysed and the author identified three broad themes within the death penalty that were 
critical to the US UPRs: the right to a fair trial, intellectual disabilities and mental illness as a 
categorical exemption, and the implementation of a death sentence. These three death 
penalty themes were then researched, considering international law and domestic US law, 
and other secondary sources. This included, other UN documents, including from the treaty 
bodies, special procedures, ECOSOC, and UNGA. International case law, particularly from 
the ICJ, was also assessed, alongside other academic research, and both governmental and 
non-governmental publications.  
This created a basis for the UPR data collected to then be analysed in the context of these 
three death penalty themes. Through this analysis, it was considered how this data could be 
used to achieve the three key aims of this thesis (see section 1.3 above). This analysis showed 
both the strengths and weaknesses of the UPR, which then allowed recommendations to 
improve the UPR process to be formulated by the author. 
Furthermore, due to the nature of the thesis, and the documents relied upon, English and 
American-English spelling conventions are used interchangeably without note throughout. The 
content of this thesis is up to date as at 24th August 2018. 
 
1.6 Structure of Thesis 
This thesis is comprised of two parts. Part I considers the bilateral and multilateral international 
relations between the law and its institutions, in the context of the US and the abolition of the 
death penalty. In order to do this, chapter two considers the US’ complex relationship with 
international law, through its political and adjudicative systems, and the role American 
exceptionalism plays in the retention of the death penalty. Chapter three then introduces the 
UPR mechanism, including setting out how it works and the US’ engagement with it. 
An analysis of the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs on the question of the abolition of the death 
penalty is the focus of Part II. In order to do this, the death penalty is analysed under three 
                                                             
91 UNHRC, ‘Universal Periodic Review’ <www.ohchr.org/en/hrbodies/upr/pages/UPRMain.aspx> accessed 24 August 2018. 
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headings: the right to a fair trial, intellectual disabilities and mental illness, and the 
implementation of a death sentence. These three areas were identified by the author for two 
reasons: first, it tracks the evolution of the death penalty from trial to execution, and, second, 
these were themes that emerged from the analysis of the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs.  
Chapter four considers the right to a fair trial within the US death penalty and how the UPR 
approaches this. Under this heading, the right to counsel, racial discrimination, wrongful 
convictions, and foreign nationals’ rights are examined. Chapter five analyses the US UPRs 
through mental illness and the death penalty, both through the current categorical exemption 
for those suffering with intellectual disabilities, and the potential categorical exemption for 
those with all serious mental illnesses. Chapter six analyses the implementation of a death 
sentence within the US UPRs. To do this, it starts with the harsh conditions on death row, 
including the use of solitary confinement and the death row phenomenon. The second part of 
the chapter then considers the method of execution, including how US courts and international 
law has dealt with the botched lethal injection executions. 
From the analysis in chapters four, five, and six, chapter seven provides suggested 
recommendations as to how the UPR mechanism can be improved. These suggested 
improvements would increase the effectiveness of the UPR in facilitating the abolition of the 
death penalty in the US, and also benefit the mechanism generally, for the protection and 
promotion of human rights globally. The reforms argued for in this chapter fill a gap in the 
current research and policy approach to the UPR.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE UNITED STATES AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
 
2.1 The Status of International Law in the US 
The UPR mechanism is based upon international law. Therefore, before an analysis of the 
US’ engagement with the UPR on the death penalty can take place, the US’ relationship with 
international law must firstly be examined. The US has a thorny relationship with international 
law and, unlike other countries around the world, it can neither be neatly categorised as a 
‘monist’1 nor ‘dualist’2 state. The American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of the Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States (‘Restatement’) defines international law to include 
customary law, international agreements, and ‘general principles common to the major legal 
systems of the world’.3 A key source of international law engaged with in this thesis is 
‘international agreements’, often referred to as treaties, which are codified bilateral or 
multilateral agreements between states.4 
The US Constitution is the supreme law in the US and all State and federal laws must be 
compatible with it.5 The Supremacy Clause of Article VI, §2 of the Constitution provides that, 
‘all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the authority of the United States, shall be 
the supreme Law of the land’,6 and the Restatement clarified that this means international 
agreements have the same status as federal law and, as such, are the supreme law over State 
laws.7 Furthermore, the Restatement also noted that ‘[t]he view, once held, that treaties are 
not subject to constitutional restraints is now definitely rejected’.8 
Although, in the present day, the US is generally considered to have a problematic relationship 
with international law, in cases as early as The Paquete Habana in 1900, SCOTUS noted that 
‘[i]nternational law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts 
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly 
                                                             
1 J G Starke, ‘Monism and Dualism in the Theory of International Law’ (1936) 17 Brit YB Intl L 66. Within a monist system, both 
domestic and international law exist within the states’ single legal system. Whereas, in a dualist system, for international law to 
become part of a states’ law, domestic legislation is required. 
2 Ibid. 
3 In its interpretation of international law, the courts in the US and the US Department of State often look to the Restatement. 
‘International agreements’ can be termed in different ways such as treaty, convention, agreement, protocol, covenant, charter, 
statute, act, declaration, concordat, exchange of notes, agreed minute, memorandum or agreement, memorandum of 
understanding, and modus vivendi, see American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law (Third) Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States (American Law Institute Publishers 1987) §301 Comment (a) 149 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Restatement’]. 
4 For a detailed discussion of how treaties are made, see Malcolm N Shaw, International Law (7th edn, CUP 2014) chapter 16. 
5 Restatement (n 2) §111 Comment (a) 43 (Restatement); The United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2. 
6 The United States Constitution, Article VI, Clause 2. 
7 Restatement (n 2) §111(1). 
8 Ibid §302 Comment (b) 153. 
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presented for their determination’.9 However, in practice, US engagement with modern-day 
international law is more complex than the Framers could have envisaged, particularly due to 
the evolution of international law from its bilateral native to multilateral application and 
protection of individual rights. Further complexity is added by the federal system in the US, 
with the federal government retaining some powers,10 and the individual State governments 
retaining others,11 and the extent to which international law can bind the US States as well as 
the federal government is often disagreed upon. 
The US’ engagement with international law can broadly be broken down into two categories: 
the political framework and the adjudicative framework. Part 2.3 of this chapter considers the 
political framework in the US regarding international law, through an analysis of the US’ 
accession to the ICCPR. This includes an evaluation of the Senate’s role in treaty making, the 
complexities of reservations, understandings, and declarations, and self-executing and non-
self-executing treaties. Furthermore, once the US has ratified the treaty, it is then for the courts 
to interpret the international agreement, which can cause conflict between State and federal 
jurisdictions. Part 2.4 considers the adjudicative framework, analysing the different 
approaches to international law and the practices of foreign nations by different SCOTUS 
Justices when interpreting the US Constitution. Part 2.5 of the chapter engages with the theory 
of American exceptionalism, with a consideration of how the death penalty may be abolished 
in the US. 
 
2.2 Key Legal Principles: Comity and Finality 
The principles of comity and finality must be established to form the basis of the arguments in 
this thesis. This is because the UPR mechanism itself is an exercise in international comity 
through the solidification of human rights, and the death penalty is an issue that raises comity 
interests on both the international stage and the domestic US level. Furthermore, whilst 
domestic law seeks to achieve finality in the US, international law seeks to move away from it 
in terms of the abolition of capital punishment. This section of the chapter will consider these 
principles in the context of the US’ relationship with international human rights and the death 
penalty. 
 
 
                                                             
9 The Paquete Habana 175 US 677, 700 (1900). 
10 The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 
11 The United States Constitution Amendment X. 
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2.2.1 Comity 
The principle of comity originated in international law, and is used ‘for maintaining 
intergovernmental relationships in a reciprocal procedural recognition of national legislation, 
judicial decisions, and other interests represented within bilateral and multilateral 
communications’.12 In practice, comity within the US federal structure is multifaceted and its 
importance has long been recognised by SCOTUS.13 This thesis considers the role of comity 
and international law within the US capital judicial system and, as such, three strands can be 
identified: first, comity in international law, second, comity in domestic US law, and, third, 
comity in the US death penalty. 
Comity in International Law 
Comity within international law describes the states’ bilateral and multilateral relationships, 
such as through treaties and judgments of international courts, including the ICJ. In the context 
of this thesis, there are two parts to this: first, the US’ relationship with international law, and, 
second, international law ensuring that the US provides protections at the domestic level. 
An example of the US’ comity relationship with international law can be seen though the US 
entering into an international agreement, such as the ICCPR discussed in section 2.3. On one 
hand, the US is limiting its sovereignty by consenting to adhere to the principles in the 
agreement, but it is also exercising its sovereignty by being protected by the provisions of the 
treaty.  
Essentially, ‘international comity allows the [US] to decide for itself how much recognition or 
restraint to give in deference to foreign government actors’.14 This is evidenced by the US’ 
comity engagement with the UN. On one hand, the US engages in international comity on the 
international level each time it ratifies a treaty, cooperates with the special procedures, and 
takes part in the UPR. However, through its engagement with these mechanisms, the US 
avoids various death penalty issues. For example, it places reservations against treaties, as 
demonstrated in section 2.3 below, and notes UPR recommendations, as analysed in Part II 
of this thesis. 
International comity also sees individuals having access to meaningful review throughout 
capital proceedings due to international law. This is provided for by the protections in Article 
14(3) ICCPR,15 which provide for the minimum guarantees to be afforded to anyone facing a 
                                                             
12 Jon Yorke, ‘Comity, Finality, and Oklahoma’s Lethal Injection Protocol’ (2017) 69 Okla L Rev 545, 553. 
13 See, e.g., Hilton v Guyot 159 US 113 (1895). 
14 William S Dodge, ‘International Comity in American Law’ (2015) 115 Colum L Rev 2071, 2077. 
15 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 
171 Article 14 [hereinafter referred to as ICCPR]. 
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criminal charge, and the 1984 Safeguards four, five, and six, regarding the protections 
specifically for those facing a death sentence.16 These protections are engaged with in chapter 
four. 
Comity in Domestic US Law 
As the US has a federal system of government, with power being shared between the federal 
and State governments, domestic comity takes place within the US, through the reciprocal 
relationship between the federal government and the US States. This has also been 
recognised by SCOTUS.17 Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution sets out the enumerated 
powers of Congress to make certain laws.18 All other powers that are not granted to Congress, 
or prohibited by the Constitution, are given to the States by way of the 10th Amendment to the 
Constitution.19 These powers granted to the States include criminal justice issues, including a 
choice over which punishments to inflict. Whilst the US States generally retain the power to 
legislate over its criminal justice system, there is still a comity relationship between the States 
and federal government, in that SCOTUS, and other federal courts, can rule upon the 
constitutionality of State punishments, including the death penalty. 
Comity in the US Death Penalty 
William S. Dodge has argued that it is a ‘myth of international comity…that the executive 
branch enjoys a comparative advantage in making comity determinations’.20 In fact, both 
federal and State courts also engage in international comity and SCOTUS has done so in key 
capital decisions.21 Section 2.4 below engages with the different interpretations of international 
law by SCOTUS justices in death penalty cases. 
Furthermore, US State courts, in their role as laboratories of democracy,22 also engage in 
international comity. This is referred to as ‘adjudicative comity’,23 which is essentially 
‘deference to foreign courts’ by US courts.24 Adjudicative comity has been seen in practice in 
the death penalty context, for example, through the decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal 
                                                             
16 ECOSOC ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ ECOSOC Res 1984/50 (25 
May 1984) Nos 4-6 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1984’]. 
17 See, eg, Austin v New Hampshire 420 US 656, 660, 666 (1975); Allen v McCurry 449 US 90, 96 (1980); Marrese v American 
Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons 470 US 373, 380 (1985). 
18 The United States Constitution, Article I, Section 8. 
19 The United States Constitution Amendment X. 
20 Dodge (n 15) 2132. 
21 See, e.g., Atkins v Virginia 536 US 304, FN21 (2002); Roper v Simmons 543 US 551, 575-78 (2005). 
22 See, New State Ice Co v Liebmann 285 US 262, 311 (1932). 
23 Dodge (n 15) 2105. 
24 Ibid. 
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Appeals in Torres v. Oklahoma,25 and the Supreme Court of Nevada in Gutierrez v. Nevada,26 
as analysed in chapter 4.5.2.2. 
However, comity within the death penalty has been limited by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act (‘AEDPA’).27 AEDPA was, in part, created to limit the procedural and 
substantive postconviction avenues for capital appellants to speed up the capital process in 
order to achieve finality.28 This has caused friction with comity, in that the review of State and 
federal decisions, and, indeed, the review of international decisions, is not being carried out 
correctly and constitutionally, which in turn causes a ‘false finality’.29 
 
2.2.2 Finality 
The modern understanding of finality and its importance in criminal litigation is derived from 
Paul M. Bator’s taxonomy.30 He detailed four reasons why finality is necessary. First, the need 
to conserve resources within the legal system by not relitigating the same issue.31 Second, 
revisiting the same issue would negatively affect the judiciary.32 Third, Bator argued that ‘[a] 
procedural system which permits endless repetition of inquiry into facts and law’ would oppose 
the deterrent and rehabilitative aims of criminal law.33 Fourth, if there is no finality to a case, it 
would have a negative psychological effect upon those involved in it.34 
International law’s exception of capital punishment to the right to life in Article 6(2) ICCPR 
allows for finality through an execution in domestic law. However, in general, international law 
seeks to move away from this finality through the abolition of the death penalty. Finality 
interests are prevalent throughout a capital case, beginning with an arrest with the possibility 
of a capital charge, and continuing throughout proceedings, until finality is achieved through 
either execution or release from death row.35 Three main strands of finality can be identified 
within the US capital judicial system: first, finality and capital crimes, second, finality of process 
in the death penalty, and, third, finality and methods of execution. These three strands are 
briefly explained below. This section does not provide a detailed analysis on the particular 
issues raised regarding the death penalty, as this analysis is carried out in Part II of the thesis. 
                                                             
25 Torres v State 120 P 3d 1184, 1186 (Okla 2005). 
26 Gutierrez v Nevada No 53506 2012 WL 4355518 (2012). 
27 The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 1996, 28 USC § 2244. 
28 Ibid. See Lee Kovarsky, ‘AEDPA’s Wrecks: Comity, Finality, and Federalism’ (2007) 82 Tul L Rev 443, 447. 
29 See, Yorke (n 13) 565. 
30 Paul M Bator, ‘Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners’ (1963) 76 Harv L Rev 441. 
31 Ibid 451. 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid 451-52. 
34 Ibid 452-53. 
35 See, Yorke (n 13) 565. 
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Finality and Capital Crimes 
Finality begins within the capital system when a person is arrested, charged, and sentenced 
to death. To legitimately achieve this finality, international and domestic standards must be 
followed. For example, Article 6(2) ICCPR states that a ‘sentence of death must be imposed 
only for the most serious crimes’.36 Moreover, SCOTUS has maintained that since its decision 
in Gregg v. Georgia, the Court’s ‘jurisprudence has consistently confined the imposition of the 
death penalty to a narrow category of the most serious crimes’37 and that ‘the death penalty 
must be reserved for the “worst of the worst”’.38  
Finality of Process in the Death Penalty 
There are also finality interests within the process to produce a death sentence. Once the 
process, i.e. the trial, has been carried out, either a conviction or acquittal will be rendered. If 
convicted, a life without the possibility of parole or death sentence will be handed down. This 
is regulated by both international and domestic laws and, to legitimately achieve finality, these 
laws must be adhered to. Article 14 ICCPR guarantees the right to a fair trial39 and the 
Safeguards detail the minimum protections for those sentenced to death.40 Furthermore, the 
US Constitution provides its own safeguards in capital cases. The Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments require due process of law, the Sixth Amendment requires competent counsel 
in all cases including capital cases, and the Eighth Amendment prohibits cruel and unusual 
punishment.41 Chapter four analyses the right to a fair trial in capital cases, within the context 
of the UPR. 
Finality and Methods of Execution 
Finality is achieved by either an execution or the release from death row, and there are also 
finality interests in the time spent on death row and the method of execution used. Article 7 
ICCPR prohibits the infliction of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment, which encompasses 
conditions on death row and the method of execution.42 The Human Rights Committee (‘the 
Committee’) – the treaty body created to monitor compliance with the ICCPR – has stated 
that, when considering a method of execution, the US ‘must take into account the prohibition 
against causing avoidable pain and recommends the State party to take all necessary steps 
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to ensure respect of [A]rticle 7 of the Covenant’.43 Furthermore, problems with a method of 
execution also pertain to an Eighth Amendment challenge under the cruel and unusual 
punishment clause.44 These issues are considered further in chapter six. 
Lee Kovarsky noted that ‘[s]ocial acceptance of final judgment reflects the confidence in the 
institutions and procedures that produce it. Finality therefore matures as an interest only upon 
completion of some reliable quantum process’.45 Therefore, if the system is flawed, as Part II 
of this thesis seeks to show the capital system in the US is, then the finality interests identified 
above cannot legitimately be achieved in death penalty cases. 
 
~ 
 
The next section of this chapter considers the political framework within the US regarding 
international law. In order to do this, it considers the political framework through the lens of 
the US accession to the ICCPR.  
 
2.3 The Political Framework in the US: The International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
At the international level, once a multilateral treaty has been negotiated and agreed upon 
between states, state parties will then decide whether to become a signatory, and then 
whether it will ratify or accede to each individual treaty. The state has a sovereign right to ratify 
a treaty or not; a state can take no action on a treaty, or become a signatory only, or fully ratify 
it. However, once a state becomes a party to a treaty, the pacta sunt servanda principle 
applies, meaning that treaties are binding and states must perform them in good faith, a 
principle which the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘VCLT’) enumerated.46 The 
VCLT governs the general law of treaties, although the US is a signatory only to it. 
An example of the US’ inconsistent approach to international law, particularly concerning 
human rights, can be seen through the political process the federal government must go 
through in order to ratify a treaty. A key example of this in the context of the death penalty is 
the US’ treatment of the seminal human rights agreement, the ICCPR.  
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The ICCPR, with its two Optional Protocols, forms one third of the ‘International Bill of Rights’ 
alongside the UDHR, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. 
The ICCPR’s intention is to codify every human beings’ civil and political rights. It entered into 
force internationally on 23 March 1976, although it had been open for signatories since 1966.47 
According to the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution, once a treaty has been proposed, 
it will be passed to the Senate for its advice and consent before the President can ratify it.48 
However, whilst Democratic President Carter had signed the ICCPR on 5 October 1977, and 
passed it to the Senate to consider, the Senate did not provide its approval on the treaty until 
Republican President H.W. Bush’s request in 1991.49 ‘Domestic and international events at 
the end of 1979, including the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the hostage crisis in Iran’50 
are cited as the reasoning for why the Senate did not make a decision on the ratification of the 
ICCPR following President Carter’s passing of the treaty to the Senate. It is also noted that 
‘[t]he Reagan Administration did not indicate any interest in ratifying the Covenant’.51 
Following President Bush’s request, the ICCPR was submitted to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee (‘SFRC’) - a sub-committee of the Senate, specifically mandated to 
consider, debate, and provide recommendations to the Senate on treaties.52 A treaty will not 
be ratified without consideration and approval by the SFRC, granting the SFRC and the 
Senate a great deal of power regarding international law. When submitting the ICCPR to the 
SFRC for consideration, the Bush Administration also proposed a list of conditions to be 
attached to the ICCPR upon US accession.53 These ‘conditions’ are more commonly known 
as reservations, understandings, and declarations (‘RUDs’). 
 
2.3.1 Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations 
In proposing the list of RUDs to be attached, the Bush Administration’s intention was to accede 
to the ICCPR whilst ensuring it would have little effect in the US. In fact, ‘Bush assured the 
Senate that ratification would require no change in [US] practice’.54 What President Bush 
proposed were five reservations, and a further eight understandings and declarations to be 
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lodged against the ICCPR.55 The SFRC considered the RUDs proposed by the Bush 
Administration and held a public hearing on 21 November 1991.56 Subsequently, the requisite 
two-thirds majority of the Senate recommended these RUDs be attached to the ICCPR. 
Thereafter, the process was finalised by President Bush signing the instrument of ratification 
on 1 June 1992 and placing it in the requisite depository of the UN Secretary-General on 8 
June 1992. This concluded the final steps required domestically, and the ICCPR with the 
fourteen RUDs attached came into force in the US on 8 September 1992.57  
According to the VCLT, a ‘reservation’ is defined as ‘a unilateral statement…made by a 
state…whereby it purports to exclude or to modify the legal effect of certain provisions of the 
treaty in their application to that [s]tate’, and it can be lodged at any time between signature 
and ratification.58 States have the sovereign right to place reservations against a treaty, 
although there is an exception to this in Article 19(c) VCLT, which provides that the reservation 
must not be ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty’.59 The US has been 
criticised by UN member states and scholars alike for its reservations lodged against Articles 
6 and 7, on the basis that these provisions are non-derogable and are therefore incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the ICCPR.60 In fact, these reservations are described by 
William A. Schabas as ‘far and away the most extensive reservations to the capital punishment 
provisions of any international human rights treaty’.61  
Attaching reservations to human rights treaties, such as the ICCPR, is an example of 
American exceptionalism to international law, as the US will sign treaties but then ‘exempt 
itself from their provisions’ through such reservations.62 American exceptionalism is examined 
further in section 2.5. 
The Reservation Against Article 6 ICCPR 
Article 6 ICCPR provides that ‘every human being has the inherent right to life’,63 whilst also 
stating that there is an exception to this right to life for capital punishment.64 Article 6 then sets 
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out minimum standards for those states still administering the death penalty – including that 
the death penalty must only be administered for the ‘most serious crimes’65 and that those 
who committed a crime whilst under the age of eighteen and pregnant mothers should not be 
executed.66 
The reservation lodged by the US against Article 6 is as follows:  
The United States reserves the right, subject to its Constitutional constraints, to impose 
capital punishment on any person (other than a pregnant woman) duly convicted under 
existing or future laws permitting the imposition of capital punishment, including such 
punishment for crimes committed by persons below eighteen years of age.67 
John Quigley has argued that this reservation ‘clearly signifie[d] an effort on the part of the 
[US] to protect and perpetuate current practice rather than to conform to the [ICCPR]’.68 
Although it was promulgated that the reservation was lodged purely due to the differing 
opinions on executing juveniles, Schabas argues that ‘the reservation extends far beyond the 
question of juvenile executions and seeks to exclude the [US] from virtually all international 
norms concerning the death penalty’.69 The SFRC’s Report on the ICCPR confirmed this, as 
it noted that the reservation was lodged due to ‘the sharply differing view taken by many of 
our future treaty parties on the issue of the death penalty (including what constitutes “most 
serious crimes” under Article 6(2))’.70 A US State Department representative further 
substantiated this in 2006, when they were questioned by the Committee following the 2005 
decision in Roper v. Simmons, wherein SCOTUS ruled that juvenile executions are 
unconstitutional.71 The Committee asked the State Department representative whether the 
reservation against Article 6 could now be removed, given the decision in Roper. However, 
the representative confirmed that the reservation would not be withdrawn, in part due to the 
fact that its reservation to Article 6 involved more than the juvenile death penalty.72 
In fact, if the reservation against Article 6 was removed, the US would be in breach of Article 
6(2) which states that a ‘sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes’.73 
The ICCPR does not provide a definition of ‘most serious crimes’, but in its General Comment 
36, the Committee asserted that ‘[t]he term “the most serious crimes” must be read restrictively 
                                                             
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid Article 6(5). 
67 Senate Committee Report (n 50) 11. 
68 John Quigley, ‘Criminal Law and Human Rights: Implications of the United States Ratification of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights’ (1993) 6 Harv Hum Rts J 59, 74. 
69 Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (n 61) 80. 
70 Senate Committee Report (n 50) 11. 
71 Roper (n 22). 
72 Robert Harris, Assistant Legal Advisor, ‘US Delegation Response to Oral Questions from the Members of the Committee’ (18 
July 2006). 
73 ICCPR (n 16) Article 6(2). 
 
36 
 
and appertain only to crimes of extreme gravity, involving intentional killing’.74 However, the 
US continues to execute those who have not actually committed murder. A recent example 
being Kelly Gissendaner, who was executed in Georgia in September 2015 for malice murder 
of her husband, despite her not carrying out the murder herself and not being present when 
the murder took place.75 The Committee further noted in its General Comment 36 that ‘a limited 
degree of involvement or of complicity in the commission of even the most serious crimes, 
such as providing the physical means for the commission of murder, cannot justify the 
imposition of the death penalty’.76 Therefore, the US would be in breach of Article 6(2) if it 
removed the reservation. 
The Reservation Against Article 7 ICCPR 
The US also lodged the first and only reservation against Article 7 of the ICCPR.77 Article 7 
provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment’,78 which is similar to the protection afforded by the Eighth Amendment of the 
US Constitution which prohibits ‘cruel and unusual punishment’.79 Article 7 also codified the 
jus cogens norm prohibiting torture or cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment.80 As shown in 
Part II of this thesis, Article 7 covers a number of issues relating to capital punishment that the 
Eighth Amendment does not, such as the harsh conditions on US death rows, the ‘death row 
phenomenon’, and certain methods of execution.81 
The reservation lodged by the US against Article 7 is as follows:  
The United States considers itself bound by Article 7 to the extent that ‘cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment’ means the cruel and unusual treatment or 
punishment prohibited by the Fifth, Eighth and/or Fourteenth Amendments to the 
Constitution of the United States.82 
The SFRC stated that this reservation was lodged due to the fact ‘the Bill of Rights already 
contains substantively equivalent protections’.83 However, the SFRC also admitted that it 
attached this reservation ‘because the Human Rights Committee like the European Court of 
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Human Rights had adopted the view that prolonged judicial proceedings in cases involving 
capital punishment could in certain circumstances constitute such treatment’ that is contrary 
to Article 7.84 In fact, the reservation was a direct response to the case of Soering v. United 
Kingdom, wherein the ECtHR found that if Soering was deported to Virginia, the length of time 
spent on death row in harsh conditions would lead to the death row phenomenon, constituting 
a violation of Article 3 ECHR’s protection against inhuman and degrading treatment.85 
Furthermore, comparisons were drawn between Article 7 ICCPR and Article 3 ECHR 
regarding the ‘death row phenomenon’,86 which is examined further in chapter 6.3.1.  
The SFRC concluded that, under Article 7, the US could be in contravention of international 
law by continuing to administer the death penalty as currently practiced, and as such lodged 
the reservation against it.87 The SFRC thereafter attempted to justify this reservation by 
assuring the international community that the US would adhere to its own version of cruel and 
unusual punishment. However, not only are the protections afforded by the Eighth Amendment 
not as broad as those under Article 7, Article 27 VCLT provides that domestic law cannot be 
used to justify non-performance of a treaty, yet this is exactly what the US has done through 
its reservation to Article 7.88 This is another example of American exceptionalism, with the US 
clearly relying on its current laws and practices to isolate itself from international human rights, 
prima facie blocking the abolition of the death penalty.89  
Are the Reservations to Articles 6 and 7 Against the ‘Object and Purpose’ of the ICCPR? 
Articles 6 and 7 protect non-derogable rights, and Article 7 protects a jus cogens norm. It can 
therefore be questioned whether the reservations the US lodged against them are valid, on 
the grounds that they undermine the object and purpose of the ICCPR. The Restatement 
agrees that a reservation must not be ‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
agreement’,90 but says that this brings with it ‘uncertainty and possible disagreement’ and 
therefore ‘the standard is intended to be an objective one’.91  
M. Cherif Bassiouni stated that the lodging of the reservations constitutes a de facto rewriting 
of the treaty.92 If this reasoning is followed, it can be concluded that the US is currently 
adhering to an alternate version of the ICCPR. This is consistent with Schabas’ view that these 
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reservations call into question whether the US is in practice a party to the ICCPR at all.93 
Schabas argued that either, the invalid reservations lodged by the US ‘can be severed or 
separated from the [US] accession to the treaty’ meaning that the US is actually bound by the 
entirety of the ICCPR, or ‘if the invalid reservations cannot be separated from [US] accession, 
then the [US] is not a party to [the ICCPR]’.94 As Schabas further argued, ‘[i]t is not plausible 
to conclude that the [US] should remain bound by the [ICCPR], with the exception of the death 
penalty provisions’,95 nor is it plausible for the US to be adhering to a different version of the 
ICCPR than the other state parties. 
Although the IACHR and the Committee have both found that reservations lodged against 
non-derogable treaty provisions will not automatically be invalid,96 the Committee concluded 
that the US’ reservations against Article 6(5) and Article 7 are invalid due to them being 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the ICCPR.97 Furthermore, the reservation against 
the prohibition of executing minors prompted eleven objections from other state parties to the 
ICCPR on the basis that such a reservation went against the object and purpose of the treaty.98 
Schabas has asserted that the US should have known that the reservations would be invalid 
as they were lodged against non-derogable provisions of the ICCPR,99 in that they are ‘rights 
so fundamental and so essential that they brook no exception, even in emergency 
situations’.100 As such, Schabas has concluded the reservations can be severed from the US’ 
accession to the ICCPR, meaning that the US is a party to the treaty, including Articles 6 and 
7.101 This was also the position of the Committee in its General Comment 24/52 in 1994, 
wherein the Committee stated that ‘[t]he normal consequence of an unacceptable reservation 
is not that the Covenant will not be in effect at all for a reserving party. Rather, such a 
reservation will generally be severable, in the sense that the Covenant will be operative for 
the reserving party without benefit of the reservation’.102 In support of this viewpoint, Schabas 
cited the ECtHR rulings in Belilos v. Switzerland and Loizidou v. Turkey wherein the court 
found the reservations lodged by Switzerland and Turkey against the ECHR were invalid and, 
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importantly, that the invalid reservations were severable, meaning that the states were bound 
by the whole of the ECHR.103 Schabas further noted that the US has shown its intention to be 
bound by the ICCPR in its entirety through its engagement with the drafting of the ACHR. 
Although the US is a signatory only to the ACHR, it includes very similar provisions to the 
ICCPR and, aside from questions about the juvenile death penalty, the US delegate engaged 
in the ACHR negotiations and did not raise any objections regarding the death penalty 
provisions.104  
However, Curtis Bradley and Jack Goldsmith disagree that the US reservations contradict the 
‘object and purpose’ of the ICCPR, relying on the fact that ‘approximately one-third of the 
parties to the ICCPR made reservations to over a dozen substantive provisions’.105 Bradley 
and Goldsmith further argue that ‘there is no basis in international law’ for the conclusion that 
the US’ reservations are severable from the ICCPR due to their invalidity, relying upon the 
principle that ‘in treaty relations a state cannot be bound without its consent’.106 They conclude 
by saying that either the reservations are valid or the US is not a party to the ICCPR, but that 
they cannot be bound by the Articles they have placed reservations against.107 Although it is 
correct that states have the sovereign right to choose whether to ratify and be bound by a 
treaty and to lodge RUDs, Bradley and Goldsmith’s argument fails to consider the non-
derogable nature of the provisions. Furthermore, the US is the only party with reservations 
lodged against Articles 6 and 7, which refutes their argument that one-third of states have 
lodged reservations against the ICCPR. The issue is not that the US has lodged reservations 
generally, but that these two particular reservations are lodged against non-derogable 
provisions, which go against the object and purpose of the ICCPR. 
Therefore, this thesis agrees with Schabas’ argument that the reservations are invalid and 
severable, and the US is bound by the ICCPR in its entirety. This conclusion, that the US is a 
party to the treaty in its entirety, also means that the US is in breach of the ICCPR Articles 6 
and 7, as demonstrated in Part II of this thesis. 
The Helms Proviso 
Alongside the RUDs, a further proviso was recommended by the SFRC. Nicknamed the 
‘Helms Proviso’, after its creator Senator Jesse Helms, it states that:  
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Nothing in this Covenant requires or authorizes legislation, or other action, by the United 
States of America prohibited by the Constitution of the United States as interpreted by 
the United States.108  
The SFRC also ‘suggested that [POTUS] not communicate the proviso to the [UN] Secretary 
General when he deposited the instrument of ratification’ on the basis that this was a matter 
regarding the US Constitution, which is a domestic issue and therefore not of international 
importance.109 President Bush adhered to this recommendation from the Senate and did not 
inform the UN of the added proviso.110  
The Helms proviso ‘appears to exempt the [US] from the obligation to protect a right more 
broadly than it is protected by the [US] Constitution’.111 This conflicts with the Committee’s 
recommendation that despite the US attaching a declaration stating that the ICCPR would be 
a non-self-executing treaty, the US should ‘ensure that effective remedies are available for 
violations of the Covenant, including those that do not, at the same time, constitute violations 
of the domestic law of the [US]’.112 The SFRC contradicts this, noting that whilst ‘[t]he 
overwhelming majority of the provisions in the Covenant are compatible with existing [US] 
domestic law’, if international law does not adhere to the Constitution it will not prevail.113 The 
Helms Proviso also violates Article 31 VCLT that ‘[a] treaty shall be interpreted in good faith’.114 
Bassiouni asserted that ‘[t]his open-ended approach to treaties is incompatible with 
international law, much as it is incompatible with common sense and good judgment’.115 This 
is also an example of the complex comity relationship the federal government has with 
international law, as noted in section 2.2.1 above. 
 
2.3.2 Self-Executing vs. Non-Self-Executing Treaties 
Equally as important (and controversial) in defining the relationship between the US and 
international law is the declaration lodged by the US that Articles 1 to 27 of the ICCPR are 
non-self-executing.116 The concept of self-executing treaties originated in the US itself,117 but 
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has since been adopted by the global community and developed into an established 
component of international law.118 In the context of treaties such as the ICCPR, if the treaty is 
considered to be self-executing, once it has been ratified, it will automatically become law in 
the ratifying state. If the treaty is considered to be non-self-executing, as the US declared the 
ICCPR to be, then it will not become law in the ratifying state until domestic legislation has 
been passed to implement it. 
The SFRC explained in its report that ‘the intent [of the Declaration was] to clarify that the 
Covenant will not create a private cause of action in the [US] courts’ and this was because the 
SFRC believed that ‘[US] law generally complies with the [ICCPR]; hence, implementing 
legislation is not contemplated’.119 However, this declaration has caused much confusion and 
differing interpretation in the US; so much so that the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
declared that ‘[t]he self-execution question is perhaps one of the most confounding in treaty 
law’.120  
Despite the SFRC stating clearly that the intent of the declaration is to prevent a private cause 
of action, courts and scholars alike have been unable to agree upon what this means in 
practice. Some scholars, such as Carlos Vasquez and Kristen Carpenter, take the view of the 
SFRC – that it will simply not allow a private cause of action unless there is domestic legislation 
giving the ICCPR authority.121 Vasquez also added that, ‘even without a “private cause of 
action”, private individuals may enforce such treaties defensively if they are being sued or 
prosecuted under statutes that are inconsistent with treaty provisions’.122 
Some courts have also utilised the SFRC’s definition of non-self-executing. For example, in 
an unreported case in the District of Colorado, the court substantiated its ruling that the non-
self-executing declaration provides for no private right of action by citing ‘[d]ozens of courts’ 
that have agreed with this point.123 However, the Southern District Court of Florida interpreted 
the non-self-executing declaration more narrowly, by stating that ‘[a]s a non-self-
executing treaty, the ICCPR is not judicially enforceable, and therefore, does not provide [the 
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defendant] with a defense’.124 According to Vasquez’s argument above, this ruling is incorrect 
and in violation of international law, as the ICCPR can be used as a defence, even without a 
private cause of action.125  
In stark comparison to the narrow holding in Florida, First Circuit Judge Lipez, in his concurring 
opinion in Igartúa v. US,126 found that ‘[t]he Senate’s declaration that the ICCPR is non-self-
executing is ultra vires with respect to the ratification process and as such that declaration is 
not binding on the courts’.127 Quigley agreed with the First Circuit’s view that the Senate was 
acting ultra vires.128 In support of his argument Quigley noted that US courts often hold treaty 
provisions to be self-executing, and so there would be no reason why the US could not do so 
in the case of the ICCPR, as Judge Lipez did in Igartúa.129 However, Carpenter contended 
that the treaties Quigley considered in coming to this conclusion did not have express non-
self-executing declarations lodged against them as the ICCPR does.130 Moreover, the 
Restatement provides that ‘[c]ourts in the [US] are bound to give effect to international law and 
to international agreements of the [US], except that a “non-self-executing” agreement will not 
be given effect as law in the absence of necessary implementation’,131 and there is currently 
no domestic legislation in place giving the ICCPR effect in the US. Whilst Quigley has made 
a valid argument, case law shows that Igartúa was an exception to the rule and the courts 
generally follow the view of the Restatement, meaning that appeals on these grounds are very 
unlikely to succeed. 
SCOTUS’ most recent view on the definition of self-executing was provided in Medellín v. 
Texas.132 In a narrow interpretation of the notion of non-self-executing treaties, the majority 
opinion of the Court, delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, stated in a footnote: 
Even when treaties are self-executing in the sense that they create federal law, the 
background presumption is that “[i]nternational agreements, even those directly 
benefiting private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private 
cause of action in domestic courts”.133  
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This was in response to the fact that the VCCR, the underlying treaty in this case, was 
‘understood at all times to be a self-executing treaty’.134 
These cases signify a widely inconsistent approach being taken by courts across the US 
regarding what the non-self-executing declaration means in practice. Such difference in 
interpretation was raised by the Committee when it provided its comments on the initial US 
report in 1995. The Committee found that ‘members of the judiciary at the federal, [S]tate and 
local levels have not been made fully aware of the obligations undertaken by the [s]tate party 
under the Covenant’.135 As identified above, this is an ongoing issue as courts are essentially 
left to their own devices to interpret the declaration, leading to judicial fragmentation across 
the US. 
Notwithstanding the differing interpretations by State and federal courts alike, it appears that 
the intention of the SFRC was clear – the ICCPR should not create a ‘private cause of action’ 
in the US. This is further evidenced by the US in its initial report to the Committee stating that 
the non-self-executing declaration will not prevent US courts ‘from seeking guidance from the 
[ICCPR] in interpreting [US] law’.136 
However, case law shows that appeals relying on the ICCPR from death row inmates will be 
unsuccessful. For example, in Buell v. Mitchell, the Sixth Circuit heard an appeal from an Ohio 
state inmate who had been sentenced to death in 1984 for the murder and sexual assault of 
an 11-year-old girl.137 Amongst his grounds for appeal was an international element; Buell 
argued that ‘Ohio's death penalty statute violate[d] the Supremacy Clause’ as it did not comply 
with the ICCPR.138 The Sixth Circuit held that his international law argument was ‘wholly 
meritless’,139 as the ICCPR does not call for abolition of the death penalty and, in fact, Article 
6(2) acknowledges the existence of the death penalty.140 Whilst this is correct, the court failed 
to add that Article 6(6) states that ‘[n]othing in this article shall be invoked to delay or to prevent 
the abolition of capital punishment by any [s]tate [p]arty to the present Covenant’.141 
Furthermore, as Schabas asserted, the travaux préparatoires of the ICCPR ‘indicate that the 
general purpose of [A]rticle 6…is the limitation of the death penalty, with a view to its eventual 
abolition’.142 The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning for dismissing Buell’s claim appeared to be in direct 
conflict with Article 6(6); the court was using reference to the death penalty in Article 6(2) to 
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continue administration of the death penalty. The previous Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, 
summary and arbitrary executions, Christof Heynes, clarified this point in 2015 by stating that, 
‘[t]he fact the death penalty may have a foothold in [A]rticle 6(2), dealing with the right to life, 
may thus not serve as an argument against the contention that the modern interpretation of 
rights…demands an end to this form of punishment’.143 Therefore, the US courts should not 
be relying upon Article 6(2) as a refusal to consider a defence under the ICCPR, as the Sixth 
Circuit did in Buell. 
The non-self-executing declaration showed the US’ ‘desire to gain a reputation as a supporter 
of human rights, all the while avoiding enforcement of those rights domestically’.144 The SFRC 
itself stated that the US had been viewed as ‘hypocritical’ by other nations for criticising human 
rights in other countries but not having ratified the ICCPR.145 By acceding to the ICCPR, but 
then making it non-self-executing, this, in theory, would allow the US to continue criticising 
other nations for their human rights records whilst avoiding criticism itself. However, in practice 
this has not been the case. The US came under fire from states and scholars alike for these 
RUDs – to date eleven states have objected to them.146 This is further evidenced by figures 
from UPR Info – the leading non-governmental organisation on the UPR – showing the top 
issue recommended on in both US UPRs in 2010 and 2015 was ‘international instruments’.147 
This included calls from states for the US to remove its RUDs from the ICCPR,148 indicating 
that the international community is irked by this treatment of international law by the US.  
 
~ 
 
Section 2.3 has considered how the executive and legislative branches of government deal 
with international law and the death penalty. To understand the role that the UPR can play in 
the abolition of capital punishment in the US, it is also important to examine how the judicial 
branch of government considers international law. Therefore, section 2.4 considers how 
SCOTUS has approached international human rights when interpreting the US Constitution 
on the question of the death penalty.  
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2.4 The Adjudicative Framework in the US: The Role of the Supreme Court149 
Since the early 1800s, SCOTUS has afforded weight to both international law and the laws 
and customs of foreign nations.150 In The Paquete Habana, Justice Gray stated that 
‘international law is part of our law’.151 More recently, international law has also been used to 
interpret the Constitution. For example, the pivotal decision in modern Eighth Amendment 
jurisprudence came in the 1958 case of Trop v. Dulles, wherein the Court held that the Eighth 
Amendment of the US Constitution ‘must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’.152 In coming to its decision, SCOTUS 
made reference to the international community, took into account the punishments of other 
‘civilized nations’, and referenced a UN survey in ruling that the sentence of denationalisation 
is unconstitutional.153 This interpretation of the Eighth Amendment is still relied upon by 
SCOTUS, and is an example of the theory of living constitutionalism, in that the Constitution 
is not a static document and its interpretation can develop over time as society progresses.154 
In relation to the death penalty, Carol and Jordan Steiker have identified the nuanced role of 
SCOTUS, in that since the death penalty’s reinstatement in 1976, there has been ‘intensive, 
top-down, constitutional regulation of [capital punishment] by the federal courts, led by 
[SCOTUS]’.155 Furthermore, in engaging with this regulation, SCOTUS has relied upon 
international law and the consensus of other nations in a number of seminal death penalty 
cases. However, these decisions involving international law and the death penalty, and 
particularly regarding the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment, have been met with fierce 
dissents from the conservative side of the Court. Section 2.4 of this chapter analyses how the 
judicial branch of government has approached international law to interpret the US 
Constitution in capital punishment cases. To evaluate this, three categories have been 
identified: first, the theory of the US Constitution taking prominence over international law; 
second, the theory of international law applying only when it aligns with the US Constitution; 
and, third, the theory of using international law to assist with the interpretation of the US 
Constitution. 
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2.4.1 Theory of Prominence of US Constitution Over International Law 
A number of SCOTUS justices are, or were, constitutional originalists – believing that the US 
Constitution should be interpreted as the Framers intended when it was written in 1787.156 In 
recent decades, prominent originalist justices include Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice 
Thomas. Under the Roberts Court, the stand-out originalist justice has, thus far, been Justice 
Antonin Scalia. Although Justice Scalia no longer sits on the Court following his passing in 
2016, his opinions, both majority and dissenting, offer clear insight into the theory of the US 
Constitution taking prominence over international law. Furthermore, his replacement on the 
Court, Justice Neil Gorsuch, has shown that he takes a very similar originalist stance to Justice 
Scalia in his opinions,157 indicating that Justice Scalia’s opinion on international law in death 
penalty jurisprudence will continue on through Justice Gorsuch’s decisions. 
Justice Scalia’s disdain for international law being used to interpret the Constitution in death 
penalty jurisprudence was evidenced in his dissent in Atkins v. Virginia, wherein the majority 
of the Court held that it is contrary to the Eighth Amendment and therefore unconstitutional to 
execute ‘mentally retarded’ persons.158 In a footnote in the majority opinion, Justice Stevens 
made reference to an Amicus Curiae brief submitted by the European Union (‘EU’) which 
stated that the ‘world community’ overwhelmingly disapproves of executing ‘mentally retarded’ 
persons.159 This was just one sentence in a footnote, but it was intensely criticised by Justice 
Scalia.160 His dissent, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, scathingly stated 
that ‘the Prize for the Court's Most Feeble Effort to fabricate “national consensus” must go to 
its appeal (deservedly relegated to a footnote) to the views of…members of the so-called 
“world community”’.161 Justice Scalia went on to state that the views of the ‘world community’ 
are ‘irrelevant’ and that its ‘notions of justice are (thankfully) not always those of our people’.162 
This strong reaction to such a small reference to the viewpoint of the EU demonstrates the 
battle between the SCOTUS justices regarding international laws and practices. However, 
Harold Hongju Koh notes that we are living in ‘an increasingly globalized society’ and as such 
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‘the opinions of other nations, and that of the international community as a whole, are more 
relevant today than ever before’.163 
Three years after Atkins, SCOTUS held that it is unconstitutional to execute juveniles who 
committed a crime when they were under the age of 18 in Roper v. Simmons.164 Justice Scalia 
was again one of the four dissenting justices in this case, and he began his dissenting opinion 
by stating ‘[b]ecause I do not believe that the meaning of our Eighth Amendment[…]should be 
determined by the subjective views of five Members of this Court and like-minded foreigners, 
I dissent’.165 Appearing offended on behalf of the citizens of the US, Justice Scalia went on to 
say ‘[t]hough the views of our own citizens are essentially irrelevant to the Court's decision 
today, the views of other countries and the so-called international community take center 
stage’.166  
Justice Scalia was particularly indignant about the Court’s de facto overruling of the US’ 
reservation against Article 6 ICCPR regarding juvenile executions, stating that ‘[u]nless the 
Court has added to its arsenal the power to join and ratify treaties on behalf of the [US]’ the 
Court must adhere to the reservation.167 However, in its consideration of the ICCPR in 1991, 
the SFRC itself stated: 
[I]t may be appropriate and necessary to question whether changes in [US] law should 
be made to bring the [US] into full compliance at the international level. However, the 
Committee anticipates that changes in [US] law in these areas will occur through the 
normal legislative process.168  
Whilst SCOTUS is not the legislative branch of government, it is unlikely that the intention of 
the SFRC was to limit SCOTUS’ role to not include interpretation of the ICCPR, or indeed the 
Eighth Amendment as was the case in Roper. Furthermore, following the argument in section 
2.3.2, the US reservation against Article 6 is actually invalid. As such, it is severed from the 
US’ accession to the ICCPR, meaning that Article 6 is binding, and the majority opinion in 
Roper was correct in applying Article 6(5). In any event, the Restatement clarifies that ‘[c]ourts 
in the [US] have final authority to interpret an international agreement for purposes of applying 
it as law in the [US],169 which is what Justice Kennedy did in the majority opinion.  
                                                             
163 Harold Hongju Koh, ‘Paying “Decent Respect” to the World Opinion on the Death Penalty’ (2002) 35 UC Davis L Rev 1085, 
1108. 
164 Roper (n 22). This was almost 40 years after the ICCPR opened for signatures prohibiting the executions of juveniles under 
the age of 18. 
165 Ibid 608 (Scalia J, dissenting). 
166 Ibid 622. 
167 Ibid. 
168 Senate Committee Report (n 50) 4. 
169 Restatement (n 2) §326.  
 
48 
 
From his dissenting opinions in Atkins and Roper, it appears that Justice Scalia was set 
against international law having any influence on the US Constitution. Whilst it is certainly true 
to broadly categorise Justice Scalia as an originalist, as Koh has asserted, ‘in other settings, 
Justice Scalia has not hesitated to argue against interpreting [US] law in a manner that “would 
conflict with principles of international law”’.170 Koh cited the anti-trust case of Hartford Fire 
Insurance Co. v. California, wherein Justice Scalia led the dissenting opinion on international 
comity, arguing that statutes should not be interpreted in conflict with international law.171 His 
dissenting opinion in Hartford is completely different to his approach taken to international law 
in Roper, betraying Justice Scalia’s reliance on the ‘originalist’ stance in death penalty cases. 
This can potentially be explained by the threat of global abolition of the death penalty and, as 
Sandra Babcock stated, ‘[w]hereas the death penalty was once viewed as a matter of domestic 
penal policy, now it is seen as a human rights issue’.172 This is something that the conservative 
Justices are trying to avoid, as the trend towards global abolition indicates that it is no longer 
a state’s sovereign right to administer the death penalty.173  
Justice Scalia’s approach to international law’s influence on the Constitution indicates that in 
practice he was of the view that the Court should take no issue with international law, but only 
when it affirms the current laws of the US. This leads on to the second category: the theory of 
international law only applying when it aligns with the US Constitution. 
 
2.4.2 Theory of Applicability of International Law Only When It Aligns with the US 
Constitution 
Although Justice Scalia was perceived to be a critic of international law being used to interpret 
the Constitution, in practice, he was a critic of international law and consensus when it 
conflicted with his interpretation of the US Constitution. This is similar to the approach taken 
by conservative Justice Sandra Day O’Connor in Roper. Like Justice Scalia, she dissented in 
the case, but provided a separate opinion, in which Justice O’Connor stated: 
[W]e should not be surprised to find congruence between domestic and international 
values, especially where the international community has reached clear agreement—
expressed in international law or in the domestic laws of individual countries—that a 
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. At least, 
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the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to confirm the 
reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus.174 
In sum, Justice O’Connor believed that international law can play a part in US jurisprudence, 
but only to the extent it is in conformity with domestic US law. Therefore, in Roper, Justice 
O’Connor did not agree that the Eighth Amendment prohibits the execution of juveniles and 
so, in her view, the international consensus against the juvenile death penalty should have no 
bearing on the Eighth Amendment. This indicates the manifestation of American 
exceptionalism within SCOTUS. Michael Ignatieff described the category of American 
exceptionalism termed ‘legal isolationism’, where ‘American judges are exceptionally resistant 
to using foreign human rights precedents to guide them in domestic principles’.175 What Justice 
O’Connor appears to have done in her dissent in Roper is a variation of legal isolationism, in 
noting that international law can sometimes be of relevance to domestic principles, but only 
when the two align.  
 
2.4.3 Theory of Using International Law to Assist in Interpreting the US Constitution 
The third and final category is the theory of SCOTUS justices using international law to 
interpret the US Constitution. Although international law or consensus will likely never be a 
dominating factor in interpreting the US Constitution, some justices have cited international 
law to support their conclusions when deciding death penalty cases. For example, Justice 
Breyer stated that although he does not purport that ‘we can or should accept other nations’ 
solutions…their examples can help us to find our own Constitution’s answer to what is 
ultimately an American constitutional problem’.176 Given this progressive, although still 
cautious, approach to international law’s role in interpreting the Constitution, it is not surprising 
that Justice Breyer is one of the key SCOTUS justices under that consults international law, 
along with Justices Ginsburg, Stevens, White and, somewhat surprisingly, Kennedy. 
An early example of this is the 1977 case of Coker v. Georgia.177 In Coker, SCOTUS held that 
a death sentence for the rape of an adult woman is cruel and unusual punishment contrary to 
the Eighth Amendment.178 Justice White delivered the majority opinion and, joined by Justices 
Stewart, Blackmun, and Stevens, cited the decision in Trop, noting that, ‘[i]t is thus not 
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irrelevant here that out of [sixty] major nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only [three] 
retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue’.179 
In Enmund v. Florida in 1982, SCOTUS considered the weight that international opinion holds 
when striking down death sentences for felony murder convictions as contrary to the Eighth 
Amendment.180 Justice White, again, delivered the opinion of the Court, finding that it is ‘worth 
noting that the doctrine of felony murder has been abolished in England and India, severely 
restricted in Canada and a number of other Commonwealth countries, and is unknown in 
continental Europe’.181 
As noted in section 2.4.1 above, Justice Stevens cited an Amicus Curiae brief submitted by 
the EU in a footnote in the majority opinion in the Atkins case.182 Although it was just a footnote, 
it acknowledged that the ‘world community’ overwhelmingly disapproves of executing 
‘mentally retarded’ persons.183 
Perhaps more surprisingly, in Roper, conservative Justice Anthony Kennedy not only gave the 
swing vote to the liberal side of the Court, but he also provided the majority opinion, which 
relied upon international law and norms.184 Justice Kennedy cited the UN Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (‘CRC’), despite the US not being a party to the CRC,185 and Article 6(5) 
ICCPR, despite the reservation lodged against it, noting the ‘stark reality that the [US] is the 
only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile death penalty’.186 
Justice Kennedy continued on to reference the United Kingdom and how it removed the 
juvenile death penalty as a punishment decades before it abolished capital punishment in its 
entirety, confirming that ‘[t]he United Kingdom's experience bears particular relevance here in 
light of the historic ties between our countries’.187 Justice Kennedy also cited the Brief for the 
Human Rights Committee of the Bar Council of England and Wales in stating that ‘[i]t is proper 
that we acknowledge the overwhelming weight of international opinion against the juvenile 
death penalty’.188 Justice Kennedy accepted that the practices of other democratic nations 
with a similar legal genealogy must have some bearing on the interpretation of the Eighth 
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Amendment. This indicated his support for living constitutionalism, as opposed to originalism 
when interpreting the Constitution.189  
This final category of interpreting the Constitution with the assistance of international law is 
the most progressive attitude towards international law and consensus. It will also be important 
for the eventual abolition of the death penalty in the US. 
 
2.5 Challenging American Exceptionalism 
Thus far, this chapter has identified how all three branches of government are ‘exceptional’ 
regarding international law and the death penalty. American exceptionalism was 
acknowledged as early as 1835 by Alexis de Tocqueville, who described the US as ‘quite 
exceptional’.190 The theory of American exceptionalism is, quite simply, that the US, just by 
virtue of being a super-power state, is exceptional and can therefore choose how to behave. 
In a speech President Obama gave at the United States Military Academy Commencement 
Ceremony in 2014, he said that ‘I believe in American exceptionalism with every fiber of my 
being. But what makes us exceptional is not our ability to flout international norms and the 
rule of law; it is our willingness to affirm them through our actions’.191 However, at the 
international human rights level, Johan D. van der Vyer has argued that American 
exceptionalism actually shows the US ‘claim[ing] a right to be above the dictates of 
international law’.192 Examples of this have already been shown through the RUDs attached 
to human rights treaties,193 and the approach of some SCOTUS justices to international laws 
and foreign practices.194 Furthermore, Part II of this thesis provides a detailed analysis of the 
US’ engagement with the UPR (an international human rights mechanism), which evidences 
this exceptionalist stance on the international stage. 
American exceptionalism is also often relied upon to explain the US’ retention of the death 
penalty. There are different strands to this theory, generally falling into two categories: for 
historical or political reasons. However, this thesis challenges the reliance upon American 
exceptionalism as an excuse for the US’ retention of the death penalty. Using the Steikers’ 
blueprint for abolition,195 in the following sections it is argued that reliance upon American 
exceptionalism is no longer acceptable, and that the abolition of the death penalty will be 
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brought about using the proportionality doctrine espoused in the blueprint. Furthermore, it is 
argued that international law and, in particular, the UPR, can be used to further this blueprint 
for abolition. Therefore, this section begins by discussing the historical and political strands of 
American exceptionalism and the death penalty. It then moves on to setting out the Steikers’ 
blueprint for abolition and how this can be used to challenge the reliance upon American 
exceptionalism, through moving the US towards the abolition of the death penalty. 
 
2.5.1 American Exceptionalism and the Death Penalty: History 
The exceptionalist approach the US takes to the death penalty has been explained through 
the US’ violent history. In particular, Franklin E. Zimring has argued that it is the vigilante 
tradition in the US that roots the death penalty within society,196 and James Q. Whitman has 
asserted that the US’ propensity to degrade its citizens is the cause of the entrenchment of 
capital punishment.197 
In Zimring’s view, the US takes an exceptionalist approach to capital punishment when 
compared with its Western European counterparts, because of the US’ ‘vigilante tradition’.198 
Zimring made the link between the US States that used to regularly carry out lynchings, and 
States that now retain the death penalty and frequently conduct executions.199 He has argued 
that ‘[t]he greater force of the American vigilante tradition and the greater expression of these 
values generated in the American federal system are the most likely cause of America’s 
persistence as an executor’.200  
Related to Zimring’s historical interpretation of the retention of the death penalty is Whitman’s 
argument that American exceptionalism in the context of the death penalty is fixed in the US’ 
cultural roots in punishment and its inclination to ‘degrade’ those in its criminal justice 
system.201 Whitman argued that because European countries had a history of using degrading 
punishments, in the modern day, ‘[d]ignity concerns are pursued in Europe with an intensity 
unlike anything to be found in the [US]’.202 Whitman asserted that this is because the US had 
no brutal history of punishments in the same way that the Europeans did, therefore the US 
now continues to degrade its prisoners, including those on death row.203 A key example of this 
is the Thirteenth Amendment of the US Constitution, which abolished slavery for all but those 
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who are incarcerated in prisons across the US.204 However, whilst the comparison between 
European and US history in terms of punishment from Whitman is correct, and there is a clear 
empirical link between States that used lynching and modern executing States,205 these 
should not be accepted as reasons for the continued retention of the death penalty in 2018. 
We live in an evolving society that progresses with time, and so this thesis argues that 
historical punishments in the US should have no bearing on what is cruel and unusual 
punishment in the 21st Century. 
 
2.5.2 American Exceptionalism and the Death Penalty: Politics 
Although the death penalty is well-rooted in US history, the reliance upon the US’ historical 
practices does not explain the continued retention of the death penalty in 2018. David Garland 
also disagreed with the historical, ‘culturist version of American exceptionalism’206 discussed 
by Zimring and Whitman. Instead, Garland argued that the US death penalty is a product of 
the last few decades and the related political and legal decisions, rather than the last few 
centuries.207 To affirm this argument, he relied upon the idea of ‘radical local democracy’, that 
the US has ‘devolv[ed] most social and penal policy decisions to local political actors’ and this 
has led to the entrenchment of capital punishment within certain geographical areas of the 
US.208 Garland further suggested that there can be no comparison between Europe and the 
US, because in Western European countries capital punishment did not form part of the 
political landscape, including elections and accountability, as it does in the US.209 In a similar 
vein to this, alongside his historical, vigilante tradition argument for the American 
exceptionalist approach to the death penalty, Zimring also argued that there is a political 
reason for the retention of capital punishment in the US. He found that the difference between 
Western Europe and the US on the question of the death penalty is that in the US it continues 
to be a political issue, whereas in Europe it is now a human rights issue instead.210 However, 
that does not explain the UK’s abolition of the death penalty in the 1960s, when public opinion 
was in favour of capital punishment.211 
Garland also suggested that the US cannot be compared to Europe because it is more difficult 
for the US to abolish the death penalty, on the basis that other nations can legislate on criminal 
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justice issues for the entire country, whereas the US cannot.212 However, this fails to take into 
account the judicial branch of the federal government’s powers in regulating the death penalty. 
Although Zimring asserted that ‘[t]he detailed regulation of what a [S]tate may or may not put 
in its capital punishment penal law is the type of micromanagement of [S]tate criminal law 
deeply resented by the [S]tates’,213 Carol and Jordan Steiker have noted that, whether rightly 
or wrongly, the regulation of the death penalty by SCOTUS has become an accepted as part 
of the capital system.214 
Therefore, this reliance upon exceptional politics within the US as an excuse for the retention 
of the death penalty is also unsatisfactory, when considering the role of SCOTUS. The US 
strives to be a ‘more perfect union’215 and, in order to achieve that, the death penalty must be 
abolished. 
 
2.5.3 American Exceptionalism and the Death Penalty: Towards Abolition 
The Steikers have argued, with which this thesis agrees, that capital punishment will be 
abolished in the US through a constitutional decision from SCOTUS, rather than through 
State-by-State repealing of death penalty legislation alone.216 Until 31 July 2018, this relied 
upon the composition of the Court being 5-4 in favour of the conservatives, but that the four 
liberal justices would vote in favour of abolition, along with a swing-vote from Justice Kennedy. 
However, on 31 July, Justice Kennedy retired from SCOTUS, leaving a vacant seat that 
President Trump is hoping to fill with his nominee, staunch conservative Brett Kavanaugh, 
who would be unlikely to provide the required swing vote.217 Although this is a blow for 
abolitionists, all hope is not lost. The Steikers have provided a ‘blueprint for abolition’, detailing 
how they believe the death penalty will be abolished in the US. This thesis uses the blueprint 
for abolition as the framework when analysing the effectiveness of the UPR in the context of 
the abolition of the death penalty in the US. 
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The blueprint for abolition of the death penalty in the US utilises the ‘proportionality doctrine’.218 
This doctrine is two-fold, involving firstly, ‘objective evidence’ and, secondly, SCOTUS’ ‘own 
judgement’ on Eighth Amendment issues.219 It is important to note that this proportionality 
doctrine has been used by the Court a number of times, including in Atkins and Roper.220 
The first part of the doctrine is the objective evidence, for example, a national consensus, 
public opinion, and even international law and consensus. In terms of the death penalty, prima 
facie, there is still a national consensus in favour of it. However, although only nineteen of the 
fifty States have abolished the death penalty, a further eleven States have not executed 
anybody in almost a decade.221 Furthermore the rate of death sentences and executions, 
factors which come under the objective evidence category, are both falling in the US.222 To a 
lesser extent, but still persuasive, is public opinion on capital punishment.223 A study carried 
out by Pew Research Center, published in September 2016, showed that public support for 
executions is at a record low, with 49% of the general public supporting the death penalty.224 
Through its analysis of the UPR, this thesis can provide further evidence of the international 
consensus against the death penalty.  
The second part of the proportionality doctrine is the Court’s own judgment. This involves the 
justices using their own judgment on pertinent issues within the capital system, such as racial 
discrimination, wrongful convictions, and long stays on death row, to interpret the Eighth 
Amendment.225 An assessment of these issues has already been carried out by Justice Breyer 
in his dissenting opinion in Glossip v. Gross.226 This thesis can also provide evidence to further 
the second prong of the proportionality doctrine under the blueprint for abolition. The key 
issues within the capital system that the Court will consider include racial discrimination, 
mental illnesses, wrongful convictions, access to competent counsel, conditions on death row, 
method of execution etc., which are discussed within the UPR. Therefore, Part II’s analysis of 
the US UPRs on the question of the death penalty, along with the findings and suggestions to 
improve the UPR mechanism, will further this second prong of the proportionality doctrine. 
Although the appointment of Justice Gorsuch to the Court in 2017, and the retirement of 
Justice Kennedy in 2018, is a setback for the fulfilment of this blueprint for abolition, it is not a 
closed door. When President Reagan first appointed Justice Kennedy to SCOTUS, he had 
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deep-rooted conservative views and voted with the staunch conservatives on the Court.227 
However, as time progressed, he moved more towards the centre of the Court and, as already 
discussed, provided the swing-vote in key death penalty decisions. Therefore, there is also 
the possibility that other conservative justices will follow in Justice Kennedy’s footsteps. 
Moreover, this change on the Court may see the four liberal justices, particularly Justices 
Sotomayor and Kagan, becoming increasingly more liberal. It has been suggested that ‘there 
are already four Justices on the [SCOTUS] who would have voted to declare the death penalty 
unconstitutional as cruel and unusual punishment’.228 However, there is no evidence to 
suggest that this is true, as Justices Sotomayor and Kagan have not stated that they believe 
capital punishment to be cruel and unusual punishment, and both Justices did not join Justice 
Breyer’s finding that the death penalty per se is unconstitutional in his dissent in Glossip.229 
However, this staunch conservative shift on the Court may actually see Justices Sotomayor 
and Kagan take a more liberal stance in future capital cases.  
As such, this thesis assesses the effectiveness of the UNHRC’s UPR through the lens of the 
abolition of the death penalty in the US. From this analysis, it argues for changes to be made 
to the UPR to improve the mechanism generally, and to facilitate the abolition of the death 
penalty through the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition. It can be used to gather evidence for the 
two prongs of the blueprint, in preparation for the Court hearing a case on the constitutionality 
of the death penalty in the future. 
 
2.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the thorny relationship the US has with international law through 
all three branches of government. It has also provided a preliminary challenge to the American 
exceptionalism theory as a reason for the retention of capital punishment, and identified that 
the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition can be utilised to abolish the death penalty in the US.  
Furthermore, it has been identified that the UPR can be used to both ensure US adherence to 
international law, and further the eventual abolition of the death penalty in the US by gathering 
evidence to substantiate the Steikers’ blueprint. Before the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs can be 
analysed in terms of their approach to the question of capital punishment in Part II, chapter 
three sets out what the UPR is and how it works.
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 
 
The primary aim of this thesis is to assess the effectiveness of the UPR in the context of the 
abolition of the death penalty in the US. As the UPR is based upon international law, chapter 
two provided a consideration of the complex, and often exceptional, relationship all three 
branches of US government have with international law. Chapter three will provide an 
examination of the UPR, with the predominant focus on the US’ engagement with the 
mechanism in the context of the death penalty, in order to set up the analysis of the 2010 and 
2015 US UPRs on the question of capital punishment in Part II of the thesis. 
First, this chapter sets out the status of human rights at the UN level, including the role of the 
UNHRC. Second, it examines the framework of the UPR. To do this, the chapter details how 
the UPR was created, and then considers each stage of the UPR, exploring how the US has 
engaged with the mechanism in its first two cycles. 
 
3.1 Human Rights at the United Nations 
3.1.1 The Commission on Human Rights 
The Commission ‘was the first international organisation mandated to deal with international 
human rights’ at the UN.1 It was central to the development of modern-day protections, 
including the drafting of the UDHR and other seminal treaties such as the ICCPR.2 The US 
also played an important role in this, providing leadership in the architecture of contemporary 
human rights, for example, through Eleanor Roosevelt’s work in the creation of both the UDHR 
and the Commission itself.3  
However, over time, the Commission began to receive criticism for its deep-rooted 
politicisation, earning a reputation for addressing ‘human rights violations in only a limited 
number of countries’.4 For example, the Commission allowed regionalism to manifest through 
tactical voting by geographic and political blocs of states, which, in turn, permitted states to 
shield allies and exacerbate already fraught political relations.5 The selectivity of the 
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Commission saw ‘country-specific [R]esolutions increasingly [being] used’6 to continuously 
target specific countries,7 whereas other states ‘with equally problematic human rights records 
were able to escape any scrutiny’.8 
Towards the end of the Commission’s existence, it was widely criticised and the US was 
particularly vocal about its concerns. The US condemned the Commission for allowing Sudan 
to retain its seat in light of the genocide that was occurring in Darfur, arguing that ‘only “real 
democracies” should enjoy the privilege of membership’.9 This followed the US losing its seat 
on the Commission in 2001, which commentators surmised was due to the US’ retention of 
the death penalty and its then-continued executions of juveniles.10 
The Commission’s fate was sealed in 2003, when a Resolution was passed that in effect gave 
veto powers to each member state of the Commission,11 meaning that the much-needed 
reform was now practically impossible. As such, the only plausible way forward was to disband 
the Commission and create a new human rights body entirely, in the form of the UNHRC.12 
 
3.1.2 The Human Rights Council  
The UNHRC is the current, principal UN body mandated to protect and promote human rights 
across the globe. Sitting at the Palais des Nations in Geneva, Switzerland, the UNHRC was 
established by UNGA Resolution 60/251 upon the dissolution of the Commission in 2006.13 
The UNHRC now encompasses two of the key mechanisms in the global promotion and 
protection of human rights: the special procedures and the UPR. Alongside these 
mechanisms, the UNHRC has a complaints procedure, wherein individual complaints of 
human rights abuses can be made, and its own human rights ‘think tank’ through its advisory 
committee.14 
However, prior to Resolution 60/251 being passed, negotiations between states regarding the 
details of the proposed UNHRC began in 2005 and involved a great deal of compromise, 
although Philip Alston has argued that there was a broad consensus on three main issues. 
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First, the Commission had failed in its mandate, second, it needed to be replaced, and, third, 
the UN institutional human rights mechanisms needed to be strengthened.15 Whilst this almost 
worldwide agreement was indeed an achievement, Alston asserted that this consensus hid 
the troubling fact that the exact reasons why the Commission had failed were not agreed 
upon.16 With this not being dealt with at the time of negotiations taking place, there was the 
potential for the problems that led to the Commission’s downfall being passed on to the 
UNHRC.  
A notable reason for the Commission’s failure was that its composition allowed states to use 
their membership to avoid scrutiny of their own human rights protection and promotion.17 In 
comparison, Resolution 60/251 ensures the UNHRC member states cannot sit as members 
for more than two consecutive three-year terms, and there is better regional representation as 
membership is based on ‘equitable geographical distribution’.18 There are forty-seven seats 
on the UNHRC and the member states of the UN are currently divided into five regional groups, 
with each group being allotted a certain number of seats on the UNHRC – the African group 
(thirteen seats), the Asia-Pacific group (thirteen seats), the Eastern European group (six 
seats), the Latin American and Caribbean group (eight seats) and the Western European and 
Others group (seven seats).19 There are four special cases wherein the state does not belong 
to the regional group their state is located in, including the US, which is not formally a member 
of any group although it is considered to be an observer state in the Western European and 
Others group for voting purposes.20 However, whilst the geographical distribution of the 
UNHRC membership is now allegedly fairer, states from the same regional group still tend to 
vote together in blocs, which often exacerbates the global north/south divide in the UNHRC.21 
Furthermore, states are elected to the UNHRC by a majority UNGA vote under secret ballot. 
Whilst UNGA ‘take[s] into account the contribution of candidates to the promotion and 
protection of human rights’,22 some regional groups have put forward a ‘closed slate’, wherein 
the group enters the same number of states as there are available seats, meaning ‘each 
candidate will run unopposed and is virtually guaranteed a seat on the Council’.23 This has led 
to states with poor human rights records being elected to the UNHRC. For example, Saudi 
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Arabia gained a seat in 201324 despite its grave human rights violations.25 This indicated that, 
despite ‘the presence of known human rights abusers as members of the Commission’ being 
instrumental in the Commission’s downfall,26 this politicisation continues to mar the UNHRC.  
During the negotiations for the creation of the UNHRC, the US put forward a number of 
suggestions, including a two-thirds majority vote needed for a seat on the UNHRC, which were 
rejected.27 In retaliation, the George W. Bush Administration voted against the UNHRC’s 
creation and, when the Resolution was passed and the UNHRC was created, refused to put 
the US forward for membership in the first round.28 The then-US Representative to the UN, in 
giving reasons for the vote against the Resolution, said ‘the Council diminished itself when the 
worst human rights violators had a seat at the table…Failure to address membership issues 
did a disservice to those people standing up for universal human rights’.29 The US did put itself 
forward for, and was elected to, the UNHRC following President Obama’s election in 2009. 
However, in June 2018, the Trump Administration withdrew from the UNHRC, citing similar 
reasons to the Bush Administration, adding that the UNHRC is biased against Israel.30 
In general, observers have concluded that the UNHRC is not as significantly different from the 
Commission as it had been intended to be31 and that ‘[g]roup alliance and factionalism remains 
a veritable force’.32 The Commission was criticised for its high level of politicisation and it has 
been argued that the UNHRC continues to be similarly plagued.33 However, politicisation is 
unavoidable and is to be expected.34 Comprised of 193 governments that communicate and 
negotiate a vast array of diplomatic issues aside from human rights, the UN is a political body 
in its nature. Therefore, it should be expected that these diplomatic relations will form part of 
the workings of the UNHRC. However, what was hoped to be the difference between the two 
was the new, innovative mechanism, the Universal Periodic Review. 
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3.2 The Universal Periodic Review 
3.2.1 The UPR: What is it and How Does it Work? 
Passed on the 6 April 2006, despite the vote against it from the US, UNGA Resolution 60/251 
created the UPR to be a universal and intergovernmental peer review process, intended to 
appraise every UN member states’ protection and promotion of human rights. The idea for 
such a mechanism was first voiced publicly by Kofi Annan, the former UN Secretary-General, 
when deliberating the dissolution of the Commission and the proposed new UNHRC during 
his address to the Commission in Geneva in 2005. Annan said in his speech: 
[The UNHRC] should have an explicitly defined function as a chamber of peer review. 
Its main task would be to evaluate the fulfilment by all states of all their human rights 
obligations. This would give concrete expression to the principle that human rights are 
universal and indivisible…every Member State could come up for review on a periodic 
basis.35 
Following the ideology articulated by Annan, and a year of fraught negotiations between 
states, Resolution 60/251 was passed, stating that the new UNHRC should: 
Undertake a universal periodic review, based on objective and reliable information, of 
the fulfilment by each [s]tate of its human rights obligations and commitments in a 
manner which ensures universality of coverage and equal treatment with respect to all 
[s]tates; the review shall be a cooperative mechanism, based on an interactive dialogue, 
with the full involvement of the country concerned and with consideration given to its 
capacity-building needs; such a mechanism shall complement and not duplicate the 
work of treaty bodies; the Council shall develop the modalities and necessary time 
allocation for the universal periodic review mechanism within one year after the holding 
of its first session.36 
Resolution 60/251 left the modalities of the UPR for the UNHRC to detail, which are provided 
for in Resolution 5/1.37 Resolution 5/1 clarifies that the UPR is based upon the Charter, the 
UDHR, the human rights treaties to which the state is a party to, voluntary commitments and 
pledges, and international humanitarian law.38 However, as Emma Hickey points out, the UPR 
is ‘based, inter alia, on the International Bill of Rights’ meaning that in practice it ‘embraces 
the whole spectrum of human rights irrespective of the [t]reaties which the state under review 
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has ratified’.39 Whilst the treaty bodies have been monitoring the implementation of states’ co-
operation with human rights treaties for some time, they only monitor the states that are a 
party to the individual treaties.40 Therefore, should a state not sign and ratify a treaty they will 
not be monitored by the corresponding treaty body. This is where the UPR can step in to fill 
the gap in the monitoring of human rights.41  
Resolution 5/1 also provided the thirteen principles of the UPR. These principles include words 
and phrases which embody the intention of the mechanism, including ‘universality’,42 
‘cooperative’,43 ‘equal treatment’,44 ‘transparent’,45 and ‘non-politicized’.46 Furthermore, for the 
UPR to be successful, Patrick Flood argued that it must also be impartial and even-handed, 
in contrast to the Commission’s way of dealing with violations of human rights which saw 
‘states engaged in an ad-hoc open political warfare’.47 However, these terms can be construed 
as oxymoronic; how can the UPR be both intergovernmental and non-politicised? The very 
nature of a process including government delegations engaging in peer review will 
undoubtedly be politicised even with the best intentions for it not to be. Just as the UNHRC 
should be considered with the expectation of some politicisation, so should the UPR. 
In terms of the practicalities of the UPR, each state is to be reviewed in cycles; the first cycle 
was four years whereas the second cycle was extended to four and a half years.48 The third 
cycle is currently underway and is due to complete in 2020. In order for the UPR to function 
effectively, it encompasses numerous stages and requires cooperation from a range of actors. 
The UPR begins with the preparation and dissemination of the three key documents that the 
review is based upon. This leads on to the review which takes place in Geneva, during which 
recommendations from other UN member states will be made as to how the state under review 
can better protect and promote human rights. Following the review, the Working Group Report 
(also referred to as the ‘Outcome Report’) will be compiled by the troika – the three countries 
enlisted to assist with the organisation of the UPR process – alongside the state under review 
                                                             
39 Emma Hickey, ‘The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights Situation on the 
Ground?’ (2013) ICL Journal, Vol 7, No 4, 4. Emphasis added. See, also, Gareth Sweeney & Yuri Saito, ‘An NGO Assessment 
of the New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council’ (2009) Human Rights Law Review 9:2 203-223, 206. 
40 Felice D Gaer, ‘A Voice Not an Echo: Universal Periodic Review and the UN Treaty Body System’ (2007) Human Rights Law 
Review 7:1, 109-139, 125. 
41 See, Manfred Nowak, ‘It's Time for a World Court of Human Rights’ in M Cherif Bassiouni and William Schabas (eds) New 
Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council 
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42 UNGA Res 5/1 (n 14) para 3(a). 
43 Ibid para 3(b). 
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and the OHCHR.49 The UNHRC will then consider and adopt the report at a plenary session 
some months later. Finally, the follow-up to the review will take place wherein the accepted 
recommendations are implemented by the state under review. Although not a formal part of 
the UPR process, the importance of the UPR Pre-sessions should be noted. Organised and 
conducted by the non-governmental organisation (‘NGO’), UPR Info, the Pre-sessions were 
created in 2012 to give a greater voice to NGOs within the mechanism.50 UPR Info advised 
that the Pre-sessions were created to provide ‘civil society [with] an international platform to 
directly advocate to [s]tate delegations ahead of the UPR session’ and also ‘to facilitate 
diplomatic delegations to ascertain information on countries’ human rights landscapes’.51 In 
doing this, ‘[t]he ultimate aim of the Pre-sessions was to ensure that the recommendations 
that would be made at the [r]eview would be specific and welltargeted’.52 The UPR Pre-
sessions have been an unprecedented success, and a number of the recommendations made 
in this thesis to strengthen the UPR suggest that the Pre-sessions are the ideal platform to 
implement them.53 
To have all 193 UN member states cooperate with this mechanism and have their human 
rights protections and, in some cases, abuses discussed and criticised in an open forum was 
an ambitious task. However, November 2016 saw the end of the UPR’s second cycle of 
reviews, with the UPR attracting 100% cooperation from all 193 UN member states since its 
beginning in 2008.54 The US was reviewed in 2010 and 2015, and its next review will take 
place in 2020.55 However, despite the positive engagement the UPR has attracted, there are 
still concerns over the impact the UPR has had in practice, and whether it has facilitated 
meaningful change for human rights on the ground as it was created to do.56 The following 
sub-sections will consider the functions of the UPR process in sequence, to allow for the 
analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the mechanism in the context of the abolition of 
the death penalty in the US to take place in Part II of this thesis. 
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3.2.2 Preparation and Dissemination of UPR Documents 
Each state UPR is based upon three documents – the National Report prepared by the state 
under review, and the Compilation of United Nations Information and the Summary of 
Stakeholders’ Information, both of which are compiled by the OHCHR.57 All three documents 
are disseminated via the UN website and must be ready at least six weeks before the review 
itself takes place, to allow time for translation into the six official languages of the UN.58  
3.2.2.1 National Report 
The first document to be prepared and submitted to the Working Group of the UNHRC is the 
National Report, which is compiled by the state under review and must be comprised of twenty 
pages or less.59 At the sixth session of the UNHRC, clear guidelines on how the National 
Report should be set out were created,60 which the US largely cooperated with in both 2010 
and 2015.61  
In collating its National Report, the state under review is also ‘encouraged to prepare the 
information through a broad consultation process at the national level with all relevant 
[S]takeholders’.62 In preparation for both UPRs, the US federal government engaged in 
consultations with civil society and members of the public.63 Sarah H. Paoletti noted that 
‘[t]hese consultations marked the first time the government had gone on the road to hear 
individuals’ concerns about [US] human rights obligations’,64 an indication of one of the 
positive effects the mechanism has had to date. 
In both National Reports, the US acknowledged the concerns surrounding capital punishment. 
In 2010, the US used this space to set out the constitutional safeguards in place for those 
facing a death sentence and execution, and made a domestic comity observation concerning 
the distinction between the federal and US States’ death penalty systems. It noted that ‘[t]he 
federal government utilizes a system for carefully examining each potential federal death 
penalty case’,65 while explaining that ‘[S]tate governments retain primary responsibility for 
                                                             
57 Ibid para 15. 
58 Ibid para 17. 
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establishing procedures and policies that govern [S]tate capital prosecutions’.66 In both 
reports, the US detailed the reduction in the number of executions carried out in the previous 
year and how many jurisdictions in the US have abolished the punishment.67 This appeared 
to be an attempt to justify the US’ retention of capital punishment. However, 2017 saw a shift 
in this trend, as twenty-three people were executed, three more than in 2016.68 This is an 
issue that must be addressed by the US in its National Report for the 2020 UPR, as a steady 
decline in executions can no longer be used as a justification for retaining the death penalty. 
In 2015, the US utilised the National Report to respond to the specific recommendations it had 
accepted in 2010, including some regarding the death penalty. It also attached Annex IV to 
the National Report, which provided further responses to recommendations accepted and 
accepted in part from the 2010 review.69 Again, the US discussed the constitutional safeguards 
in place protecting those facing the death penalty, but this time in more detail. For example, it 
addressed the Eighth Amendment protections, stating that ‘[t]here are strict prohibitions 
against the use of any method of execution that would inflict cruel and unusual punishment’.70 
The report advised that a case was to be heard by SCOTUS ‘on whether the lethal injection 
protocol used in executions by Oklahoma constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the 
Eighth Amendment of our Constitution’.71 This referenced the controversial Glossip v. Gross 
case,72 wherein SCOTUS ruled in a 5-4 decision in June 2015 that the use of midazolam in 
Oklahoma’s three-drug cocktail did not amount to cruel and unusual punishment.73 While the 
US cited this in its National Report as a positive step taken by SCOTUS, during the 
consideration and adoption of the outcome report and following the judgment in Glossip v. 
Gross, Ireland ‘regretted that [SCOTUS] had recently upheld the use of the lethal injection’.74 
In fact, not only did SCOTUS uphold the use of midazolam, the majority opinion held that 
‘some risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution’ and, as such, some pain would not 
necessarily constitute cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment.75 As 
the issue of methods of execution in the US continues to be of international significance, it is 
likely that this will be a feature in the US’ 2020 UPR, and methods of execution in the US UPR 
is examined in more detail in chapter six. 
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3.2.2.2 Compilation of United Nations Information 
The second of the three documents to be prepared is the Compilation of United Nations 
Information (‘Compilation Report’). Compiled by the OHCHR, it begins by setting out the 
current scope of the state under review’s international obligations, and moves on to include 
‘information contained in the reports of treaty bodies, special procedures, including 
observations and comments by the [s]tate concerned, and other relevant official [UN] 
documents’.76 However, how the OHCHR decides upon what information will be included and 
excluded is not currently known. 
Once a state becomes a party to a treaty, it has an obligation to take part in the corresponding 
reporting procedure, which includes the treaty bodies formulating detailed reports and 
recommendations, and they feed directly into the Compilation Reports of the UPR. The special 
procedures are divided into two categories – country-specific and thematic – and as of 1 
August 2017 there were forty-four thematic mandates and twelve country mandates.77 Each 
special procedure is tasked with its own mandate and led by independent human rights 
experts (usually known as Special Rapporteurs)78 who are able to bring their own individual 
expertise to specific human rights issues. There is also a reporting element to the work of the 
special procedures, and these reports also feed into the Compilation Reports of the UPR, with 
the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (‘SRE’) and the 
Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment (‘SRT’) being particularly relevant to the issue of the death penalty in the US.  
Furthermore, the work of the OHCHR and UNGA is considered when compiling the 
Compilation Reports of the UPR. For example, in the 2010 US UPR, the OHCHR had 
‘expressed concerns, in August 2008, about the decision of the authorities in Texas to proceed 
with the execution of a [foreign national], despite an order to the contrary by the [ICJ]’.79 Given 
the significant role the OHCHR plays in international human rights, it is important that its input 
can be recorded in the UPR through the Compilation Report. In terms of UNGA, a relatively 
recent and seemingly effective way of its involvement in the death penalty is through its regular 
Resolutions on a global moratorium. The most recent Resolution was in December 2016, 
which saw 117 votes in favour of a global moratorium, thirty-one abstentions, forty votes 
against, and five absences.80 The UNGA Resolutions were cited in both the US 2010 and 2015 
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Compilation Reports, noting that the US had consistently voted against the global 
moratorium.81  
3.2.2.3 Summary of Stakeholders’ Information  
The third and final document to be produced and disseminated is the Summary of 
Stakeholders’ Information (‘Stakeholder Report’).82 Both the UN and the US State Department 
agree that a ‘Stakeholder’ includes NGOs (also known as Civil Society Organisations ‘CSOs’) 
and National Human Rights Institutions (‘NHRIs’),83 although the US does not currently have 
an NHRI and has rejected calls during the UPR to create one.84 Civil society is encouraged to 
play an integral role in the UPR process and this includes each Stakeholder submitting a five-
page submission. Resolution 5/1 sets out that this should be ‘[a]dditional, credible and reliable 
information provided by other relevant [S]takeholders’.85 There is no specific definition 
provided of ‘credible and reliable information’, although guidance has been produced by the 
OHCHR, which Stakeholders can use as advisory material when compiling their individual 
reports.86 In practice, the OHCHR will consider all of the individual Stakeholder submissions 
– of which there were 103 in 201087 and ninety-one in 2015 for the US 88 – and summarise 
them into a ten-page document. The individual reports are an important part of the UPR 
mechanism as they provide a wealth of information on a range of human rights issues on the 
ground, including the death penalty. Part II of this thesis analyses these individual reports to 
provide an insight as to why it is imperative that the Stakeholders’ voices are heard throughout 
the UPR. 
Similar to the Compilation Report, there is little literature on how the OHCHR decides what 
information will be selected and rejected from the individual reports to go into the final 
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Stakeholder Report.89 However, when Julie Billaud undertook a three-month internship with 
the drafting team, she noted that the OHCHR cannot synthesise any of the individual 
submissions and therefore the report is ‘made up of a collection of direct quotes extracted 
from NGOs’ contributions’.90 Furthermore, Hilary Charlesworth and Emma Larking have noted 
that the drafting teams have a ‘genuine desire’ to ‘give consideration to issues raised by 
[S]takeholders who might not otherwise be heard’.91 This is imperative to the authenticity of 
the Stakeholder Report, given that some NGOs will not always have the funds to attend the 
review in Geneva. It is also a way of NGOs voicing the human rights situation on the ground 
which, in turn, legitimises the UPR process.  
There have been particular criticisms of the five-page limit on individual submissions, as it has 
caused NGOs to feel ‘forced to be “selective and strategic” in identifying a few key issues’ to 
include in its individual report.92 In fact, many NGOs will attach a number of lengthy 
appendices, and will direct readers to even lengthier submissions on their own websites.93 For 
example, United States Human Rights Network (‘USHRN’) attached twenty-five appendices 
to its 2010 submission to the US UPR.94 The main issue with this is that most UN member 
states will not read these additional documents and therefore key information may be missed.  
Furthermore, the 2010 review saw much repetition from Stakeholders on the issue of the death 
penalty. For example, both USHRN and Amnesty International (‘AI’) advised that there 
continues to be executions of the mentally disabled and criticised the poor conditions on death 
row.95 To limit this issue to some extent, the second cycle of the UPR saw more NGOs 
collaborating to provide joint submissions rather than individual reports. For example, in 2015, 
USHRN provided a joint submission - ‘JS41’ - which was a ‘summary of [thirty-four] 
[S]takeholder reports submitted by our members and partners’.96 As this increases the 
maximum page limit from five to ten pages, these joint submissions were hoped to have a 
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greater impact upon the UPR, allowing NGOs to jointly and potentially more successfully 
monitor the implementation of recommendations as they are tasked to do by Resolution 5/1.97  
The number of joint submissions in the US UPR more than doubled from twenty-five in 2010 
to fifty-two in 2015,98 and while this is certainly a positive step, in terms of the death penalty 
this tactic appears not to have had the desired effect. In 2010, the Stakeholder Report cited 
five NGOs99 which raised eight different issues regarding the death penalty.100 However, in 
2015, the Stakeholder Report again cited five NGOs or joint submissions,101 but between them 
only raised six issues regarding capital punishment.102 Therefore, despite the use of joint 
submissions, less information was cited in the final report regarding the death penalty. This is 
not because the capital system in the US is not being raised in the individual Stakeholder 
submissions, but because only certain information is being referred to in the final Stakeholder 
Report. For example, AI’s original Stakeholder submission stated that, ‘[i]n numerous cases, 
prisoners have gone to their deaths…where inadequate legal representation for indigent 
defendants meant that the sentencing jury had not been presented with the full array of 
mitigating evidence available in the case’.103 However, this was not relayed in the final 
document. To understand why certain issues are not included in the report, more transparency 
from the OHCHR is needed regarding the process utilised to decide how it selects the content 
of the final report. This idea is explored further in Part II. 
This shortage of information regarding the death penalty in the 2015 Stakeholder Report had 
an effect on the reduced discussion of capital punishment throughout the rest of the UPR. In 
the rankings of ‘most recommended upon issues’, the death penalty slipped from 4th place in 
2010 to 5th in 2015.104 This indicates that what makes it into the Stakeholder Report will be 
influential on the recommendations, as less information was relayed into the final Stakeholder 
Report in 2015 than in 2010. As such, the OHCHR should aim to ensure that the Stakeholder 
Report is as comprehensive as possible.  
 
~ 
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As would be expected, the drafting of these three documents and the decisions of what to 
include and exclude involves ‘disagreements and conflicts, and negotiations and 
compromises’.105 However, whilst the process for preparing the documents in the UPR is not 
an easy one, getting it right is imperative to ensuring the smooth running of the review.  
 
3.2.3 The Review 
Following the submission of the three documents, the US was reviewed on 5 November 2010 
and 11 May 2015. In order for the UPR to be a success, it relies upon the effective involvement 
of the UN member and observer states, particularly during the interactive dialogue wherein 
‘any UN Member State can pose questions, comments and/or make recommendations to the 
[s]tates under review’.106 As Walter Kalin noted, ‘[i]n extremis, a state could be reviewed in its 
absence, but peer review without peers is not possible’.107 Resolution 5/1 advises that ‘[t]he 
review will be conducted in one working group, chaired by the President of the Council and 
composed of the 47 member [s]tates of the Council’,108 and while ‘[o]bserver [s]tates may 
participate in the review’,109 Stakeholders may only ‘attend the review’ with no rights of 
audience.110 
For each review, three UNHRC member states act as rapporteurs, known as the ‘troika’. The 
OHCHR provides the ‘necessary assistance and expertise’ to the troika as is required, with 
the aim to ensure the UPR process runs as smoothly as possible.111 The state under review 
can request that a troika state be from their regional group and they can alternate one of the 
troika on one occasion only.112 The troika assists at various points during this stage of the 
UPR,113 for example, prior to the review taking place, UN member states can submit questions 
in advance via the troika.114 This allows the state under review time to reflect upon the points 
raised in advance and the opportunity to discuss them during the interactive dialogue. For 
instance, in 2015, Belgium, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland all submitted 
advance questions to the US regarding preventing the execution of those with intellectual 
disabilities and other mental illnesses.115 However, this is an informal process. The advance 
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questions are not presented in a formal UN document with a designated document number, it 
is just a simple Microsoft Word document, and they are only provided in one language, rather 
than the six official UN languages. Moreover, states do not have an obligation to respond to 
these questions during the interactive dialogue and, certainly in the US UPRs, there were no 
repercussions when the government delegation did not respond to an advance question. 
Therefore, Part II of this thesis identifies ways in which this part of the UPR process can be 
improved. 
The first cycle of the UPR saw three hours allocated to each review.116 However, this limited 
the number of states able to speak during the interactive dialogue and, in turn, saw poor 
practices emerging. For example, in order to obtain a place on the speaking list, ‘state 
representatives [would stay] overnight’ in order to ‘ensure blocks of ally nations got to speak 
together and thereby increase the impact of their praise or criticism’.117 This was particularly 
prevalent during the US UPR in 2010, wherein German representatives witnessed diplomats 
spending ‘the night in front of the UN building to get on the list’118 and Cuba and Venezuela 
starting ‘their own list more than a week before, which delegations then rushed to get on’.119 
Though this list was declared invalid by the Secretariat,120 it indicated that the current 
formulation of the review encouraged politicisation in the first cycle. It was therefore 
considered how this could be remedied during the five-year review of the UNHRC in 2011 and, 
when Resolution 16/21 was passed, the time limit for each review was increased to three 
hours thirty minutes with the confirmation that all states can take the floor during the interactive 
dialogue if necessary.121  
In order for the review to be successful, it must rely upon the ‘strong participation of states that 
ask questions and make recommendations’.122 Kalin has cautioned that, because of the 
somewhat time consuming nature of the UPR, ‘there is a real risk that over time the willingness 
of states to serve as peers will decline to a core group of diehards’ with a large number of 
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states only appearing for states who persistently commit human rights violations or for 
politically motivated reasons.123 Furthermore, the wide scope of the UPR can put a strain on 
smaller states that do not have a permanent mission in Geneva. At present though, following 
the amendments to the time limitations, overall the review appears to be working more 
smoothly, efficiently, and transparently, with regular cooperation from a large number of states, 
particularly throughout the recommendations section of the review. 
3.2.3.1 Recommendations 
The recommendations are an integral part of the UPR as this is where UN member states 
provide suggestions, during the interactive dialogue, as to how the state under review can 
better promote and protect human rights.124 Furthermore, the recommendations accepted by 
the state will be the focus of the follow-up to its UPR and will underpin the subsequent 
review.125 They are also a measurable part of the UPR, as implementation of accepted 
recommendations can be quantified. The troika has a role to play in this process and can 
choose to ‘group issues…to ensure that the interactive dialogue takes place in a smooth and 
orderly manner’.126 There is very little guidance from the UN on recommendations, such as 
how they should be formed, how long they should be, or how much detail should be included, 
with Resolution 5/1 merely stating: 
Recommendations that enjoy the support of the [s]tate concerned will be identified as 
such. Other recommendations, together with the comments of the [s]tate concerned 
thereon, will be noted. Both will be included in the outcome report to be adopted by the 
Council.127 
In practice recommendations are ‘accepted’ or ‘noted’, and the US also ‘supports in part’ some 
recommendations, clarifying that this means it ‘support[s] the proposed action or objective but 
reject[s] the often-provocative assumption or assertion embedded in the recommendation’.128 
‘Noted’ recommendations are essentially de facto rejections. This is a wider issue with the 
UPR process, as Resolution 5/1 sets out that subsequent reviews are based on 
recommendations accepted in the previous cycle,129 meaning that states can be tactical when 
considering whether to accept or note recommendations and use this to avoid addressing 
certain human rights issues. This can be frustrating, but the non-mandatory nature of the UPR, 
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and the fact that the recommendations are not binding upon states, allows them to retain their 
sovereign power and has attracted 100% cooperation from states to date. 
Furthermore, partly due to the lack of official guidance on the content of the recommendations, 
there are considerable issues with how recommendations are formed and presented. Largely, 
recommendations will be too broad, meaning they ‘are unlikely to translate to specific action 
on the ground’130 and, often, ‘so called friendly states’ will bestow ‘meaningless praise upon 
each other’ despite this not reflecting the ‘human rights situation on the ground’.131 When 
Edward McMahon published a study in 2010 of all recommendations made in the first five 
UPR sessions, he categorised them into five groups.132 Category five is ‘[r]ecommendations 
of specific action (undertake, adopt, ratify, establish, implement, recognize – in international 
legal sense)’133 and McMahon gives an example of one such recommendation being ‘[a]bolish 
the death penalty’.134 However, while this recommendation does ask for a specific action, 
absent further details of how or why capital punishment should be abolished, it is unlikely to 
lead to any meaningful implementation. All recommendations in the 2010 and 2015 UPRs 
suggesting that the US to abolish the death penalty or place a moratorium on it were noted 
and no action taken on them.135 Therefore, such broad recommendations are unlikely to lead 
to the abolition of the death penalty, and this is a particular area of the UPR that would benefit 
from reform, as examined in Part II. 
Some states have simply failed to engage with the recommendation process entirely. In its 
first review, North Korea ‘did not accept a single recommendation’ and Israel only accepted 
three recommendations ‘and failed to provide clear answers to many others’.136 This lack of 
engagement with the recommendations is disappointing, considering many states made well-
reasoned and constructive recommendations to both countries. Equally as concerning is that 
some states will ‘respond to recommendations by claiming that they are already recognising 
rights when this is clearly not the case’.137 To be dismissive of the recommendations could 
potentially undermine the entire UPR review process. Other states have been accused of 
hypocrisy, such as the US, which ‘recommended that Switzerland provide “consular 
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notification and access consistent with applicable international legal obligations, including 
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to detained foreign nationals”’, 
despite the ICJ finding the US to be in violation of Article 36 on two separate occasions in 
relation to the death penalty.138 Chapter four of this thesis provides more detail on why this 
action appears to be hypocritical. However, this thesis argues that these issues should still be 
raised, even though the recommending state would also benefit from a similar 
recommendation in its own UPR.  
3.2.3.2 The US and Recommendations  
The US has maintained its involvement in both its own UPRs and the UPRs of other states; in 
the first cycle the US provided 465 recommendations to other states and in the second cycle 
it provided 490.139 However, what is perhaps most interesting is that the US received the 
highest total number of recommendations to date in the entirety of the UPR process.140 In 
2010, the US received 228 recommendations in total, of which 173 were supported in whole 
or in part.141 In 2015, the US received 343 recommendations in total, wherein 150 were 
accepted, eight-three noted, and 110 supported in part.142  
Of the 228 recommendations the US received in 2010, the death penalty was the focus of 
twenty-two, or 9.6% of the total recommendations made.143 Forty-four human rights issues 
were raised during the 2010 UPR and the death penalty was ranked as being the fourth most 
recommended upon issue.144 Six of the twenty-two death penalty recommendations in 2010 
were accepted in full or part by the US.145 In 2015, the number of recommendations spiked, 
and the US received 343 in total. Forty-three of these recommendations, or 12.54%, were 
made regarding capital punishment but only five were accepted in full or part.146 Furthermore, 
the death penalty was demoted to being the fifth most recommended upon issue, overtaken 
by women’s rights and racial discrimination.147 
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Scholars and practitioners alike are sceptical of the effect high numbers of recommendations 
will have on human rights. Hickey stated that the ‘more critical issues will tend to get diluted’148 
and De la Vega and Lewis commented that it causes ‘difficulties with attempts to develop a 
plan to implement the recommendations’.149 As such, Chauville has found that because of this, 
‘[s]tates are forced to prioritise…[making] it likely they will act on the least challenging 
recommendations first’,150 despite them not necessarily being the most important. This area 
of the recommendations process could also be strengthened, as detailed in Part II. 
 
3.2.4 Consideration and Adoption of the Outcome Report 
Subsequent to the review, the troika, the OHCHR, and the state under review will prepare the 
Outcome Report (or ‘Working Group report’) detailing the member states’ ‘conclusions and/or 
recommendations, and voluntary commitments of the State concerned’, including any initial 
responses of the state under review to the recommendations it received.151 Once the report is 
prepared, it is then considered and adopted at a UNHRC plenary session in Geneva a few 
months after the review.152 This gives the state under review time to consider which 
recommendations it will accept and provide any additional comments in an Addendum to the 
Report of the Working Group. The US provided an Addendum in both 2010 and 2015, wherein 
it provided more detail on why it accepted, or accepted in part, certain recommendations.153 
At the OHCHR’s request, the US provided further clarification on its ‘supported in part’ 
recommendations in the Report of the Working Group Appendix to the Addendum document 
in 2015.154 These documents are analysed further in Part II of this thesis.  
At the plenary session, prior to the adoption of the Outcome Report, the state under review, 
member and observer states, and Stakeholders are given the opportunity to make ‘general 
comments’ upon it.155 It is at this stage that the Stakeholders are given the opportunity to voice 
their opinions on the human rights situation on the ground, in front of the UNHRC. There is 
often a vast difference between Stakeholders’ and member states’ comments. During a 
research visit to the US’ plenary session in September 2015, it was observed that some 
member and observer states used this time to skirt around important issues or to provide 
unnecessary praise to the state under review. However, when the Stakeholders took the floor 
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they would be more critical, but still provided praise where appropriate. This is a by-product of 
the mechanism being intergovernmental, as comments made by states during the UPR 
process will more than likely be considered in future diplomatic relations. This is where the 
role of the Stakeholders is key, as they are not involved in the political relations between states 
and so can speak openly and honestly about the human rights situation on the ground. For 
example, in 2010, ‘Morocco thanked the [US] delegation for providing further information on 
the recommendations received and the efforts to comply with the promotion and protection of 
human rights’.156 In contrast, in 2015, Human Rights Watch (‘HRW’) had considered that no 
action had been taken on France’s recommendation on racial disparities in 2010, and so 
‘urged the [US] to specify how they plan to implement recommendations they supported on 
looking into racial disparities in the application of the death penalty’.157 As UPR Info has noted, 
it is important that this stage of the process is used ‘to obtain clear responses to 
recommendations [and] details on implementation plans’,158 which is exactly what HRW was 
aiming to do. This is arguably the part of the UPR process where the Stakeholders can 
currently have the most impact. It also further legitimises the role of the Stakeholders in the 
UPR, as they do not have to only rely upon lobbying other UN member states and submitting 
reports, and can provide their own comments and opinions before the UNHRC. 
This stage of the mechanism has also been used to consider the US’ general engagement 
with the UPR itself, which is also significant when considering the impact the UPR can have 
on the death penalty abolition movement. In 2010, Cuba, Iran, China, and Bolivia all noted 
that it was concerning that the US had rejected so many recommendations.159 In contrast, 
Russia ‘noted with appreciation the acceptance of a large number of recommendations’,160 
highlighting the continued politicisation of the UPR, particularly as in the 2015 interactive 
dialogue, Russia stated it ‘regretted that the [US] had paid insufficient attention to the 
recommendations made during the first review cycle’.161 The Stakeholders also considered 
the US’ commitment to the UPR. In 2015, the American Civil Liberties Union (‘ACLU’) criticised 
the US’ implementation of 2010 recommendations, calling it ‘disappointing’ and stating that 
‘the Government engagement has not translated into any meaningful changes in domestic 
policies’.162 Furthermore, HRW ‘regretted that the [US] appear to use the UPR process more 
as a way to highlight their current policies than to commit to improving their human rights 
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record’.163 As HRW has noted, ‘[t]he UPR is ineffective if limited to a conceptual exercise, and 
no country should claim success by accepting recommendations that require no identifiable 
outcomes or even proof of a deliberative process’.164 This links to the first objective of the 
UPR, which is ‘[t]he improvement of the human rights situation on the ground’.165 The UPR 
will be unsuccessful if it is not resulting in actual improvements to the human rights situation 
in the US or any of the other 192 UN member states.  
The state under review also has the opportunity to provide its comments on the report. The 
US delegation noted in 2015 that the ‘federal system enhances protections for human rights, 
and that [S]tate, local, and tribal officials are often best positioned to solve problems’.166 
However, Stakeholders have argued that this inaccurate. For example, Africans in the America 
for Restitution and Repatriation (‘AA4RR’) asserted that the federal system is hindering the 
role of human rights in the US, particularly because compliance with the ICCPR and ICERD 
‘is left largely to the unchecked discretion of [S]tate and local authorities as demonstrated in 
the Ferguson riots between African Americans with [S]tate and local officials’.167 AI also noted 
that because of the non-self-executing declarations attached to international human rights 
treaties, ‘[f]or individuals under US jurisdiction, the fact of the US[] becoming a party to a 
human rights treaty has often been more symbolic than real’.168 
Also in 2015, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Scott Busby stated that ‘[t]he [US] did not 
support the majority of recommendations on capital punishment, noting that continuing 
differences in this area are a matter of policy, and not what the rules of international human 
rights law currently require’.169 However, Part II of this thesis shows that this statement is 
incorrect, as the US does not consistently comply with international human rights regarding 
the death penalty. 
 
3.2.5 Follow-Up to the Review 
The follow-up to the review takes place outside of the scrutiny of the UN. Once the review 
process has been completed, and the Outcome Report has been adopted, the accepted 
recommendations must then be implemented.170 Primarily, it is the state’s duty to implement 
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recommendations, although the Stakeholders should assist ‘as appropriate’171 and other UN 
member states should also help where necessary.172 Despite the importance of this part of the 
UPR, there is no official UN-led monitoring of implementation and very little guidance on how 
to do so. Chauville argued that ‘the lack of an independent United Nations-led assessment 
mechanism’ is a weakness of the UPR.173 He suggested that ‘[a]n objective assessment by 
the OHCHR, published one month before the review in the format of a report, would be an 
effective way to fill this gap’.174 However, John Carey viewed the idea of an independent 
assessment as ‘too authoritarian’ and ‘likely to chill the warm reception’ that the UPR has 
received to date.175  
The issue of follow-up and implementation of recommendations was raised in the US UPRs. 
In the 2010 Stakeholder Report, the Center for Economic and Social Rights (‘CESR’) had 
‘recommended establishing an effective and inclusive process to follow-up on the 
recommendations from the [UPR]’.176 During the 2010 interactive dialogue, ‘Norway stated 
that it looked forward to the transparent and inclusive follow-up in the [UPR] implementation 
phase’,177 and Austria provided a recommendation to ‘[c]ontinue consultations with non-
governmental organisations and civil society in the follow up’,178 which the US accepted with 
no comment.179 
Again, in 2015, recommendations focused on the follow up stage of the UPR. For example, 
Paraguay recommended that the US should ‘[c]onsider the possibility of establishing a system 
to follow up on international recommendations, including [UPR] accepted 
recommendations’.180 The US accepted this recommendation, noting that ‘[t]he federal 
government has established interagency working groups to coordinate follow-up to supported 
UPR recommendations and to consider recommendations by human rights treaty bodies’.181 
However, when Norway recommended that ‘a mechanism be established at the federal level 
to ensure comprehensive and coordinated compliance with international human rights 
instruments at the federal, local and [S]tate levels’,182 the US only supported this in part. The 
delegation clarified this in its Working Group Appendix document, stating that ‘[w]e do not 
support the part of this recommendation asking us to create a single mechanism with respect 
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to the [S]tate and local levels’.183 The response from the key UPR actors clearly indicates that 
the follow-up to the review is considered an integral part of the UPR, but that it could be 
improved and strengthened, particularly through some oversight of the process. 
Constance de la Vega and Cassandra Yamasaki highlighted that, subsequent to the 2010 
review, the US delegation noted that the UPR is ‘a useful tool to assess how our country can 
continue to improve in achieving its own human rights goals’,184 but ‘failed to say how these 
goals would be implemented’.185 However, during the consideration and adoption of the 
Outcome Report in 2010, the US delegation stated that since the review, ‘US federal agencies 
held numerous meetings with civil society to discuss the response to the recommendations’.186 
Moreover, in its 2015 individual submission, Joint Submission 29 (‘JS29’) noted that following 
the review in 2010, ‘the [US] government established several interagency working groups to 
follow up on accepted recommendations and also encouraged exchanges between these 
working groups and civil society’.187 The US did the same in 2015, describing the consultations 
as follows: 
The UPR Working Groups have both an internal coordination and a public outreach 
mandate. Each Working Group meets internally to identify and discuss proposals to 
address accepted UPR recommendations, identify opportunities for interagency 
collaboration, share best practices on cross-cutting issues, and discuss public 
engagement.188  
The Working Groups also consider recommendations of the treaty bodies and special 
procedures, although they only provide responses to the UPR recommendations. By only 
responding to UPR recommendations, this shows that the mechanism is having a greater 
effect than the others in the US. However, the question is what impact is this having for human 
rights on the ground? Particularly relevant for the death penalty was Working Group 2 on 
Criminal Justice, led by the US Department of Justice (‘DOJ’), which took place on 1 August 
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2016 in Washington D.C.189 Unfortunately, there is relatively little information on the outcome 
of the Working Group sessions, attributed to the fact that the DOJ’s invitation to the Working 
Group session was cited as being ‘off the record and closed to the press’.190 A vital part of 
implementing recommendations is the dissemination of the progress being made, in order for 
the key UPR actors to effectively monitor the situation. This cannot be done if the follow-up 
Working Groups are off the record and their outcomes remain unpublished. Furthermore, 
JS29, which has been particularly involved in the Equality Working Group, noted that ‘since 
its mandate and authority are very limited, it is not a sufficiently systematic or strong 
mechanism to assure implementation of human rights commitments’.191 
This highlights a further issue of the US’ non-engagement with the UPR’s mid-term reporting. 
Although there is no official UN mechanism to track progress, one way of monitoring the 
implementation of recommendations is through states having the opportunity to voluntarily 
provide a mid-term report around half way between reviews, to advise on its progress. 
However, only fifty-five states submitted these voluntary mid-term reports in the first cycle, 
with the US declining to submit a report.192 The mid-term report not only allows the key UPR 
actors to monitor the progress of implementation of recommendations, but it also allows the 
state under review to further consider ‘noted’ recommendations. For example, ‘following its 
first UPR in 2011, Denmark accepted [twenty] new recommendations in its 2014 midterm 
report’.193 The US has the resources to collate a mid-term report, and the fact that it did not 
submit one indicates an unwillingness to fully engage with the UPR process. To contribute to 
the mid-term reporting process, the outcome of the Working Groups in 2016 could be collated 
and submitted, which would seemingly involve little extra work for the US government. The 
US has also not submitted a mid-term report for cycle two, despite it being due in early 2018.194 
Other than the voluntary mid-term report, the only other way to monitor implementation of 
recommendations is through the subsequent UPR, four and a half years later. Resolution 
16/21 provides that: 
The second and subsequent cycles of the review should focus on, inter alia, the 
implementation of the accepted recommendations and the developments of the human 
rights situation in the [s]tate under review.195  
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In some respects, this is an effective method of monitoring implementation of accepted 
recommendations, but it is a lengthy and protracted one as we must wait four and a half years 
until the next cycle. Furthermore, the heavy reliance on the recommendations accepted by 
states in previous reviews is potentially a downfall of the UPR, particularly when considering 
its role in the movement towards the abolition of capital punishment. As Charlesworth and 
Larking pointed out, this method of follow-up ‘[risks diverting] attention from the most pressing 
human rights issues in the country concerned’ through non-acceptance of certain 
recommendations in the previous cycle.196 In practice, it allows states to be selective in which 
recommendations it accepts and, as such, states can avoid certain human rights issues if it 
chooses to. The death penalty in the US is a clear example of this in practice. In the US’ first 
review it received many recommendations to abolish the death penalty, none of which were 
accepted by the US. The US State Department then emphasised that the second review in 
2015 was to be based upon the recommendations accepted in the 2010 review,197 giving the 
US the opportunity to avoid this issue. 
 
~ 
 
In general, the success of the UPR can tentatively be measured by the fact that all states to 
date have cooperated with the mechanism.198 Israel is the only country not to engage with the 
UPR process in January 2013 when its government delegation did not submit its National 
Report or attend its scheduled review. However, this was due to Israel boycotting the UNHRC 
in general, rather than specifically the UPR mechanism.199 Its UPR was postponed until 
October 2013, which the delegation attended, and Israel’s second review was completed.200 
Further positives of the UPR include that the ‘big fish’ states of the UN, including the US, 
cannot avoid the scrutiny of its human rights records, as it could do so under the Commission. 
Given the transparency of the UPR mechanism, to be viewed as a human rights violator by 
the international community is not only embarrassing for a state, but also can have damaging 
political implications including on trade and tourism. 
                                                             
196 Charlesworth & Larking (n 4) 15-16. 
197 US Department of State, ‘2015 UPR Report Fact Sheet on U.S. Process’ (6 February 2015) 
<www.state.gov/j/drl/upr/2015/237251.htm> accessed 24 August 2018. 
198 Charlesworth & Larking (n 4) 7. 
199 UPR Info, ‘Israel Absent from its own UPR’ (30 January 2013) <www.upr-info.org/en/news/israel-absent-its-own-upr> 
accessed 24 August 2018. 
200 UNHRC, ‘Universal Periodic Review Second Cycle – Israel’ <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/ILIndex.aspx> 
accessed 24 August 2018. 
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Most scholars are positive about the role the UPR has in promoting and protecting 
international human rights,201 although others disagree.202 For example, Olivier de Frouville 
has faulted the UPR for ‘overshadowing the work of the treaty bodies and of the special 
procedures’.203 Although it is extremely important that the views and recommendations of 
independent experts are given sufficient prominence, the UPR covers all human rights issues, 
as opposed to particular states or issues as the treaty bodies and special procedures do.204 
Also, as de la Vega and Lewis note, ‘[t]he recommendations made to countries under review 
often refer to the treaty bodies and special procedures’.205 This thesis argues that all three 
mechanisms are pivotal to the global protection of human rights. Moreover, this thesis also 
argues that all 193 states have engaged with the UPR, compared with the sporadic 
engagement with the treaty bodies and special procedures. From this alone, the UPR must 
be a step in the right direction. Furthermore, de Frouville has argued that, given the UPR is 
based upon international law, it is difficult for states ‘to address legal norms’, as the extent of 
these norms will be regarded with ‘national interest’ in mind.206 However, this is where the 
expertise of the UN bodies and NGOs, through the Compilation Report and Stakeholder 
Report, is vital, as they can independently verify the extent of the legal obligations. Although 
not perfect, this thesis believes that the UPR is a positive factor towards ensuring the 
protection and promotion of human rights globally. 
However, some critics are still cautious about bestowing too much praise on the 100% 
cooperation of all states at this early stage.207 As discussed above, the UPR is still a politicised 
mechanism due to its intergovernmental nature. Therefore, much of the interaction between 
states is based upon diplomatic relations. Furthermore, as the analysis in Part II of this thesis 
uncovers, the UPR is still in its infancy as a mechanism and, accordingly, the UPR in its current 
form should not be accepted as the finished product. Instead, it must be given the time and 
opportunity to develop to its full potential. 
 
                                                             
201 See, Natalie Baird, ‘The Role of International Non-Governmental Organisations in the Universal Periodic Review of Pacific 
Island States: Can ‘Doing Good’ Be Done Better?’ (2015) Melb J Intl L Vol 16 No 2, FN3, citing, Alex Conte, ‘Reflections and 
Challenges: Entering into the Second Cycle of the Universal Periodic Review Mechanism’ (2011) 9 NZ Y Int’l L 187; Elvira 
Domínguez-Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review – Is There Life beyond Naming and Shaming in Human Rights 
Implementation?’ (2012) 4 NZ L Rev 673; Rosa Freedman, ‘New Mechanisms of the UN Human Rights Council’ (2011) 29 NQHR 
289; Edward McMahon and Marta Ascherio, ‘A Step Ahead in Promoting Human Rights? The Universal Periodic Review of the 
UN Human Rights Council’ (2012) 18 Global Governance 231; Constance de la Vega and Tamara N Lewis, ‘Peer Review in the 
Mix: How the UPR Transforms Human Rights Discourse’ in M Cherif Bassiouni and William A Schabas (eds) New Challenges for 
the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? 
(Intersentia 2011); Charlesworth & Larking (n 4). See, also, Sweeney & Saito (n 39) 222-23; James Gomez and Robin Ramcharan 
(eds) The Universal Periodic Review of Southeast Asia (Palgrave Macmillan 2017) 33-34. 
202 De Frouville (n 33) 250. 
203 Ibid 251. 
204 See, De la Vega and Lewis (n 55) 368-69. 
205 Ibid 372. 
206 Ibid 254. 
207 Kalin (n 8) 30. 
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3.3 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the different stages of the UPR process, and how the US has 
engaged with each stage. The examination of the UPR in this chapter has found that it has 
great potential to be an important and effective international human rights mechanism. In 
particular, the UPR can be used to further the aims of this thesis. Namely, to ensure the US is 
adhering to international law whilst it retains the death penalty, to gather information to further 
the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition, and to ensure the protection and promotion of human rights 
across the world. However, to ensure its success, there are ways in which the UPR needs to 
be improved. Part II of the thesis analyses the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs through the lens of 
capital punishment, in order to assess how effective the UPR has been in the context of the 
abolition of the death penalty. From this analysis, it provides suggestions for reform for the 
UPR to increase its effectiveness, both generally as a human rights mechanism, and 
specifically for the abolition of capital punishment in the US.
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PART II 
Part I of this thesis outlined the US’ thorny relationship with international law in chapter two, 
including its American exceptionalist attitude towards international human rights and the death 
penalty. It also introduced the UPR mechanism in chapter three. Part II of this thesis builds 
upon Part I, by analysing the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs as to the mechanism’s effectiveness 
in the context of the abolition of the death penalty. This analysis is carried out through the 
three broad areas of capital punishment identified by the author: chapter four examines the 
death penalty and the right to a fair trial within the US UPRs, chapter five considers intellectual 
disabilities and mental illnesses within the US UPRs, and chapter six reviews the 
implementation of a death sentence and how the US UPRs dealt with this. These three 
chapters take on a similar structure: they identify the particular issue within the US capital 
system, consider the relevant international and domestic laws, and then analyse the 2010 US 
and 2015 US UPRs. The examination in these chapters highlights the positive and negative 
aspects of the UPR and, from this analysis, chapter seven identifies and argues for a number 
of recommendations to be made to improve the UPR mechanism. These changes aim to firstly 
further the abolition of the death penalty in the US, and, secondly, improve the mechanism in 
its entirety. 
From the outset, it is clear that the US response to the UPR is evidence of the American 
exceptionalism explored in chapter two. Despite this, it is argued in this thesis that the 
exceptionalist attitude should not been seen as a barrier to the UPR being used as a vehicle 
to further the abolition of capital punishment in the US. Changes can be made to the UPR to 
ensure the US cannot hide behind American exceptionalism as an excuse for non-adherence 
to international law, as identified throughout Part II and substantiated in chapter seven. The 
world is now wise to the US’ reliance upon American exceptionalism as an excuse for retaining 
the death penalty and not engaging meaningfully with international human rights on capital 
punishment. This knowledge can now be used to improve the UPR mechanism, ensure US 
adherence to international law whilst it retains the death penalty, and further the Steikers’ 
blueprint for abolition. 
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CHAPTER FOUR  
THE US DEATH PENALTY, THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL, AND THE UNIVERSAL 
PERIODIC REVIEW 
 
4.1 The Right to a Fair Trial in Capital Cases 
The right to a fair trial and due process of law are fundamental human rights embedded within 
both the international legal framework and domestic US law. Article 10 UDHR provides that 
‘[e]veryone is entitled in full equality to a fair and public hearing by an independent and 
impartial tribunal’.1 Furthermore, Article 14 ICCPR sets out the basics required for a trial to be 
‘fair’.2 The ‘equality of arms’ is a principle referred to by the UN, meaning that both the 
prosecution and defence should be equal under the right to a fair trial.3 The equality of arms 
principle includes the rights under Article 14(3), such as the right to a public trial without undue 
delay, the right to counsel and to have adequate time to prepare a defence, the right to cross-
examination, and the right to an interpreter where necessary.4 The Committee has also 
acknowledged that a death sentence that does not follow the fair trial guarantees in Article 14 
will also breach Article 6 ICCPR.5 Furthermore, in order to ensure the specific protections are 
afforded to a capital defendant resulting from Article 14, ECOSOC adopted its Safeguards in 
1984.6 In 1989 and 1996 these Safeguards were strengthened by ECOSOC,7 and to monitor 
adherence to the Safeguards, the UN Secretary-General provides a quinquennial report on 
‘Capital punishment and implementation of the safeguards guaranteeing protection of the 
rights of those facing the death penalty’.8  
In US capital cases, fair trial protections are heightened due to the severity of the punishment, 
earning itself the term ‘super due process’ following the SCOTUS decision in Lockett v. Ohio.9 
                                                             
1 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III) Article 10 [hereinafter referred to as 
‘UDHR’]. 
2 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 
171 Article 14 [hereinafter referred to as ‘ICCPR’]. 
3 See, UNHRC, ‘General Comment No 32’ on ‘Article 14: Right to Equality Before Courts and Tribunals and to a Fair Trial (2007) 
UN Doc CCPR/C/GC/32; Khuseynov and Butaev v Tajikistan Communication No 1263-1264/2004 UN Doc CCPR/C/94/D/1263-
1264/2004 (2008); William A Schabas, The Abolition of the Death Penalty in International Law (3rd edn, CUP 2002) 121. 
4 ICCPR (n 2) Article 14. 
5 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Draft General Comment 36’ on ‘Article 6 Right to Life’ (2017) para 21 [hereinafter referred to as 
‘General Comment 36 2017’]. 
6 ECOSOC ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ ECOSOC Res 1984/50 (25 
May 1984) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1984’]. 
7 ECOSOC ‘Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ 
ECOSOC Res 1989/64 (24 May 1989) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1989’]; ECOSOC ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing 
Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ ECOSOC Res 1996/15 (23 July 1996) [hereinafter referred to as 
‘Safeguards 1996’]. 
8 ECOSOC ‘Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing 
the Death Penalty Report of the Secretary-General’ UN Doc E/2015/49 para 61 (13 April 2015) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report 
of the Secretary-General 2015’]. 
9 Lockett v Ohio 438 US 586 (1978). Roger Hood and Carolyn Hoyle have noted that the ‘super due process’ available for capital 
trials is not working in practice for a myriad of reasons including: ‘[p]oor legal representation for those facing the death penalty; 
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The US has relied upon the fact that its Constitution provides adequate fair trial guarantees 
without the need for the ICCPR’s protections, namely through the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments’ due process clauses, that no person shall ‘be deprived of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law’.10 
This chapter will examine four key areas of due process within the capital system that were 
identified throughout the US UPRs: the right to counsel, racial discrimination, wrongful 
convictions, and foreign nationals’ right to consular assistance. Each of these four due process 
protections will be analysed in turn, in the following format. First, it will be considered how the 
protection is codified in international law, and the extent to which it is assimilated into US law. 
Second, the effectiveness of the UPR will then be examined, analysing to what extent the fair 
trial guarantee was raised in the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs and where this highlights 
inadequacies within the UPR mechanism. 
 
4.2 The Right to Competent Defence Counsel 
4.2.1 International Law 
The equality of arms principle, and Article 14 ICCPR, provide for the international right to legal 
assistance, including state-provided counsel for indigent defendants.11 This right also includes 
having ‘adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence and to communicate 
with counsel of his own choosing’,12 and the right to examine and cross-examine witnesses.13 
The Safeguards reiterate these protections,14 whilst also adding the right to ‘adequate 
assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings, above and beyond the protection 
afforded in non-capital cases’.15 The right to counsel is also noted in the UN Secretary-
General’s quinquennial reports and, in his 2017 supplement to the quinquennial report, the 
Secretary-General noted the correlation between poverty and the denial of the right to counsel 
leading to death sentences.16 
                                                             
huge variations in the rules relating to DNA evidence; inadequate proportionality review of death sentences; flaws in the statutory 
definitions of capital murder; imprecise definitions of intellectual disability; failures to identify and respond appropriately to those 
with mental illness; and a lack of means to ensure the absence of racial discrimination’, Roger Hood & Carolyn Hoyle, The Death 
Penalty: A Worldwide Perspective (5th edn, OUP 2015) 137. 
10 The United States Constitution, Amendment V, Amendment XIV. 
11 ICCPR (n 2) Article 14 3(d); Reid v Jamaica Communication No 250/1987 UN Doc CCPR/C/51/D/355/1989 (1994) para 13; 
Pratt and Morgan v Jamaica Communication No. 210/1986 UN Doc CCPR/C/35/D/210/1986 (1989) para 13.2; La Vende v 
Trinidad and Tobago Communication No 554/1993 UN Doc CCPR/C/61/D/554/1993 (1997) para 5.8. 
12 ICCPR (n 2) Article 14 3(b). 
13 Ibid Article 14 3(e). 
14 Safeguards 1984 (n 6) Number 5; Safeguards 1989 (n 7) para 1(a). 
15 Safeguards 1989 (n 7) para 1(a). 
16 ECOSOC ‘Capital Punishment and Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing 
the Death Penalty Report of the Secretary-General Yearly Supplement of the Secretary-General to his Quinquennial Report on 
Capital Punishment’ UN Doc A/HRC/36/26 para 12 (22 August 2017) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Supplement of the Secretary-
General to his Quinquennial Report on Capital Punishment 2017’]. 
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The Committee has also adjudicated on these rights in a number of cases regarding 
assistance of counsel in capital cases, including in Little v. Jamaica17 and Reid v. Jamaica.18 
In Little, the Committee advised that the definition of ‘adequate’ in terms of the adequate time 
to prepare a defence must be considered on a case-by-case basis,19 but, as in the present 
case, a thirty minute consultation before trial is a clear breach of the standard in Article 
14(3)(b).20 Similarly in Reid, the Committee held that this provision was breached when Reid 
only met with his lawyers on the day of the trial.21 Moreover, not having access to a lawyer 
when initially detained was also considered to be a breach of Article 14 in Rolando v. 
Philippines,22 just as it was decided that allowing two days for an adjournment is not enough 
time for counsel to adequately prepare a defence in Chan v. Guyana.23 Equally, when a 
defendant is only allowed access to counsel for a few moments each day during trial, the 
Committee found in Rayos v. Philippines this will breach Article 14, and, as a sentence of 
death was imposed, this also breached Article 6.24 In Zhuk v. Belarus, it was found that 
spending just five minutes with a lawyer, and being without legal representation for most of 
the ‘investigative proceedings’ despite asking for assistance, was a breach of the equality of 
arms principle and Article 14(3)(b) and (d).25  
 
4.2.2 Domestic Law 
The Sixth Amendment of the US Constitution provides that, ‘[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the 
accused shall…have the assistance of counsel for his defense’.26 Subsequent SCOTUS 
decisions have confirmed the right not only to defence counsel, but to effective legal 
representation.27 The case of Strickland v. Washington28 set out the two-prong test for 
determining whether counsel was ineffective: counsel must have fallen below the objective 
                                                             
17 Little v Jamaica Communication No 283/l988 UN Doc CCPR/C/43/D/283/l988 (1991). 
18 Reid (n 11). 
19 Little (n 17) para 8.3. 
20 Ibid para 8.4. 
21 Reid (n 11) para 11.3. 
22 Rolando v Philippines Communication No 1110/2002, UN Doc CCPR/C/82/D/1110/2002 (2004) para 5.6. 
23 Chan v Guyana Communication No 913/2000, UN Doc UN Doc CCPR/C/85/D/913/2000 (2006) para 6.3. 
24 Rayos v Philippines Communication No 1167/2003, UN Doc CCPR/C/81/D/1167/2003 (2004) para 7.3. 
25 Zhuk v Belarus Communication No 1910/2009, UN Doc CCPR/C/109/D/1910/2009 (2013) para 8.5; See, also, Kovaleva & 
Kozyar v Belarus Communication No 2120/2011, UN Doc CCPR/C/106/D/2120/2011 (2012) para 11.5, 11.7; Khuseynov and 
Butaev v Tajikistan (n 3) para 8.5; Larrañaga v Philippines Communication No 1421/2005, UN Doc CCPR/C/87/D/1421/2005 
(2006) para 7.7. The Committee continues to hear cases regarding the equality of arms and right to legal assistance. For example, 
in 2017, it heard the non-capital case of Chelakh v. Kazakhstan. The Committee found that by not allowing Clelakh’s newly 
appointed counsel time to prepare for the case, this violated his Article 14(3)(b) right. Clelakh v Kazakhstan Communication No 
2645/2015, UN Doc CCPR/C/121/D/2645/2015 (2017). See, also, Allaberdiev v Uzbekistan Communication No 2555/2015, UN 
Doc CCPR/C/119/D/2555/2015 (2017) para 8.9; Berezhnoy v Russian Federation Communication No 2107/2011, UN Doc 
CCPR/C/118/D/2107/2011 (2016) para 9.5. 
26 The United States Constitution, Amendment VI. 
27 Strickland v Washington 466 US 668 (1984); Powell v Alabama 287 US 45 (1932); Gideon v Wainwright 372 US 335 (1963); 
Wiggins v Smith 539 US 510 (2003). 
28 Strickland (n 27). 
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standard of reasonableness, and counsel’s deficiencies must have prejudiced the defendant’s 
case.29  
However, there is a strong presumption of competence afforded to trial counsel. This was 
established in Strickland, wherein Justice O’Connor, in delivering the opinion of the Court, 
stated that counsel must have a ‘wide latitude’ to make ‘tactical decisions’.30 This presumption 
of competence was confirmed following the restrictions placed on federal habeas corpus 
appeals set out in the AEDPA.31 When considering a federal habeas appeal on the grounds 
of ineffective assistance of counsel (‘IAC’) under AEDPA, the courts must ‘use a “doubly 
deferential” standard of review that gives both the [S]tate court and the defense attorney the 
benefit of the doubt’.32 An example of this deference can be seen in the ‘sleeping lawyer case’ 
of Burdine v. Johnson.33 Burdine was convicted of murder and sentenced to death in 1984, 
whilst his ‘attorney slept repeatedly throughout the guilt-innocence phase’ of his trial.34 Despite 
this apparent breach of Burdine’s Sixth Amendment right to effective counsel, a number of 
appeals were denied on these grounds, including a denial of certiorari from SCOTUS.35 It was 
not until 2001 that the Fifth Circuit held that his trial lawyer’s actions had prejudiced the 
defendant’s case and his capital conviction was vacated.36 In fact, since the death penalty was 
reinstated in 1976 up until 2018, SCOTUS has reversed only five capital convictions on the 
grounds of IAC.37 In these successful cases, ineffective conduct has included defence counsel 
providing an expert showing statistics that the defendant was more likely to reoffend because 
he was black,38 failure to investigate the defendant’s previous conviction for a serious 
offence,39 and counsel’s failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence on the basis of 
the defendant’s mental health, family history, and military service.40  
The vast majority of those sentenced to death in the US are indigent, resulting in the 
appointment of state-funded defence counsel, a right which mirrors the Article 14 protection. 
However, public defenders are often underpaid, overworked, and lacking in the requisite 
experience and knowledge to undertake the daunting task of defending a person’s life.41 The 
                                                             
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid 689. 
31 28 USC § 2254. 
32 Burt v Titlow 571 US 12, 15 (2013) (quoting Cullen v Pinholster 563 US 170, 189 (2011)). 
33 Burdine v Johnson 262 F 3d 336 (5th Cir 2001). 
34 Ibid. 
35 Ex Parte Calvin Jerod Burdine 901 S W 2d 456 (Mem) (Texas 1995); Burdine v Texas 515 US 1107 (1995). A writ of certiorari 
is granted by SCOTUS to review the judgment of a lower court. 
36 Burdine v Johnson (n 33). 
37 Buck v Davis 137 S Ct 759 (2017); Rompilla v Beard 545 US 374 (2005); Porter v McCollum 558 US 30 (2009); Wiggins v 
Smith 539 US 510 (2003); Williams v Taylor 529 US 362, 390, 398-9 (2000). Correct as at 24th August 2018. 
38 Buck v Davis (n 37).  
39 Rompilla v Beard (n 37). 
40 Porter v McCollum (n 37); Wiggins v Smith (n 37); Williams v Taylor (n 37). 
41 See, Stephen B Bright, ‘Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crimes but for the Worst Lawyer’ (1994) 
103 Yale LJ 1835. 
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American Bar Association (‘ABA’), a voluntary organisation made up of over 400,000 legal 
professionals in the US,42 plays an important role in the right to counsel in the US by providing 
the ‘Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty 
Cases’.43 These guidelines set out the many standards capital defence counsel must abide 
by. Although the guidelines are not legally binding, they are given considerable weight, 
including by SCOTUS in IAC cases.44 The objective of the guidelines ‘is to set forth a national 
standard of practice for the defence of capital cases in order to ensure high quality legal 
representation for all persons facing the possible imposition or execution of a death sentence 
by any jurisdiction’.45 Practitioners have asserted that, in general, the guidelines ‘include[] a 
responsibility to maintain a strong ongoing relationship with clients, through the post-
conviction stage of representation, even after someone has been convicted of the death 
penalty’.46 However, despite the intentions of the ABA, ‘[i]n 2008, only [ten] of the [thirty-six] 
[S]tates that allowed the death penalty possessed [S]tate-wide capital-defence schemes 
which satisfied the ABA that its standards were being adhered to’.47 
It is therefore unsurprising that many capital post-conviction appeals rely upon trial counsel 
being ineffective. As SCOTUS Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg famously said, ‘[p]eople who are 
well represented at trial do not get the death penalty’.48 Moreover, Hood and Hoyle have 
argued, ‘the inadequacy of the legal representation provided has, in many cases, been shown 
to be the Achilles heel of the death penalty system’.49 This problem with access to competent 
defence counsel continues to be a key issue in the US, and is the type of capital issue 
expected to be raised throughout the UPR. 
 
4.2.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Capital Defence Counsel 
National Report 
In its 2010 National Report, the US clarified that it is realising its obligations under Article 14 
ICCPR regarding access to counsel, by stating that: 
                                                             
42 American Bar Association ‘About the American Bar Association’ <www.americanbar.org/about_the_aba.html> accessed 24 
August 2018. 
43 American Bar Association, ‘Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases’ 
(2003) 31 Hofstra L Rev 913. 
44 See, Justice Breyer’s dissent in Glossip 135 S Ct 2726, 2762 (2015); Justice Breyer’s dissent in Sanchez-Llamas v Oregon 
548 US 331, 382 (2006); Rompilla v Beard (n 37) FN7; Wiggins v Smith (n 37) 524. 
45 ABA, ‘Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases’ (n 43) Guideline 1.1 A.  
46 Elizabeth Compa, Cecelia Trenticosta Kappel & Mercedes Montagnes, ‘Litigating Civil Rights on Death Row: A Louisiana 
Perspective’ (2014) 15 Loy J Pub Int L 293, 308. 
47 Hood & Hoyle (n 9) 280. 
48 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘Inadequate Representation’ <www.aclu.org/other/inadequate-representation> accessed 24 
August 2018. 
49 Ibid 275. 
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The [US] Constitution, as well as federal and [S]tate statutes, provides a number of 
substantive and procedural protections for individuals accused of committing 
crimes…includ[ing]…the right to an attorney…[and] the right to cross-examine 
witnesses at trial.50  
However, despite this assurance from the US government, throughout the 2010 UPR, the 
extent of these protections was questioned, particularly by the Stakeholders. 
Stakeholder Reports 
Considering the importance of the ABA in the capital system, it is no surprise that it was a 
pivotal Stakeholder in both the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs. In 2010, the ABA provided an 
individual Stakeholder submission plus five appended ‘background documents’, presumably 
due to the strict five-page limit on the submission.51 The ABA’s finding that ‘some jurisdictions 
in the US…fail[] to meet fundamental standards of competency of defense counsel’ was cited 
in the main Stakeholder Report.52 However, much more detail was provided in its individual 
submission documents. For example, one of the ABA’s appended background documents was 
a letter to President Obama regarding prosecutors seeking the death penalty for six alleged 
9/11 terrorists.53 In the letter, the ABA set out the basic standards that its guidelines require 
from capital defence counsel:  
The Guidelines call for defense teams -- consisting of at least two qualified attorneys, 
one investigator, and one mitigation specialist -- with sufficient experience and training 
to provide high quality legal representation to those who face execution if convicted.54  
Unfortunately, it is doubtful that other member states participating in the UPR will have read 
this appended background document. The government delegations potentially have 192 
UPRs to contribute to, and so considering the limited time and resources available, it is unlikely 
that states will consider any documents other than the three main reports. However, for UN 
member states formulating recommendations, it would have been beneficial for them to be 
aware of the details of the ABA guidelines before the review took place. Therefore, in order to 
ensure as much information is conveyed to the member states as possible, this thesis argues 
that the advance questions section of the UPR should also include questions from 
Stakeholders, as well as UN member states as it does at present.55 This would allow the ABA 
                                                             
50 UNHRC, ‘National Report of the United States of America’ (23 August 2010) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/1 para 56 [hereinafter 
referred to as ‘National Report 2010’]. 
51 See, chapter 7.1.2. 
52 UNHRC, ‘Summary of Stakeholders Information – United States of America’ (14 October 2010) UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/3/Rev1 para 30 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Stakeholder Report 2010’]. 
53 ABA, ‘United States Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission Annex 4’ (2010) 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRUSStakeholdersInfoS9.aspx> 2 accessed 24 August 2018. 
54 Ibid. 
55 See, chapter 7.2.1. 
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the autonomy to decide what information would be provided to the member states, rather than 
leaving it to the OHCHR to select the content of the Stakeholder Report from its individual 
submission. Although the Stakeholders would be able to ask advance questions on any area 
of human rights, it would be logical for the ABA to deal with the right to counsel, given its 
expertise. 
Although, in its individual Stakeholder submission, the ABA did note that some US States are 
not meeting the requisite standards required of counsel, the only explanation provided for this 
was that the ‘[s]erious deficiencies in the competence of capital counsel remain, in part 
because Congress in 1996 eliminated all federal funding from Post-Conviction Defender 
Organizations’.56 However, there are many other reasons for capital defendants receiving 
ineffective assistance of counsel. For example, the main Stakeholder Report cited the ACLU, 
which had noted other reasons for IAC, such as ‘indigent capital defendants…are often 
appointed attorneys who are overworked and lacking critical resources, and the lack of 
adequate counsel in post-conviction proceedings leaves them with little recourse’.57 This is in 
contravention of ABA guideline 6.1, which states that ‘[t]he Responsible Agency should 
implement effectual mechanisms to ensure that the workload of attorneys representing 
defendants in death penalty cases is maintained at a level that enables counsel to provide 
each client with high quality legal representation’.58  
A further issue is the underpayment of capital attorneys, and ABA guideline 9.1.B provides 
that ‘[c]ounsel in death penalty cases should be fully compensated at a rate that is 
commensurate with the provision of high quality legal representation and reflects the 
extraordinary responsibilities inherent in death penalty representation’.59 The ABA provided 
further detail about under-compensating capital attorneys in its study ‘The State of the Modern 
Death Penalty in the US’ which, although not cited in the UPR, provided a wealth of information 
regarding many different areas of the death penalty. In this context, the study confirmed that 
some States are ‘distinguishing between in-court and out-of-court work and imposing caps on 
compensation’,60 which in turn means these ‘[i]n- and out-of-court rate disparities and flat fees 
can induce counsel to bring a case to trial, as opposed to negotiating a plea agreement that, 
in many capital cases, is in the best interest of the client’.61 What this leads to is ‘[q]ualified 
counsel [opting] not to represent capital defendants out of concerns that their considerable 
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efforts will not be fairly compensated’.62 Given the life or death nature of representing a client 
facing a capital sentence, the amount of money required to ensure counsel is effective should 
be of little concern. If the State budget does not cover competent counsel’s fees 
commensurate with the complexity of the work carried out, then death sentences should not 
be sought by prosecutors, as it violates the equality of arms principle. A lack of funds to pay 
competent counsel does not override a defendant’s Sixth Amendment and Article 14 ICCPR 
rights, and USHRN similarly noted in its Death Penalty Annex to its UPR submission, that 
‘income, like race, should never be a factor in who is sentenced to death’.63  
In its National Report, the US government stated that ‘[m]any of our [S]tates have adopted 
procedures of their own to provide experienced counsel for indigent defendants’.64 However, 
the ACLU’s individual submission contradicts this, making it clear that IAC ‘is not isolated to a 
few bad attorneys; it is a widespread and systematic failure to ensure access to justice for 
defendants facing capital charges and those convicted of capital crimes’.65 The ACLU gives 
substance to its assertions by noting that ‘[i]nadequate counsel not only adversely affects the 
client at trial and sentencing, but substandard attorneys fail to investigate and preserve 
objections, resulting in an inadequate trial record’ which, in turn, causes problems on appeal.66 
It is often difficult enough at the post-conviction stage to prove a violation of the petitioner’s 
constitutional rights, but the ACLU noted that ‘beyond the first appeal to federal court, people 
fighting their death sentences have no constitutional right to a lawyer, and the quality of 
available counsel can be even more abysmal in these appeals than at the trial level’.67 It would 
have added clarity to the problem of access to counsel in the capital system if the ACLU had 
challenged the US government on its statement in the National Report. This could have been 
done during the UNHRC plenary session, or through the advance questions if Stakeholders 
were able to provide them.68 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in the Medellín, Cardenas, and Leal Garcia Cases 
The sub-standard performance by capital attorneys was evidenced by the IACHR in its 
individual submissions to the US UPR, which included the case report of José Ernesto 
Medellín, Ramírez Cardenas, and Leal García, three men facing execution in Texas.69 Their 
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petitions included a number of constitutional and international law grievances, including 
breaches of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (‘VCCR’) and concerns over the 
lethal injection, but also regarding the performance of their State-appointed attorneys. 
Medellín’s trial counsel ‘was under a six month suspension from the practice of law for ethics 
violations in another case’ and had actually been jailed for a week prior to the trial for practicing 
while suspended.70 Furthermore, it was alleged that trial counsel ‘spent a total of eight hours 
on the investigation prior to the commencement of jury selection…[and] failed to strike jurors 
who revealed their inclination to impose automatically the death penalty’.71 In its individual 
submission, the ACLU noted that this was a widespread issue, stating that ‘capital cases are 
among the most complex, time-intensive and financially draining cases to try’ but that despite 
this, ‘[i]ncompetent defense attorneys fail to investigate cases thoroughly, fail to present 
compelling or mitigating evidence, and fail to call witnesses that would aid in the defense’.72 
ABA guideline 10.7.A says that ‘[c]ounsel at every stage have an obligation to conduct 
thorough and independent investigations relating to the issues of both guilt and penalty’,73 
which was breached in this case.  
Another problem raised by the Medellín case and also cited by the ACLU in its individual 
submission, is counsel having ‘a critical lack of resources for investigation and expert 
assistance’.74 Indigent defendants have the right to State-funded expert assistance under Ake 
v. Oklahoma, but only when relevant factors are significant at trial.75 For example, there is no 
right to a jury expert under Ake, and there will often be no funds available to instruct one, as 
in Medellín’s case. This is concerning, as jury selection in the US is a significant part of a 
capital trial – Steven Serio has asserted that it ‘can be a matter of life or death’.76 During a 
trial, a jury expert ‘drafts a model of potential jurors, uses the model to select an appropriate 
jury panel, and educates the attorney about effective jury selection strategies’.77 This, in turn, 
allows counsel to ‘focus[] on questioning the venire’.78  Given the bifurcated nature of capital 
trials which means jurors not only decide on guilt or innocence, but also make the life or death 
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sentencing decision,79 it is crucial that jury selection is effective. ABA guideline 10.10.2.C 
states that ‘[c]ounsel should consider seeking expert assistance in the jury selection 
process’.80 However, Serio argues that, due to the vital role of the jury, a capital defendant 
should have the constitutional right under Ake to a jury selection expert to ensure a fair trial.81 
There are clear examples of defendants who were not afforded a jury expert and were 
subsequently sentenced to death, for example, in the case of Quintero v. State82 and in 
Medellín’s case presented to the IACHR.  
In Cardenas’ case, he was not appointed counsel at the arraignment hearing ‘even though he 
was indigent and was constitutionally entitled to legal representation’.83 This was a violation of 
Cardenas’ Sixth Amendment right to counsel ‘at all critical stages’ which, as per the SCOTUS 
case of Powell v. Alabama, includes arraignment.84 It was also a violation of his right to 
‘adequate assistance of counsel at every stage of the proceedings’, and the equality of arms 
principle, under international law.85 
Leal García’s attorneys were also allegedly ‘grossly ineffective’, and the petitioner reported to 
the IACHR that ‘[o]ne of them had been disciplined on three occasions for violating State ethics 
rules and twice he had been given a probated suspension for neglecting legal matters’.86 
Furthermore, at the penalty phase following the guilty verdict, ‘the prosecution introduced 
evidence that Mr. Leal García had sexually assaulted another teenager who was acquainted 
with him’ despite Leal García never being prosecuted for or convicted of this offence.87 The 
IACHR, citing a previous decision regarding the US death penalty, took particular exception 
to this, finding that ‘the [S]tate’s conduct in introducing evidence of unadjudicated crimes 
during a sentencing hearing was “antithetical to the most basic and fundamental judicial 
guarantees applicable in attributing responsibility and punishment to individuals for crimes”’.88 
Whilst this involves a separate issue regarding prosecution ethics, it is also a failure on the 
part of the defence attorney; Leal García’s defence team ‘did nothing to investigate this 
allegation’89 in contravention of ABA guideline 10.7.A.90  
The IACHR particularly lamented the Texas capital public defender system, noting that it:  
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[Had] no [S]tate-wide agency responsible for providing specialized representation in 
capital cases [and a] great majority of lawyers who handle death penalty cases in Texas 
are sole practitioners lacking the expertise and resources necessary to properly defend 
their clients, and as a result, capital defendants frequently receive deficient legal 
representation.91  
The IACHR concluded that, where there had been violations of the fair trial guarantees, the 
State of Texas should ‘[v]acate the death sentences imposed and provide the victims with an 
effective remedy, which includes a new trial in accordance with the equality, due process and 
fair trial protections’.92 However, despite these grave violations of international and domestic 
law, all three petitioners have now been executed.93 
Through the submission of these petitions to the UPR, the IACHR evidenced that IAC in death 
penalty cases is a serious issue requiring urgent remedy in the US. It highlighted specific 
examples of how incompetent counsel can lead to a death sentence and eventual execution, 
whilst also pointing to the failings of the ‘super due process’ standards that are supposedly 
afforded to capital defendants in the US. Despite this, reference was not made to these cases 
in the Stakeholder Report. These petitions shed light on serious inadequacies in the US capital 
system that all key UPR actors would have benefited from reading about, in particular the 
member states when formulating their recommendations. More transparency is needed from 
the OHCHR as to how they decide upon the content of the reports in order to understand why 
certain important information is being omitted.94 A further example of why this transparency is 
needed is that the issue of IAC was also raised as a concern by the Committee on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’) – the UN treaty body mandated to ensure 
compliance with the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination (‘ICERD’) – in its 2008 report on the US.95 However, whilst this report was cited 
in relation to other human rights issues in the 2010 Compilation Report, this specific issue of 
the right to capital counsel did not make it into the report. 
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Recommendations 
Despite IAC being such an important issue, no recommendations or advance questions were 
provided by any UN member states in 2010. A potential reason for this has been discussed 
by Chauville, who found that the information provided in the Compilation Report ‘has been 
extensively used by countries making recommendations to the state under review’.96 As there 
was no discussion of the issues surrounding the right to capital counsel in the Compilation 
Report, and limited references in the Stakeholder Report, this likely had an effect on the lack 
of advance questions and recommendations. There was a wealth of information regarding the 
issue of IAC in capital cases in the 2010 UPR, but this may not have been relayed to the 
recommending states. This adds to the argument in this thesis that the OHCHR needs to be 
more transparent about how it decides on the content of its reports.97 From this, the UN bodies 
and Stakeholders would be able to amend their individual submissions accordingly. 
Furthermore, by permitting Stakeholders to provide advance questions this would allow key 
issues such as IAC to be raised, especially if it had not been discussed in detail in the main 
reports.98 This may then prompt the member states to provide recommendations on IAC, 
including ways in which the US can improve access to competent counsel in death penalty 
cases, which would provide the impetus for changes to be made in this area in the US. 
 
4.2.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Capital Defence Counsel 
National Report 
Although the right to counsel continued to be a concern between the 2010 and 2015 UPRs, 
the second US UPR saw a sharp reduction in discussion of this issue. There was only one 
mention of it in the three main reports, which was, surprisingly, in the National Report, despite 
there being no recommendations from the previous cycle for the US delegation to respond to. 
The National Report stated that ‘[t]he Constitution requires that all criminal defendants, 
including capital defendants, receive effective assistance of counsel’.99 However, this was just 
recitation of sections of the Constitution, as already discussed, there is clear proof that indigent 
defendants are not receiving effective assistance of counsel. Therefore, this assertion from 
the US should have been challenged throughout the rest of the UPR process. 
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Stakeholder Reports 
There was no discussion of the right to counsel in the Compilation Report or Stakeholder 
Report, and there was only one mention in the individual submissions by AI, which found that 
‘[i]n numerous cases, prisoners have gone to their deaths…where inadequate legal 
representation for indigent defendants meant that the sentencing jury had not been presented 
with the full array of mitigating evidence available in the case’.100 Furthermore, the IACHR did 
not submit case reports in the way that it did in 2010. This was despite a number of potential 
cases regarding IAC being heard by the IACHR, including regarding Ivan Teleguez, wherein 
the petitioner alleged that IAC ‘was a significant --if not the most significant-- factor leading to 
his being found guilty and then being sentenced to death’.101 
The substantial reduction of Stakeholders discussing the right to counsel may have been due 
to the lack of recommendations made in 2010. As the subsequent reviews are based upon 
recommendations accepted in the previous review,102 and there were no recommendations 
made on this in 2010, the US was not expected to carry out any follow-up. Therefore, this may 
have influenced the Stakeholders’ discussion of the right to counsel in their individual 
submissions, indicating that in its current format the UPR is allowing some human rights issues 
to be overlooked. This suggests a need for change in the approach to the UPR, particularly 
from the Stakeholders. This thesis argues that, alongside allowing Stakeholders to submit 
advance questions, another way to strengthen the UPR is to encourage Stakeholders to 
provide reports thematically to ensure important issues regarding the death penalty are not 
overlooked in future reviews.103 For example, the ABA’s expertise is in matters regarding 
counsel and so it could use this expert knowledge to provide a submission specifically on this 
area. Other examples include the Innocence Project, which could submit a report on wrongful 
convictions,104 and Reprieve, which could submit a report on methods of execution due to their 
expert knowledge and engagement on this issue.105 
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Recommendations 
Again, just as in 2010, there were no advance questions asked regarding defence counsel. 
However, despite the reduction in discussion of the right to counsel generally, Poland 
recommended that the US should ‘[s]trengthen safeguards against wrongful sentencing to 
death and subsequent wrongful execution by ensuring, inter alia, effective legal representation 
for defendants in death penalty cases, including at the postconviction stage’.106 Although this 
recommendation was supported by the US, it did not provide any further detail and there is no 
evidence that this has been implemented.107 A potential way to remedy this to ensure that 
during the follow-up to the review implementation is measurable, would be to require the state 
under review to briefly address how it will implement accepted recommendations and why it 
did not accept noted recommendations.108 The US already provides an Addendum to the 
Working Group Report, highlighting reasons behind some accepted or accepted in part 
recommendations, but this is inconsistent.109 In providing such extra details, for example how 
it will implement Poland’s recommendation on ensuring effective counsel in capital cases, this 
would allow a discussion to take place during the UNHRC plenary session. The state under 
review, UN member states, and Stakeholders could provide details regarding how they can 
assist with the implementation of accepted recommendations, while also considering the 
reasons why the noted recommendations were not accepted. This would inform the other UN 
member states and Stakeholders as to the barriers blocking the remedy of specific human 
rights issues in the US and would allow them to formulate their advance questions and 
recommendations for the next UPR accordingly, whilst also disseminating key information 
locally to affect change on the ground. 
The fact that only one recommendation was made on the right to counsel indirectly highlights 
a wider issue with the recommendations in general – that the US has received a high number 
of similar recommendations. For example, in 2015, eight recommendations were made asking 
the US to just generally adhere to ‘human rights instruments’.110 In order to reduce the number 
of recommendations when collating the Outcome Report, the troika should group them 
together thematically.111 The troika already has the option to collate identical and very similar 
recommendations, but this is not being carried out consistently. Furthermore, instead of 
making such broad recommendations on international instruments, which are sometimes used 
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‘a way of sparing states under review from criticism’,112 states should instead consider the 
benefits of providing specific recommendations on important issues, such as the right to 
defence counsel as Poland did in the 2015 review.113 Not only do specific recommendations 
prevent states from hiding from criticism, but their implementation is more measurable, which 
may also encourage engagement on critical human rights issues. 
 
4.3 Racial Discrimination and the Right to a Fair Trial 
4.3.1 International Law 
Another prevalent concern regarding many capital defendants’ right to a fair trial is racial 
discrimination. The racially disparate use of the death penalty contravenes a number of 
international standards, including ICERD, a treaty the US signed in 1966 and acceded to in 
1994 with a list of RUDs.114 Particularly relevant is Article 5, which provides that parties to 
ICERD should: 
[U]ndertake to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms and to 
guarantee the right of everyone, without distinction as to race, colour, or national or 
ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably in the enjoyment of…[t]he right to equal 
treatment before the tribunals and all other organs administering justice.115 
Furthermore, Article 2 UDHR sets out that when applying the rights set out in the UDHR, no 
distinction should be made on the basis of race,116 and Article 2 ICCPR provides that each 
party to the treaty must undertake not to discriminate on the basis of race when applying the 
provisions of the ICCPR.117 Article 26 ICCPR also guarantees that ‘[a]ll persons are equal 
before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In 
this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and 
effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race’.118 Although the US is 
a party to the ICCPR, it lodged an understanding against Articles 2 and 26, explaining that the 
distinctions stated in the Articles would only be permitted when they were ‘rationally related to 
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a legitimate governmental objective’.119 The Committee’s General Comment 36 from 2015 
noted that:  
Data about the disproportionate representation on death row of members of religious or 
ethnic minorities or foreign nationals may suggest that the application of the death 
penalty has an unequal effect on members of such groups and it may be, as a result, 
contrary to [A]rticle 6, paragraphs 1 and 2.120 
This was a cautious approach from the Committee. It did not directly state that executions 
based upon a discriminatory application of a death sentence would violate Article 6 ICCPR, 
but suggested that there was the possibility. This thesis argues that the Committee needs to 
be bolder in its assertions, setting clear guidelines for states. 
Although the Safeguards do not explicitly mention racial discrimination, the Secretary-General 
in the 2015 quinquennial report discusses the issue under the fair trial heading. For example, 
the report highlighted that EU guidelines provide that the death penalty ‘must not be applied 
or used in a discriminatory manner on any ground including political affiliation, sex, racial or 
ethnic origin’.121 The report also specifically noted the issue of black people being vastly 
overrepresented in the death row population in the US.122 In fact, the Secretary-General’s 
yearly supplement to the quinquennial report in 2017 was focused on the right to equality and 
the death penalty.123 It noted that ‘58 per cent of death row inmates in the [US] are from African 
American, Hispanic or other communities with economically vulnerable backgrounds’.124  
 
4.3.2 Domestic Law 
Article 5 ICERD is similarly worded to the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the US Constitution, which provides that the US shall not ‘deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws’.125 The Fourteenth Amendment was 
enacted in 1868 following the abolition of slavery in the US, and there is a history of racial 
discrimination in the US that traces back to slavery and lynchings.126 As AA4RR noted in its 
individual UPR submission in 2015, ‘[f]rom the days of slavery, Jim Crow and Willie Lynch to 
more modern issues of racial discrimination, the plight of Africans in the [US] has continually 
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received world-wide attention’.127 In Furman v. Georgia, Justice Douglas found in his 
concurring opinion, that ‘[i]t would seem to be incontestable that the death penalty inflicted on 
one defendant is ‘unusual’ if it discriminates against him by reason of his race, religion, wealth, 
social position, or class, or if it is imposed under a procedure that gives room for the play of 
such prejudices’.128 Matthew C. Altman believes that Justice Douglas was ‘worried specifically 
that juries were basing their sentencing decisions on racial prejudice, sentencing black 
defendants to death who did not deserve it and giving lighter sentences to white defendants 
who deserved the death penalty’.129 Although the death penalty was reinstated in 1976 on the 
basis that it would be applied more fairly,130 research has shown that race continues to be 
influential in a jury’s decision to sentence to death.131  
Detailed studies have been carried out on the link between race and the death penalty, which 
show ‘a correlation between holding racially biased beliefs and support for the death penalty 
in the [US]’.132 For example, the Baldus Study, a sophisticated study carried out on sentencing 
within cases in the 1970s and the racial disparities in the death penalty in Georgia,133 found 
that there was a 4.3:1 chance of a defendant receiving the death penalty for killing a white 
person than a black person.134 From this, the authors concluded that the race of the victim is 
almost as influential as a defendant having previously been convicted of crimes such as 
robbery.135 Furthermore, when the raw data was analysed it showed that even in this category 
black defendants were more likely to be executed than white defendants.136 In the case of 
McCleskey v. Kemp,137 the appellant attempted to rely upon the Baldus study to show that ‘the 
Georgia capital sentencing process is administered in a racially discriminative manner in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments’.138 However, in a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS 
rejected this argument and, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Powell found that for 
an Equal Protection claim to stand, an appellant must prove ‘that the decision-makers in his 
case acted with discriminatory purpose’. 139 The majority found McCleskey had not done this, 
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as he had relied solely on the findings of the Baldus study, rather than on the facts of his own 
case.140 
This problem has not improved over time. The Death Penalty Information Center (‘DPIC’) 
carried out a study of all capital cases from 1976 to June 2015, which provided statistical 
results showing that ‘[o]ver 75% of the murder victims in cases resulting in an execution were 
white, even though nationally only 50% of total murder victims generally are white’.141 
Furthermore, the 2015 report to the UN Secretary General on the consequences of the death 
penalty identified that the race of the victim and/or the defendant is a ‘major factor’ in death 
penalty cases and stated that, in the US, racial discrimination ‘persists unabatedly’.142 
Concerns about these statistics are echoed by many other UN mechanisms, including 
throughout the UPR.  
 
4.3.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Racial Discrimination in the Death Penalty 
In its 2010 National Report, the US addressed civil society’s concerns about ‘racial disparities 
in sentencing’143 and advised that the federal capital system ‘operates to help ensure that the 
death penalty is not applied in an arbitrary, capricious, or discriminatory manner’.144 However, 
despite this assurance from the US government, CERD was cited in the 2010 Compilation 
Report as it ‘remained concerned about the persistent racial disparities regarding the 
imposition of the death penalty’.145 Furthermore, both CERD and the Committee 
‘recommended that the State adopt all necessary measures, including a moratorium, to ensure 
the death penalty is not imposed as a result of racial bias’.146 The Compilation Report did not 
advise whether CERD or the Committee provided any further guidance on how this should be 
carried out. However, upon consideration of CERD’s original report, in its Concluding 
Observations to the US, CERD ‘recommend[ed] that the [US] undertake further studies to 
identify the underlying factors of the substantial racial disparities in the imposition of the death 
penalty, with a view to elaborating effective strategies aimed at rooting out discriminatory 
practices’.147 This was also recommended on in the 2010 UPR by France, which suggested 
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the US should ‘[u]ndertake studies to determine the factors of racial disparity in the application 
of the death penalty, to prepare effective strategies aimed at ending possible discriminatory 
practices’.148 Although the US accepted this recommendation it provided no explanation as to 
how it would be implemented,149 which became an issue when it was made clear in the 2015 
UPR that this recommendation had not been acted upon.150 This indicates a flaw in the UPR’s 
follow-up to the review. As argued above, a way to remedy this to ensure implementation is 
measurable, would be to require the state under review to briefly address how it will implement 
accepted recommendations and why it did not accept noted recommendations.151 
Definition of Racial Discrimination 
A further issue highlighted in the 2010 UPR was the incompatibility between the definition of 
racial discrimination under international law and US law: international law protects against 
non-intentional discrimination, whereas US law does not. To raise this point within the UPR, 
the Compilation Report cited CERD, which had ‘recommended that the [s]tate review the 
definition of racial discrimination used in the federal and [S]tate legislation and in court 
practice, so as to ensure it is consistent with that of [ICERD]’.152 This was also raised by the 
Stakeholders in 2010. In the Stakeholder Report, it was cited that ‘USHRN noted the failure to 
address de facto and de jure discrimination and the definition of discrimination is not in 
accordance with the ICERD’.153 In fact, one of the twenty-five annexes to USHRN’s individual 
submission was a document dedicated to ICERD. In this Annex, they further explained that 
the difference between definitions is that ‘[w]ith few exceptions cognizable racial discrimination 
in the US requires evidence of intent to discriminate’ and ‘[t]his requirement is contrary to 
[ICERD’s] framework’,154 as ICERD’s definition includes non-intentional discrimination.155 
Non-intentional discrimination encompasses the links between race, poverty, and education 
with crime and, ultimately, the death penalty. Therefore, a key factor to consider is how the 
US can be held accountable specifically to the ICERD standard through the UPR. China 
recommended on this issue in 2010, suggesting that the US ‘[m]odify the definition of the 
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discrimination in the law to bring it in line with the ICERD and other international standards’.156 
However, the US noted this recommendation, stating that ‘[w]e believe that our law is 
consistent with our [I]CERD obligations’.157 The language used by the US in noting our 
obligations, indicates the manifestation of American exceptionalism in seeking to differentiate 
between its obligations and other member states’ obligations under ICERD. This is also 
opaque and closed-off language, the direct opposite of the transparency encouraged by the 
UPR. 
Furthermore, the Organization for Defending Victims of Violence (‘ODVV’) noted that the link 
between poverty and race ‘creates structural problems that go far beyond patterns of 
income…it interacts with a number of mutually reinforcing factors, such as poor educational 
attainment, low-paying wages and inadequate housing, which create a vicious cycle of 
marginalization and exclusion of minorities’.158 USHRN, in its Annex to its individual report, 
argued that a ‘[r]eduction of racial disparities in poverty, education, health, and incarceration 
are essential to a healthy and vibrant democracy and will put the US on the path to eliminating 
racial discrimination’.159 These basic economic and social factors must be remedied in order 
to reduce racial disparities in the criminal justice system. In its Death Penalty Annex, USHRN 
cited the Committee in its 2006 report on the US, which recommended the US ‘assess the 
extent to which [the] death penalty is disproportionately imposed on ethnic minorities and on 
low-income population groups, as well as the reasons for this, and adopt all appropriate 
measures to address the problem’.160 This was not cited in the Stakeholder Report or 
Compilation Report, but is a vital strand to the racial discrimination argument, furthering the 
position in this thesis that there needs to be more transparency from the OHCHR as to how it 
decides upon the content of its reports.161 This thesis also argues that links should be made 
between economic and social factors and the death penalty, and this could be done through 
member states providing specific recommendations on this, as opposed to the broadly drafted 
ones often seen in the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs.162 
Stakeholder Reports 
More generally, the Stakeholder Report cited AI, USHRN, and the ABA regarding their findings 
that racial disparities permeate the entirety of the criminal justice and capital systems.163 The 
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Report noted that ‘AI called on the US to address racial disparities in the criminal justice 
system and to pass legislation to bar racial profiling in law enforcement, with effective 
complaints and compliance procedures’.164 It also noted that the ‘ABA reported that some 
jurisdictions in the US continue to impose the death penalty in a manner that reflects racial 
disparities’.165 It is positive that racial discrimination featured in the Stakeholder Report, but 
there was much more discussion on this issue in the individual Stakeholder submissions. For 
instance, Advocates for Human Rights (‘AHR’) acknowledged that ‘[s]tudies show defendants 
convicted of killing white victims are more likely to receive death sentences than defendants 
convicted of killing African-American victims’.166 AHR went on to reference a 2007 study 
sponsored by the ABA,167 which ‘showed African-American defendants received the death 
penalty at three times the rate of white defendants where the victims were white’.168 Given the 
many studies showing that there is clear racial discrimination in the capital system, it can be 
questioned what the value of another study on the implications of race and the death penalty, 
as recommended in the US UPR, would be in practice. Alternatively, this thesis argues that it 
would be better to recommend on how the US can use these studies to eliminate racial 
discrimination, including focusing on the definition of discrimination.169 
The IACHR provided an individual submission of its case report on Orlando Hall, ‘an indigent 
African-American man’ who was sentenced to the federal death penalty in Fort Worth, Texas 
‘by an all-white jury’.170 Although not cited in the main report, this submission by the IACHR 
raised two issues: first, racial discrimination in the federal death penalty, and second, the issue 
of racially discriminate juries. 
The federal death penalty is often cited by the US government in terms of the rare numbers of 
capital sentences and executions.171 However, in the case before the IACHR regarding 
Orlando Hall, the Federal Death Penalty Resource Council provided statistics that ‘illustrate[d] 
that the death penalty [was] applied more than three times as often against non-whites as 
against whites and more than twice as often against blacks as against whites’.172 Furthermore, 
the petitioner had specifically cited the federal death penalty in Texas, wherein ‘black 
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defendants are 5.3 times more likely than white defendants to face the death penalty in Texas 
federal prosecutions; and 10.3 times more likely than Hispanic defendants’.173 This suggests 
that whilst the federal death penalty is not used as often, it is more discriminatory based on 
race. 
The second issue this case raised concerned racially discriminatory juries. A number of 
studies into capital juries have been carried out in the US, with the Capital Jury Project (‘CJP’) 
finding that ‘what mattered most in influencing whether or not a defendant was sentenced to 
death was the racial composition of the jury’.174 The CJP found ‘this had the greatest impact 
in cases where the defendant was black and the victim white’.175 Studies carried out by Bowers 
et al on behalf of CJP showed that ‘[w]here there were four or fewer white males on the jury, 
[thirty] per cent of cases were sentenced to death, but where there were five or more [seventy] 
per cent were sentenced to death’.176  
In Orlando Hall’s case, the petitioner argued that the case was tried ‘in the Northern District of 
Texas, Ft. Worth Division, rather than in the Eastern District of Arkansas, Pine Bluff Division, 
where the murder occurred and where African-Americans comprised a significant[ly] larger 
percentage of the prospective jury pool’.177 This did not provide a fair cross-section of society 
and was not a jury of Mr. Hall’s peers, which is a breach of his Sixth Amendment right 
according to Taylor v. Louisiana.178 This indicates that the issue of racial discrimination in the 
modern-day death penalty is even more complex and nuanced. It cannot just be categorised 
into the race of the defendant or victim, but also the race of the jurors. The ACLU in its 
individual submission also noted that many defendants ‘have suffered serious constitutional 
violations, such as…racially discriminatory jury selection’.179 NGO International CURE made 
an important recommendation to the US government in its individual submission to ‘[m]ake 
certain juries actually reflect the racial make-up of the community’.180 However, this 
recommendation is not measurable, as Stakeholders cannot provide recommendations in the 
UPR. This adds weight to the argument in this thesis that the Stakeholders should be allowed 
to provide advance questions, in order to ask questions on issues such as the racial 
composition of juries, which do not make it into the main report, but are equally as important.181 
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Recommendations 
The US received thirty recommendations in total on the issue of racial discrimination in 
2010,182 although only one of these recommendations was about the death penalty and a 
second was more generally regarding the criminal justice system.183 Considering the negative 
impact racial discrimination has on the death penalty and the broad discussion by the UN 
mechanisms and civil society, more recommendations on this issue would have been 
beneficial to raise awareness and to affect change on the ground in the US.184 
As discussed above, France recommended that the US ‘[u]ndertake studies to determine the 
factors of racial disparity in the application of the death penalty, to prepare effective strategies 
aimed at ending possible discriminatory practices’.185 This was supported by the US,186 but 
there is no evidence available to suggest this has been implemented. Austria recommended 
that the US ‘[t]ake appropriate legislative and practical measures to prevent racial bias in the 
criminal justice system’.187 This was also supported by the US,188 but, again, there is no 
evidence that this has been implemented. Furthermore, it appears that the US States are 
doing the opposite of Austria’s recommendation, as evidenced by the repealing of North 
Carolina’s Racial Justice Act. In a move against ending racial discrimination in the death 
penalty, ‘[o]n 10 June 2013, in North Carolina, the State’s Racial Justice Act from 2009, which 
allowed death row inmates to challenge their sentences on racial grounds, was repealed by 
the Governor. He claimed that the Act “created a judicial loophole to avoid the death penalty 
and not a path to justice”’.189 In fact, in July 2018, four people on death row in North Carolina 
who had their death sentences commuted when the Racial Justice Act was instated, but then 
were resentenced to death when the Act was repealed, raised a legal challenge against the 
State court’s decision.190 To remove a person from death row because of racial discrimination, 
only to resentence them to death because of retroactive repealing of legislation, appears to 
be cruel and unusual punishment. This should also be raised in future US UPRs. 
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4.3.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Racial Discrimination in the Death Penalty 
The three main documents for the 2015 UPR indicated that racial discrimination in the criminal 
and capital systems continues to be a major issue. A key point that was reiterated throughout 
the reports related to France’s 2010 recommendation on undertaking studies on racial 
disparities in the death penalty.191 Although in the National Report, the US noted that ‘[t]he 
President has directed DOJ to conduct a review of how the death penalty is being applied in 
the [US]’,192 it failed to provide any further information about this study, and whether it was 
directly related to racial discrimination.  
The Compilation Report noted that the High Commissioner had ‘expressed concern at the 
disproportionate number of young African Americans who had died in encounters with police 
officers, or who were in prisons and on death row’,193 and that the High Commissioner ‘urged 
the [US] authorities to conduct in-depth examinations into how race-related issues were 
affecting law enforcement and the administration of justice, both at the federal and [S]tate 
levels’.194 Furthermore, the SRE was cited in the Compilation Report as it had noted that the 
US ‘supported the UPR recommendation to determine the factors in the racial disparity in the 
application of the death penalty and to prepare strategies aimed at ending discriminatory 
practices, indicating that further statistical analysis and studies on sentencing disparities were 
highly anticipated’.195 Also, in its individual submission, Joint Submission 17 (‘JS17’) ‘called 
upon the US to identify the root causes of ethnic disparities in pertaining the death penalty and 
ethnically disparate sentencing, with the objective of developing means to eliminate ethnic or 
racial bias in the criminal justice system’.196 During the UNHRC plenary session, HRW ‘urged 
the [US] to specify how they plan to implement recommendations they supported on looking 
into racial disparities in the application of the death penalty’.197 Furthermore, Germany also 
provided an advance question on this particular issue198 and France recommended upon it 
again.199 This is an example of good practice in the UPR, as all key actors came together to 
provide information and recommendations on the same issue in order to affirm its importance 
to the US, which in turn will put pressure on the US to implement France’s recommendation. 
This can be used as a model for future UPRs on other issues. 
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Definition of Racial Discrimination 
The Compilation Report cited the fact that ‘special procedures mandate-holders called upon 
the Government to examine laws that could have a discriminatory impact on African 
Americans, and to ensure that such laws were in compliance with the country’s international 
legal obligations’.200 Just as it did in 2010, ‘CERD reiterated its concern that the definition of 
racial discrimination used in federal and [S]tate legislation and in court practice was not in line 
with [ICERD]’.201 Azerbaijan also provided an advance question on this, noting CERD’s 
concerns and asking the US ‘[w]hich measures are envisaged by the Government in order to 
address the concerns of CERD’?202 However, this was not addressed in the interactive 
dialogue by the US delegation, indicating that the role of the advance questions in the UPR 
needs to be reconsidered.203  
Ghana provided a similar recommendation to that of China in 2010, recommending that the 
US ‘[b]ring in line the definition of racial discrimination in federal and [S]tate legislation’ with 
ICERD,204 which the US supported in part, noting that ‘although we recognize there is always 
room for improvement, we believe that our law is consistent with our [I]CERD obligations’.205 
Albeit small, progress was made between the two UPRs, as the recommendation had 
progressed from being noted in 2010 to accepted in part in 2015, with the US acknowledging 
that the law could be improved. Stakeholders and UN member states now need to consider 
how they can approach this issue in 2020 to ensure it is accepted and implemented. 
Furthermore, cited in the Stakeholder Report, AA4RR suggested potential solutions to 
ensuring ‘[m]eaningful implementation of [I]CERD and ICCPR’ stating that it ‘requires a 
permanent institutional mechanism to monitor domestic compliance with the [I]CERD and 
ICCPR, conduct awareness-raising on it and ensure that treaty commitments are in fact being 
fulfilled by federal, [S]tate, and local authorities’.206 All of these observations and 
recommendations were noted in the main documents in 2015, indicating that the key UPR 
actors were identifying the severe problem of racial disparities in the US. 
Stakeholder Reports 
Again in 2015, the race of the victim featured as a cause for concern for the Stakeholders. AI 
noted in its individual submission that ‘[s]tudies demonstrate that race, particularly race of [the] 
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murder victim, plays a role in who is sentenced to death’.207 Other Joint Submissions also 
considered this issue, including JS29, which highlighted that ‘[i]t is well-documented that the 
likelihood of receiving a death sentence increases exponentially if the victim is [w]hite’.208 Joint 
Submission 41 (‘JS41’) also found that ‘[t]hose convicted of killing whites are more likely to be 
sentence to death than those convicted of killing blacks and black defendants are more likely 
to be sentenced to death regardless of the race of their victim’.209 In fact, JS29 provided cogent 
recommendations to the US government on this issue in its individual submission: 
(a) DOJ should develop and implement training to reduce implicit and explicit racial bias, 
and encourage criminal justice agencies at the [S]tate level to collect and evaluate data 
on racial outcomes at key decision making points in the justice system;  
(b) The Obama [A]dministration should encourage [S]tates to repeal the death penalty;  
(c) The [A]dministration should also urge Congress to introduce federal legislation to 
eliminate capital murder from federal law.210 
However, as already discussed, these recommendations are not measurable within the UPR, 
as they were made by a Stakeholder in its individual submission. As argued above, the 
Stakeholders should be permitted to submit advance questions to present such issues.211 
Alongside this, the Stakeholders should continue to lobby member states, specifically 
regarding the wording of their recommendations and should provide examples such as the 
recommendation from JS29 above. An ideal platform for this is during the UPR Pre-Sessions, 
organised by UPR Info to give more flexibility to the Stakeholders in the UPR process,212 as 
the Pre-sessions attract wide attendance from both government and civil society.213 
Advance Questions 
There were four advance questions asked in 2015 on this issue from Azerbaijan, Belgium, 
China, and Germany, which is an improvement on the 2010 UPR when no questions were 
asked. Particularly relevant was Belgium’s advance question asking the US ‘to give an 
overview of:…[t]he evolution in the alleged overrepresentation of ethnic minorities on death 
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row and the evolution of these numbers since the first UPR cycle’.214 Furthermore, Germany 
asked ‘how the [US] currently assesses the factors of racial disparity in the application of the 
death penalty’.215 The US replied very broadly to these during the interactive dialogue, stating 
that ‘[i]n all cases where the death penalty is or can be applied, the [US] seeks to ensure the 
absence of racial discrimination and respect for legal and procedural safeguards’.216 This does 
not directly answer the questions and it points to the need for clarification on the role of the 
advance questions. If they are to be a focal point of the UPR, as this thesis argues they should 
be, the troika should have a role in directing the state under review to the advance questions 
during the interactive dialogue to ensure they are acknowledged and answered.217 
Recommendations 
Racial discrimination was widely discussed throughout the interactive dialogue in the 2015 US 
UPR, and there was also a sharp rise in recommendations on this point. The US received fifty-
seven recommendations on this area218 compared with thirty in 2010. This indicates a link 
between the increase in general discussion in this area throughout the three main UPR 
documents and the amount of recommendations provided, highlighting the importance of the 
content of the documents.219 
However, only three recommendations were made regarding the death penalty and race. 
Angola recommended that the US ‘[i]dentify the root causes of ethnic disparities concerning 
especially those sentenced to capital punishment in order to find ways [to] eliminate ethnic 
discrimination in the criminal justice system’.220 Although Angola termed this ‘ethnic’ 
discrimination, it is synonymous with racial discrimination and the recommendation was 
accepted by the US.221 France, again, asked the US to ‘[i]dentify the factors of racial disparity 
in the use of the death penalty and develop strategies to end possible discriminatory 
practices’.222 As discussed above, the need for the repetition of this recommendation points to 
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a flaw in the follow-up to the review section of the UPR, which should be remedied.223 
Furthermore, as France provided a similar recommendation in 2010, it may be prudent for the 
French delegation to consider asking an advance question on how this has been implemented 
in the 2020 US UPR.224 Raising it before the recommendations would allow for a discussion 
to take place in the interactive dialogue, whilst also making other recommending member 
states aware of the issue. This is particularly relevant given that the Trump Administration has 
taken office since the 2015 review, and will perhaps have different priorities regarding UPR 
recommendations.225 
Belgium’s recommendation was more pointed, asking the US to ‘[t]ake specific measures in 
follow-up to the recommendations of the…Committee to the [US] in 2014 with regards to 
capital punishment such as measures to avoid racial bias’.226 This was also mentioned by 
Montenegro in the interactive dialogue, which ‘noted the concerns of [the Committee] about 
racial disparities in the imposition of the death penalty’.227 The US supported Belgium’s 
recommendation in part, advising that ‘[w]e support consideration of these recommendations, 
noting that we may not agree with all of them’.228 In the Appendix to the Addendum report 
provided by the US, the delegation explained further that ‘[w]e support this recommendation 
to the extent that it calls upon us to consider the non-binding 2014 recommendations from [the 
Committee]’.229 However, no action has actually been taken regarding measures to ensure the 
avoidance of racial bias in the capital system. This indicates that the suggested changes to 
the UPR mechanism discussed in this section should be made to encourage action to be taken 
on the issue of race and the death penalty. 
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4.4 Wrongful Convictions 
4.4.1 International Law 
International protections guaranteeing the right to a fair trial are ultimately aimed at preventing 
wrongful convictions. Additionally, in capital cases, there are extra precautions in place to 
protect against executing the innocent. For example, Article 6(4) ICCPR states that ‘[a]nyone 
sentenced to death shall have the right to seek pardon, or commutation of sentence’.230 
Safeguard number 7 provides the same protection,231 and this was strengthened by ECOSOC 
in 1989, which confirmed that there should be ‘mandatory appeals or review with provisions 
for clemency or pardon in all cases of capital offense’.232 Furthermore, Safeguard number 4 
states that ‘capital punishment may be imposed only when the guilt of the person charged is 
based on clear and convincing evidence leaving no room for an alternative explanation of the 
facts’.233  
However, although there are protections in place at the international level to prevent wrongful 
convictions, there is currently no international law or remedy in place for those who want to 
claim actual innocence.234 Brandon L. Garrett has argued that the right to pursue legal 
recourse for claims of actual innocence should be a form of customary international law.235 
This right to innocence claims could also be codified, potentially through additional 
Safeguards. 
 
4.4.2 Domestic Law 
The constitutional due process rights already discussed in this chapter are all in place to 
protect against wrongful convictions. Broadly, there are two ‘types’ of wrongful conviction: a 
claim of actual innocence, or a claim of a procedural wrongful conviction.236 The Eighth 
Amendment’s cruel and unusual punishment clause protects against the execution of an 
innocent person,237 and the other constitutional safeguards are in place to ensure there are 
no procedural wrongful convictions. In the US, there is a lengthy appeals process following a 
death sentence, including an automatic direct appeal immediately following sentence. 
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However, despite the protections in place to prevent wrongful convictions, a capital appellant 
cannot rely on a claim of actual innocence for a federal habeas appeal. This was set out in the 
1993 decision of SCOTUS in Herrera v. Collins.238 Chief Justice Rehnquist found that, 
because Herrera did ‘not seek excusal of a procedural error so that he may bring an 
independent constitutional claim challenging his conviction or sentence, but rather argue[d] 
that he is entitled to habeas relief because newly discovered evidence shows that his 
conviction is factually incorrect’, his claim of actual innocence must fail.239 The opinion of the 
Court noted that, although actual innocence cannot form the basis of a federal habeas appeal, 
the clemency process is in place to hear claims of actual innocence.240 
In the capital system, clemency is a granting of mercy from execution, giving it a significant 
role in the capital process with the aim of achieving finality. Despite this, there are numerous 
different frameworks regarding clemency in the US. For example, ‘[i]n [thirteen] American 
[S]tates the Governor has sole authority to grant clemency, in eight the Governor must have 
a recommendation from a Board, in a further nine the recommendation is non-binding, and in 
five a Board determines clemency’.241 Furthermore, only POTUS may grant clemency to 
federal prisoners.242 As the clemency frameworks differ from State to State, these differences 
lead to inconsistencies. Sarah L. Cooper and Daniel Gough noted that there are a further 
‘number of obstacles that may hinder innocents’ abilities to successfully navigate the clemency 
process’, and these include ‘transparency issues, imbalanced administrative board 
compositions, and barriers to meaningful review’.243 Perhaps the biggest issue with clemency 
in the US, particularly in capital cases, is that ‘American executives primarily utilize the 
clemency power for political expedience rather than to remedy wrongful convictions’.244 This 
was evidenced by the Illinois Governor, George Ryan, who, two days before he left office, 
placed a moratorium on the death penalty in Illinois and granted clemency to those who were 
on death row.245 Whilst this appeared to be a positive step towards total abolition on behalf of 
the Republican Governor, it was still politicised. If Governor Ryan had been up for re-election 
it would be unlikely that he would have acted in the same manner. Furthermore, Governor 
Ryan’s ‘clemency did not focus on the morality of the death penalty as a punishment…[but] 
was largely rooted in a critique of its application and administration’.246 Therefore, this act was 
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not necessarily a nod towards complete abolition in the US, but more akin to the reasoning in 
Furman v. Georgia.247 
The fundamental aim of due process is to prevent wrongful convictions. However, as Hood 
and Hoyle asserted, ‘America’s super due-process has not prevented innocent persons being 
sentenced to death’,248 and 162 people have been exonerated from death row since 1973.249 
Furthermore, due process cannot ‘guarantee that some innocent people have not been 
executed’.250 Hood and Hoyle contend ‘that no safeguards can be devised that can absolutely 
rule out the incidence of wrongful conviction and execution’.251 There are a number of reasons 
for wrongful convictions in the US, including, eyewitness misidentification,252 false 
confessions,253 government misconduct,254 problems with crime laboratories,255 and ‘junk 
science’.256 Given the irreversible finality of an execution, the concern of wrongful capital 
convictions was expected to feature within the US UPRs. 
 
4.4.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Wrongful Capital Convictions 
Despite expectations, in the 2010 US UPR, the issue of wrongful convictions and actual 
innocence featured minimally. Although it was raised by eight Stakeholders in their individual 
submissions,257 there was no discussion in the National Report or Compilation Report and it 
was not directly referenced in the main Stakeholder Report. This was in spite of USHRN in its 
Death Penalty Annex to its individual submission clarifying that ‘[p]unishment of the innocent 
as a result of government-sanctioned misconduct or discrimination violates Article 7 of the 
ICCPR’.258 
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Stakeholder Reports 
The Stakeholder Report did indirectly note that the ‘ABA indicated that post-conviction 
collateral review continues to be curtailed by [AEDPA]’.259 For those who are not scholars or 
practitioners of US law, which most government delegates making recommendations in the 
UPR will not be, this required clearer explanation of the limits AEDPA has placed on post-
conviction review in terms of uncovering potential wrongful convictions. The ACLU did this in 
its individual submission, noting that AEDPA and the USA PATRIOT Improvement and 
Reauthorization Act of 2005 ‘drastically limit the availability of federal habeas corpus relief for 
defendants sentenced to death’260 and, as such, these laws potentially leave innocent people 
‘with no recourse’ to establishing their innocence.261 However, as this was not discussed in 
the Stakeholder Report, recommending states may have missed the significance of the ABA’s 
comment cited in the main report, and in turn this may have prevented recommendations being 
formulated based upon this information.262 
In its individual submission, AI noted that ‘[m]ore than 100 prisoners have been released from 
US death rows since 1977 on grounds of innocence [and in] numerous cases, prisoners have 
gone to their deaths despite serious doubts about their guilt’.263 AHR provided that ‘[t]he death 
penalty in the [US] violates human rights regarding due process of law, right to liberty and 
security, and equal protection of law by subjecting innocent people to punishment’,264 and 
discussed the troubling case of Cameron Todd Willingham, a potentially innocent man 
executed in Texas in 2004.265 Willingham was convicted and sentenced to death in 1992 for 
the murder of his three children through arson. However, leading up to his execution, his 
lawyers provided evidence through a ‘nationally recognized arson expert’ who testified that 
his conviction was based upon ‘erroneous forensic analysis’.266 This case continues to gain 
attention due to the fact there is the possibility that Willingham was innocent, despite the 
prosecutor in the case being cleared of misconduct in a trial in May 2017.267 Furthermore, 
Willingham is not the only potentially innocent person to be executed, the DPIC lists fifteen 
cases with ‘strong evidence of innocence’ on its website.268 
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Hood and Hoyle addressed the point of potential compensation for the family of Willingham, if 
it were found that he was actually innocent. They found that ‘[a]bout half the US [S]tates have 
enacted statutory compensation schemes to provide relief for those who have been wrongfully 
convicted and incarcerated’ although they ‘fail to take account of the harm of wrongful 
execution, and the families are not likely to receive compensation’.269 USHRN briefly raised 
the issue of compensation in the Death Penalty Annex to its individual submission, noting that 
the US ‘does not always compensate individuals who have been wrongly convicted and 
sentenced to death’.270 However, this issue was not explored any further and was not included 
in the Stakeholder Report. 
Although, again, this was not discussed in the Stakeholder Report, the IACHR submitted its 
case report on Medellín, Ramírez Cardenas, and Leal García in the 2010 UPR.271 The issue 
of ‘junk science’ played a key part in the convictions. For example, Leal García’s conviction 
was partially based upon bite-mark evidence which the petitioner argued ‘allegedly result[s] in 
63.5% false positives’.272 The National Academy of Sciences in its ‘Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward’ report, called bite mark evidence 
‘controversial’,273 noting that ‘bite marks on the skin will change over time…[which] may 
severely limit the validity of forensic odontology’.274  
Furthermore, in Leal García’s case, it was alleged that the victim ‘had been sexually assaulted 
by several men on the night she was killed but the prosecution never attempted to match their 
dental impressions with the marks found in her body’.275 It was also stated that ‘post-conviction 
counsel retained a forensic odontologist whose testimony shed serious doubt on the reliability 
of the bite mark analysis…because of the way in which the evidence was handled and 
explored’,276 highlighting a further issue of the handling of evidence in State crime laboratories. 
Although DNA testing is ‘the most reliable approximation of individualized evidence that the 
science method can currently offer’,277 Leal García’s post-conviction attorneys found a ‘DNA 
expert who testified that the lab conducting the testing had not followed accepted protocols, 
had made mistakes handling the blood samples, and had failed to provide complete results’.278 
To date, 362 people in the US have been exonerated by postconviction DNA testing proving 
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their innocence,279 and twenty of those spent some time, if not all, on death row.280 However, 
this does not prevent human error or tampering with DNA evidence. 
The IACHR’s case report also raised the ineffectiveness of the clemency procedure in the 
State of Texas, another curtailment to potential claims of innocence from those on death row. 
The petition stated that:  
[T]he Board of Pardons and Paroles does not advise condemned prisoners or their 
counsel of the date on which it will consider their clemency petition; it does not provide 
any opportunity for representations at the time it considers the petition; it does not allow 
applicants to view the evidence submitted in opposition to their clemency requests; and 
it does not afford them an opportunity for appeal or reconsideration of the Board’s 
ruling.281  
The IACHR found that the ‘procedure in place falls short of establishing minimal safeguards 
to prevent arbitrary decisions concerning evidence submitted either in favour or in opposition 
of a clemency request pending the execution of a death sentence’.282 However, whilst the 
IACHR submission raised important points regarding wrongful convictions, none of this 
information was transferred into the final Stakeholder Report, indicating that the OHCHR 
needs to be more transparent in its procedures for deciding upon the content of the 
Stakeholder Report.283 
Advance Questions and Recommendations 
The UK submitted an advance question about ‘the continuing use of the death penalty in the 
US’ and the ‘inevitable risk of irreversible miscarriages of justice’, asking ‘[c]ould you tell us 
what steps the Administration is taking to address these concerns?’284 However, the US did 
not respond to this question during the interactive dialogue, further indicating that changes to 
the procedure for advance questions must be made.285  
Moreover, following the minimal discussion in the three reports, it is unsurprising that there 
were no recommendations made by states regarding wrongful convictions in 2010. This was 
despite, as stated above, the eight Stakeholders all discussing the issue of wrongful 
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convictions and its causes and effect in their individual submissions. Again, this is further 
evidence that the recommending member states will not read the individual submissions, 
making it imperative that the main Stakeholder Report is thorough.286 
 
4.4.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Wrongful Capital Convictions 
In comparison with 2010, the 2015 US UPR provided more discussion on wrongful convictions, 
although the majority of this was focused upon compensation, as examined below. In terms 
of wrongful convictions in general, the Compilation Report provided that both the Committee 
and CERD had urged the US ‘to strengthen safeguards against wrongful sentencing to 
death’.287 However, just as in 2010, there was no discussion in the Stakeholder Report on 
wrongful convictions. This is particularly concerning considering the Stakeholders raised 
alarming statistics in their individual submissions.288 AI reiterated that ‘[m]ore than 130 
prisoners have been released from death row since 1977 on grounds of innocence [and i]n 
numerous cases, prisoners have gone to their deaths despite serious doubts about their 
guilt’.289 Furthermore, Joint Submission 2 (‘JS2’) indicated that ‘[t]he findings of a study 
conducted by the American National Science Academy shows that more than 4% or 1 out of 
every 25 prisoners sentenced to death are innocent’.290 
Compensation following Wrongful Convictions 
The focal point of the 2015 US UPR under the heading of wrongful convictions was the right 
to compensation. Although the National Report was silent on this issue, the Compilation 
Report cited the Committee in particular, which ‘recommended ensuring the retentionist states 
provide adequate compensation for persons who were wrongfully convicted’.291  Obtaining 
compensation following a wrongful conviction, even from death row, is extremely rare. Alanna 
Trivelli notes the three main ways of gaining compensation following wrongful conviction: ‘he 
can file a civil rights lawsuit, he can present a private bill to the legislature, or he can obtain 
relief through a [S]tate compensation statute if the incident occurred in one of the thirty states 
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with a statute enacted’.292 However, twenty US States do not have a State compensation 
statute293 and in many States, ‘police and prosecutors are in most instances granted immunity 
from civil suits by the wrongfully convicted’, meaning that it is very difficult to bring a suit for 
compensation.294 In the 2015 UPR, Germany asked an advance question on ‘whether 
adequate compensation for persons who were wrongfully convicted is provided on the national 
as well as subnational level’.295 However, this advance question was not answered by the US 
during the interactive dialogue, indicating that the troika should play a role in ensuring the 
questions are addressed by the state under review.296 
The most recent SCOTUS decision on this issue was in Connick v. Thompson in 2011.297 After 
spending eighteen years in prison, including time spent on death row, John Thompson was 
awarded $14,000,000.298 However, in a 5-4 decision, SCOTUS reversed the decision to award 
Thompson compensation on the grounds that a District Attorney’s office cannot be liable under 
§1983 USC ‘for failure to train [its prosecuting attorneys] based on a single Brady violation’.299 
The four dissenting justices, led by Justice Ginsburg, vehemently opposed this, stating that ‘I 
would uphold the jury's verdict awarding damages to Thompson for the gross, deliberately 
indifferent, and long-continuing violation of his fair trial right’.300 In its individual submission, 
JS17 noted that this decision ‘effectively expanded prosecutors’ immunities against lawsuits 
for their misconduct’.301 The decision provides no deterrence for prosecutorial misconduct, 
particularly given that it is also a prevalent issue throughout the criminal justice system in the 
US.  
Linked to the issue of government misconduct is false confessions, which are often brought 
about by harsh interrogations of those with mental health issues by law enforcement.302 In its 
‘The State of the Modern Death Penalty’ report compiled between 2006 and 2013, but not 
cited in the UPR, the ABA noted that some States ‘[d]o not require recording of the entirety of 
custodial interviews with suspects and witnesses in potential capital cases’.303 This can lead 
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to potential coercive behaviour including using the death penalty as a threat,304 and, in turn, 
false confessions. In fact, ‘according to the Innocence Project, innocent defendants made 
incriminating statements, delivered outright confessions, or pled guilty in about 25% of DNA 
exoneration cases in the [US]’.305 In some States, the exoneree must not have ‘contributed’ to 
his or her arrest or conviction to be eligible for an award, which means that a false confession 
due to government misconduct can render the exonerated ineligible for compensation. 
JS17 detailed more difficulties exonerees face in obtaining compensation: 
When exonerees are released, they face numerous challenges in reintegrating into 
society including social, economic, and legal hurdles. The right to compensation for 
wrongful imprisonment varies widely from [S]tate-to-[S]tate, so exonerees from different 
[S]tates are not guaranteed equivalent compensation. Sixteen retentionist [US] [S]tates 
do not have compensation laws for wrongfully convicted individuals. In [S]tates that do 
have compensation laws, exonerees often must overcome onerous procedural and 
eligibility barriers. If they succeed, the compensation they may receive can be meager 
and fall short of the corollary federal standards.306 
JS17 went into further detail regarding the effect of a lack of or delay in compensation has on 
the exoneree. For example, ‘[a]lmost all exonerees possess no assets when released, one-
third have lost child custody due to their wrongful imprisonment, and many face severe 
challenges in obtaining employment or housing’.307 Furthermore, ‘[s]ecuring employment and 
appropriate housing is difficult for exonerees because expungement of the wrongful conviction 
from their criminal record is not automatic’.308 Due to education programmes in prison not 
being available to most death row inmates, when an exoneree is released they will leave with 
little or no education.309 There are also healthcare issues to consider particularly post-
traumatic stress disorder and other mental illnesses,310 and the fact that ‘exonerees are not 
automatically eligible for Medicaid’ meaning that particularly mental health issues often go 
untreated.311 All of these factors put barriers in the way of the exoneree rebuilding their lives, 
and it is unsurprising that 38.1% of exonerees that were part of a study carried out on the post-
release behaviour of a group of exonerees went on to commit criminal offences.312 
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Even when compensation is awarded, JS17 noted that ‘the money may be redirected toward 
basic needs and legal fees’,313 and still, ‘the average amount of time to obtain State 
compensation is three years’.314 Exonerees need the money when they are released, not only 
to start rebuilding their lives and paying family members back for legal fees, but also to prevent 
reoffending. 
JS17 recommended that ‘[t]he [US] should adopt and promote procedures such as those 
recommended by the ABA and The Innocence Project designed to prevent or mitigate the 
negative effects of eyewitness misidentifications, including those resulting from cross-racial 
misidentifications’ in order to curtail wrongful convictions.315 The Innocence Project, an 
organisation that seeks to use DNA evidence to exonerate the wrongfully convicted, cites 
eyewitness misidentification as ‘the greatest contributing factor to wrongful convictions’.316 
There are a number of reasons for eyewitness misidentification, such as, ‘the distance of the 
eyewitness from the crime, the lighting in the area, the race of the perpetrator, any trauma to 
the witness, and the method used by the police to obtain identifications’.317 Furthermore, often 
a witness will feel certain that they have identified the correct person, for example in the case 
of Steven Avery, made famous by the documentary ‘Making a Murderer’. In Avery’s case, the 
victim, Penny Ann Beernsten, misidentified Avery as her attacker, who was eventually 
exonerated by DNA evidence after twenty-two years in prison.318 Nicole Megale contended 
that, ‘[w]ith so many variables affecting the validity of eyewitness identifications and the high 
percentage of wrongful convictions based on these identifications, a death penalty sentence 
should not be allowed to hinge on an eyewitness identification alone’.319 
The Innocence Project’s report ‘Making up for Lost Time: What the Wrongfully Convicted 
Endure and How to Provide Fair Compensation’ provided a number of recommendations on 
the issue of compensation, and these were cited by JS17 in its individual submission. The 
recommendations included: 
Require [US] [S]tates to adopt compensation legislation that provides at least $100,000 
per year on death row…Require [US] [S]tates to adopt legislation that provides 
exonerees with adequate and appropriate services, including housing, transportation, 
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education, physical and mental care, employment assistance, and other services to 
assist with reintegration…Where official immunity presents barriers to accountability, the 
[US] should ensure there are adequate and alternate mechanisms to hold prosecutors, 
judges, and law enforcement accountable when their conduct leads to wrongful 
convictions.320  
If these recommendations from Stakeholders could be made readily available to UN member 
states, they may be transformed into measurable recommendations during the US UPR. This 
could be done through Stakeholders, such as JS17, being able to provide advance 
questions,321 or the Innocence Project itself providing a thematic Stakeholder submission and 
an advance question on wrongful convictions, given its expertise in this area. JS17 was the 
main Stakeholder reporting on wrongful convictions in 2015, highlighting the potential positive 
impact thematic Stakeholder submissions could have.322 However, to ensure this information 
is then transferred to the main report, the OHCHR also needs to be clearer on how it decides 
on the content of the final report.323 
Recommendations 
Compared to the 2010 UPR, wherein no countries made recommendations regarding 
innocence or wrongful convictions, 2015 saw three such recommendations. Again, this 
suggests that the fact these issues were raised in the main reports had an effect on the 
recommending states.324 Belgium recommended that the US ‘[t]ake specific measures in 
follow-up to the recommendations of [the Committee] to the [US] in 2014 with regards 
to…avoid[ing] wrongful sentencing to death and to provide adequate compensation if wrongful 
sentencing happens’.325 The US supported this part of the recommendation, stating that ‘we 
support the measures to avoid…wrongful sentencing to death, and to provide adequate 
compensation in the event of wrongful sentencing’.326 However, in practice, this 
recommendation is not being implemented, particularly in light of the SCOTUS decision in 
Connick v. Thompson.327 
The Democratic Republic of Congo recommended the US ‘[s]trengthen[s] the justice sector in 
order to avoid imposing the death penalty on those persons wrongly convicted’.328 Poland also 
recommended that the US should ‘[s]trengthen safeguards against wrongful sentencing to 
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death and subsequent wrongful execution by ensuring, inter alia, effective legal representation 
for defendants in death penalty cases, including at the postconviction stage’.329 These 
recommendations were also supported by the US without comment.330 
It is clearly a positive step that these recommendations have been supported by the US; it 
indicates that the US is taking wrongful convictions seriously and aims to do something about 
it. However, the recommendations make no mention of how the US should go about 
implementing them and, to date, no clear progress appears to have been made by the US on 
implementation. Instead, as discussed above, states should be required to advise during the 
UNHRC plenary session how it will go about implementing accepted recommendations, as 
this would allow Stakeholders and other member states to prepare accordingly for the next 
UPR and for domestic work in between reviews.331  
Furthermore, member states should consider the intended audience of their 
recommendations.332 Usually, in the case of the US, they would be made to the federal 
government. However, thought should be given to making recommendations directly to the 
US States on issues relating to the death penalty. The US States are carrying out a 
punishment that is regulated by the ICCPR and, as such, the often-used reliance upon 
federalism as a barrier to abolition should be challenged through the UPR. The practice of UN 
member states working with individual US States has been successful in other areas of 
international relations, such as the California governor, Jerry Brown, making a deal directly 
with China regarding climate change following the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the 
Paris Agreement.333 Alongside aiming recommendations at the individual US States, they 
could also be targeted towards SCOTUS. Firstly, this could lead to domestic US courts citing 
the UPR, most likely through practitioners citing the UPR and its recommendations in briefs, 
as, to date, no US court has made reference to the mechanism.334 This would also increase 
the publicity of the UPR, whilst seeking to ensure that the US adheres to international human 
rights when carrying out the death penalty.335 Secondly, these recommendations could have 
a positive impact upon the potential abolition of the death penalty, by gathering evidence to 
further the two prongs of the Steikers’ blueprint of abolition. They would raise awareness of 
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the issues within the capital system, which can be cited by SCOTUS justices under the Court’s 
own judgment prong of the blueprint for abolition.336 
 
4.5 Foreign Nationals on Death Row and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 
Another key due process protection in capital cases is the right of foreign nationals to be 
advised of their right to consular assistance under the Vienna Conviction on Consular 
Relations (1963).337 Generally, the VCCR is uncontroversial in defining the terms of consular 
relations between states. However, US non-compliance with Article 36 has caused problems 
internationally. At the centre of the issue is Article 36(1)(b), which gives detained foreign 
nationals the right to be informed of their right to consular assistance without delay.338 For 
those detained in a foreign country where there may be language barriers and almost certainly 
detainees will have little or no knowledge of the criminal procedures, state adherence to the 
VCCR is essential. It is in place to ensure that foreign consuls are granted access to nationals 
detained abroad and that detainees are made aware of their right to consular assistance with 
their defence. The right to consular assistance is now widely considered to be a fundamental 
due process right. Although it is not included under Article 14, the IACHR and the Committee 
considers that it should be, particularly for death penalty cases.339  
The US became a signatory to the VCCR on 24 April 1963 and President Nixon ratified the 
treaty on 24 November 1969.340 The State Department then issued guidance on the VCCR for 
law enforcement personnel, within which it stated that ‘[i]mplementing legislation is not 
necessary’.341 This implied that the US considered the VCCR to be self-executing, adding that 
‘[a]lthough the obligations of consular notification and access are not codified in any federal 
statute, they are binding on [S]tates and local governments as well as the federal government, 
by virtue of international law and the Supremacy Clause’.342  
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Despite this action taken by the State Department to encourage compliance with the VCCR, 
Schabas has noted that ‘many if not most foreign nationals condemned to death within the 
[US] have not benefited from this information’.343 In support of this, a study by Reprieve carried 
out between 2009 and 2012 found that 95.1% of foreign nationals on US death row had not 
been afforded their Article 36 rights.344 This is particularly concerning given that ‘effective 
consular assistance at an early stage’ can prevent a death sentence being imposed in the first 
instance, avoiding the lengthy and mandatory appeals process in the US.345 The final part of 
this chapter will consider the key international and domestic VCCR cases, the US’ purported 
withdrawal from the VCCR’s Optional Protocol, and the role of the UPR in ensuring this due 
process right is adhered to. 
 
4.5.1 International Court of Justice Cases 
The ICJ is ‘the principal judicial organ’ of the UN,346 and its function is to rule upon disputes 
between member states.347 To date, three countries have initiated proceedings against the US 
in the ICJ regarding a breach of the VCCR in death penalty cases: Paraguay, Germany, and 
Mexico.  
4.5.1.1 Breard Case (Paraguay v. United States) 
The Breard case involved Angel Francisco Breard, a Paraguayan national348 who was 
convicted in the Commonwealth of Virginia of attempted rape and capital murder in 1993, and 
was sentenced to death without being afforded his Article 36 rights.349 Conall Mallory asserted 
that ‘acute damage’ was caused by the lack of consular assistance in Breard’s case, as he 
refused to take a pre-trial plea bargain to spare his life and spend his life in prison without the 
possibility of parole.350 
When Breard became aware of his Article 36 rights in 1996, he filed for habeas relief in the 
federal courts citing, for the first time, that his rights under Article 36 VCCR had been 
breached.351 However, the federal courts denied his claim on the grounds it was procedurally 
barred.352 The rule of procedural default has caused insurmountable problems for foreign 
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nationals on US death row attempting to appeal on the grounds of a breach of Article 36. It is 
defined as ‘a federal rule that, before a [S]tate criminal defendant can obtain relief in federal 
court, the claim must be presented to a [S]tate court’.353 However, this relies upon effective 
assistance of counsel, namely that counsel is aware of the foreign nationals’ VCCR rights, 
which is not always the case. 
After Paraguay’s case was struck out in the domestic US courts,354 Paraguay then issued 
proceedings against the US in the ICJ on 3 April 1998.355 From the alleged breaches of the 
VCCR, Paraguay argued that it was entitled to restitutio in integrum insofar as any criminal 
liability against Breard be voided and a new trial granted with Breard now being aware of his 
Article 36 rights.356 Due to Breard’s execution date being imminent, on 9 April 1998 the ICJ 
ordered provisional measures, in line with Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court 
of Justice,357 that the US should ensure it does not execute Breard pending the outcome of 
the proceedings before the ICJ.358  
Subsequently, both Breard and Paraguay petitioned for a writ of cert to SCOTUS. On the day 
of Breard’s execution, SCOTUS denied to grant cert and held, per curiam, that ‘[i]t is clear that 
Breard procedurally defaulted his claim, if any, under the Vienna Convention by failing to raise 
that claim in the [S]tate court’.359 Both Breard and Paraguay had argued that procedural default 
did not apply in this case, given that the VCCR was the ‘supreme law of the land’ according to 
the Supremacy Clause of the US Constitution.360 However, the per curiam opinion held that 
was ‘plainly incorrect’ because, firstly, ‘the procedural rules of the forum State govern the 
implementation of the treaty in that State’ and, secondly, that whilst treaties may be the 
supreme law of the land, they must be consistent with the Constitution, which is where the 
procedural default rule originates.361 Further, SCOTUS held that even if the claim was not 
procedurally defaulted, ‘it is extremely doubtful that the violation should result in the 
overturning of a final judgment of conviction without some showing that the violation had an 
effect on the trial’.362 Harold Hongju Koh, former Assistant Secretary of Democracy Human 
Rights and Labor, stated that ‘it seems incredible that the Court did not delay the execution, 
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grant certiorari, and hear plenary briefing and argument, if only out of simple comity to the 
ICJ’.363  
Following this decision, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, sent a letter to the 
Governor requesting a stay of execution for Breard.364 However, the Governor of Virginia 
denied the request from the Secretary of State and Angel Breard was executed on 14 April 
1998. 365 Thereafter, Paraguay filed a notice of discontinuance with the ICJ,366 and so the court 
did not rule upon whether the US had breached international law by executing Breard. 
4.5.1.2 LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States) 
The second case to come before the ICJ on this issue involved two brothers of German 
nationality – Karl and Walter LaGrand – who were on Arizona’s death row and had not been 
advised of their Article 36 rights.367 When Germany became aware that two of its nationals 
had been sentenced to death abroad, and following failed diplomatic attempts to stay the 
executions,368 it took the case to the ICJ to rule upon, arguing that the US was in breach of 
international law. By the time Germany issued proceedings, Karl had already been executed 
and Walter’s execution date was set for 3 March 1999, one day after Germany filed its 
application with the ICJ.369 
The ICJ, again, ordered provisional measures that the execution of Walter should be stayed.370 
Thereafter, Germany filed a motion with SCOTUS ‘for leave to file a bill of complaint…[and] 
for preliminary injunction’ against the US and the Governor of Arizona, due to Walter’s 
execution being scheduled for that evening.371 SCOTUS denied the motion through a per 
curiam opinion, citing the decision in Breard.372 The Court also criticised Germany for filing the 
action ‘within only two hours of a scheduled execution that was ordered on January 15, 1999, 
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based upon a sentence imposed by Arizona in 1984, about which the Federal Republic of 
Germany learned in 1992’.373 However, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer stated he 
would have granted a stay of execution to give the Court ‘time to consider, after briefing from 
all interested parties, the jurisdictional and international legal issues involved’.374 Justice 
Breyer is one of the SCOTUS justices that acknowledges international law when interpreting 
the US Constitution,375 adding weight to the consideration that recommending states in the US 
UPR should consider the audience of its recommendations, including directly targeting 
SCOTUS and other courts.376  
Following SCOTUS’ denial of Germany’s motion, and the Governor of Arizona’s refusal to 
grant clemency, Walter LaGrand was executed on 3 March 1999.377 However, Germany did 
not withdraw its application before the ICJ, and public hearings took place between 13-17 
November 2000, with judgment being handed down in 2001.378 The ICJ held that by executing 
Walter LaGrand, the US had breached international law and a binding provisional measures 
order,379 the VCCR gives rise to an individual right to consular assistance,380 and that similar 
cases in future should be reviewed and reconsidered by a domestic US court.381 
Furthermore, the ICJ did not just rule upon the breaches of international law, but also on the 
application of the domestic US rule of procedural default. Germany contended in its application 
to the ICJ that the doctrine of procedural default prejudiced the LaGrand brothers in their 
applications for federal habeas relief.382 The LaGrand brothers had previously petitioned the 
District Court of Arizona for habeas relief based in part on the breach of their rights under the 
VCCR, but, as in Breard’s federal appeals, the appeal was denied on the grounds of 
procedural default, and the Ninth Circuit upheld this decision.383 The ICJ adjudicated on this 
point, agreeing with Germany that the application of the procedural default rule in this case 
prevented the LaGrand brothers from exercising their Article 36 rights and, as such, this was 
a breach of the US’ obligation to Germany under Article 36(2).384 This decision was in direct 
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conflict with SCOTUS’ denial of cert in Breard v. Greene, wherein it was found that procedural 
default does still apply in these circumstances.385 However, the ICJ found that in effect this 
meant the LaGrands were never able to benefit from their right to consular assistance.386 
4.5.1.3 Avena and Other Mexican Nationals Case (Mexico v. United States) 
Despite assurances from the US government that it was doing all it could to ensure foreign 
nationals were being advised of their right to consular assistance, two years after the LaGrand 
judgment, Mexico initiated the Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico 
v. United States) (‘Avena’) in the ICJ.387 This case involved fifty-two Mexican nationals on 
death row across the US whom Mexico claimed had not been afforded their Article 36 rights 
and, as such, argued that the principle of restitutio in integrum should be applied.388  
In its judgment handed down on 31 March 2004, the ICJ denied Mexico’s appeal for restitutio 
in integrum, but ordered that the US should review and reconsider the convictions and 
sentences of fifty-one of the fifty-two Mexican nationals named in the application.389 The ICJ 
ruled that the review of the fifty-one cases ‘should occur within the overall judicial proceedings 
relating to the individual defendant concerned’390 and that the procedural default rule should 
not be used to prevent the individuals relying on their Article 36 right.391 Furthermore, the ICJ 
held that, on its own, ‘the clemency process, as currently practised within the [US] criminal 
justice system, does not appear to meet the requirements’ to satisfy the ICJ judgment.392 
Texas – the State that has carried out the most executions in the US and has a high number 
of Mexican nationals on death row – was less than accepting of the Avena judgment. The 
Texas Attorney-General, Greg Abbott ‘indicated that, absent recommendations from the 
federal government, his office had no plans to ask for new trials, new sentencing, or stays of 
execution’.393 The federal government did that through President Bush’s Memorandum sent 
to the US Attorney-General ordering that the State courts must comply with the Avena 
judgment.394 However, this did little to move the Texan Attorney-General’s stance and Abbott’s 
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office stated that ‘[w]e respectfully believe the executive determination exceeds the 
constitutional bounds for federal authority’.395 This response shows ‘a very “American” 
suspicion of outside involvement in national sovereign functions’ says Valencia et al.396 It also 
highlights both the American exceptionalist approach to the influence of international law on 
the US criminal justice system, and also a more specific ‘Texas exceptionalism’ towards 
international law.397 
 
4.5.2 Domestic Cases 
4.5.2.1 Medellin v. Texas: The US Supreme Court’s View on Avena 
It was not until 2008 that SCOTUS heard a case concerning a foreign national named in the 
ICJ’s decision in Avena. This was the case of Medellín v. Texas, involving José Ernesto 
Medellín (‘Medellín’), a death row inmate in Texas who was not afforded his Article 36 rights.398 
Based upon the decision of the ICJ in Avena, Medellín was working his way through the federal 
appeals process399 when President Bush sent his Memorandum to the US Attorney-General 
on 28 February 2005, advising that State courts should enforce the Avena decision.400 
Medellín then, adhering to the procedural rules of appeal in the US, petitioned the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals relying upon the President’s Memorandum.401 However, the Texas Court 
was unmoved by the President’s Memorandum and the ICJ’s judgment in Avena regarding 
procedural default, and rejected his appeal.402 Accordingly, Medellín petitioned SCOTUS for 
a further writ of cert, which was granted. 
Chief Justice Roberts delivered the opinion of the Court and noted that ‘[a]s a signatory to the 
Optional Protocol, the [US] agreed to submit disputes arising out of the [VCCR] to the ICJ’.403 
However, the Chief Justice went on to state that Article 94 of the UN Charter provides that 
states will ‘undertake’ to comply with ICJ judgments and, as such, Article 94 ‘is not a directive 
to domestic courts’ as it ‘does not provide that the [US] “shall” or “must” comply with an ICJ 
decision’.404 Through this ruling on the technical wording of the Charter, the Court ‘has made 
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[US] compliance [with ICJ decisions on the VCCR] not mandatory but optional’.405 It has also 
arguably made compliance with the VCCR in general optional; if the remedy for a breach is 
not binding, there is nothing to prevent further noncompliance with the VCCR. Regarding the 
issue of the application of the procedural default rule, the Court referenced its judgment in 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon.406 Handed down after the Avena judgment, but not involving a 
Mexican national named in the Avena case, SCOTUS held in Sanchez-Llamas that ‘contrary 
to the ICJ's determination, the [VCCR] did not preclude the application of [S]tate default 
rules’.407 The reliance on its judgment in Sanchez-Llamas reinforced SCOTUS’ finding that 
judicial review was not necessary and that the procedural default rule should still apply. 
The Court also noted that President Bush had issued a Memorandum to the Attorney-General, 
stating ‘that the [US] would “discharge its international obligations” under Avena “by having 
State courts give effect to the decision”’.408 Despite the Restatement’s view that ‘Courts give 
particular weight to the position taken by the [US] Government on questions of international 
law’,409 much like the Texas Attorney-General, SCOTUS was unmoved by the President’s 
intervention. The majority held that ‘neither Avena nor the President's Memorandum 
constitutes directly enforceable federal law that preempts state limitations on the filing of 
successive habeas petitions’.410 The Court went further and held that the President went 
beyond his constitutional powers; the majority opinion stated that he ‘has an array of political 
and diplomatic means available…but unilaterally converting a non-self-executing treaty into a 
self-executing one is not among them’.411 This confirmed that SCOTUS finds the VCCR to be 
non-self-executing, despite the guidance provided by the federal government indicating 
otherwise.412 
4.5.2.2 Torres v. Oklahoma and Gutierrez v. Nevada: The State Court View on Avena 
Notwithstanding the SCOTUS decision in Medellín, some State courts have followed the ICJ’s 
judgment in Avena and considered it to be binding. The two key cases this thesis considers 
have been handed down by State courts in Oklahoma and Nevada.  
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Torres v. Oklahoma 
The first case to come before a domestic US court involving a Mexican national from the Avena 
case was that of Osbaldo Torres Aguilera (‘Torres’), who was due to be executed six weeks 
after the Avena judgment was handed down.413 In April 2004, one month after the ICJ’s 
decision in Avena, Torres issued a second application for post-conviction relief with the 
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals and appealed for clemency to the Governor of 
Oklahoma, Brad Henry.414 The Governor and the Parole Board received letters from the EU 
and the Legal Advisor to the State Department, William Taft.415 The EU referred to the Avena 
decision as being binding416 and, while Taft was not as explicit, his letter strongly suggested 
that the decision should be followed.417 Thereafter, Governor Henry commuted Torres’ death 
sentence to life without the possibility of parole.418 
On the same day as the commutation of sentence, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals 
stayed Torres’ execution and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing.419 In a special 
unpublished concurrence, Judge Chapel held that ‘[t]here is no question that this [c]ourt is 
bound by the [VCCR] and Optional Protocol’ and ‘[a]s this [c]ourt is bound by the treaty itself, 
we are bound to give full faith and credit to the Avena decision’.420 Furthermore, Judge Chapel 
found that ‘[t]he [US] voluntarily and legally entered into a treaty, a contract with over 100 other 
countries. The [US] is bound by the terms of the treaty and the State of Oklahoma is obligated 
by virtue of the Supremacy Clause to give effect to the treaty’.421 Judge Chapel also made 
reference to treaties being international ‘contract[s] between states’,422 substantiating the role 
of comity not only in the federal-State relationship but between US State courts and 
international courts. This was considered to be a nuanced, and generally unexpected, 
approach to international law from a US State court.423 
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Gutierrez v. Nevada 
Another important State court decision came through the 2012 case of Gutierrez v. Nevada,424 
which involved another Mexican national named in Avena. The Supreme Court of Nevada 
remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing on the grounds of Gutierrez’s Article 36 rights 
being breached and to allow him the opportunity to show he had been actually prejudiced by 
not being afforded consular assistance.425 By way of avoiding the SCOTUS precedent, the 
court in Gutierrez distinguished the facts in that case from those in Medellín v. Texas and 
likened them to Torres v. Oklahoma, by holding that ‘[u]nlike Medellín…but like Torres, 
Gutierrez arguably suffered actual prejudice due to the lack of consular assistance’.426 This 
indicates that the courts consider there to be two ‘types’ of Article 36 appeal cases: cases 
where the lack of consular assistance prejudiced the Petitioner, and cases where it did not. 
However, the Gutierrez court also held that ‘without an evidentiary hearing, it is not possible 
to say what assistance the consulate might have provided’.427 Arguably this would have been 
the same in the Medellín case. Although the facts of the case were different, there would be 
no way of knowing what assistance would have been provided to Medellín had he been 
afforded his Article 36 rights, and whether he was therefore prejudiced, thus warranting an 
evidentiary hearing. Moreover, scholars have taken issue with the requirement for ‘prejudice’ 
to be shown before the courts will judicially review and reconsider a case. Shank & Quigley 
have argued that the requirement of prejudice is ‘too strict to comply with Article 36’ as the 
right to consular access is ‘an absolute right’.428 It is clear from the decision in Avena that this 
is not what the ICJ ordered; this requirement for prejudice also forms part of the ‘procedural 
default’ rules, which the ICJ held should not be used to prevent the review and reconsideration 
of the cases of the fifty-one Mexican nationals.429 
 
4.5.3 The Validity of the US’ Withdrawal from the VCCR’s Optional Protocol 
4.5.3.1 The US’ ‘Withdrawal’ from the VCCR’s Optional Protocol 
To add to the confusion surrounding Article 36, in 2005 the US purported to withdraw from the 
VCCR’s Optional Protocol. Article I of the Optional Protocol gives compulsory jurisdiction to 
the ICJ to rule upon disputes between parties specifically regarding the ‘interpretation or 
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application’ of the VCCR.430 In fact it was the US that ‘proposed the Optional Protocol in 1963 
and [thereafter] ratified it with the rest of the VCCR in 1969’.431  
However, in 2005 following the outcome of the Avena case, the US purported to withdraw from 
the Optional Protocol by way of a letter from the Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, to the 
UN Secretary-General. It stated that: 
This letter constitutes notification by the United States of America that it hereby 
withdraws from the [Optional] Protocol. As a consequence of this withdrawal, the [US] 
will no longer recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice reflected in 
that Protocol.432  
Therefore, the US claimed that it would no longer be subject to the jurisdiction of the ICJ 
regarding the interpretation and application of the VCCR. A US State Department 
spokesperson commented, after the withdrawal, that the ICJ had ‘interpreted the [VCCR] in 
ways that we had not anticipated that involved [S]tate criminal prosecutions and the death 
penalty, effectively asking the court to supervise our domestic criminal system’.433 This was a 
clear indication from the State Department that the withdrawal is a direct retaliation to the three 
ICJ cases, and that the US is not willing to forego its sovereignty regarding the imposition of 
the death penalty, fuelling the accusations that the US acts unilaterally on the international 
stage due to American exceptionalism.434 
4.5.3.2 Was the US’ ‘Withdrawal’ from the Optional Protocol Valid? 
It is of course correct that the Optional Protocol is, by its name, optional. However, it does not 
include a ‘denunciation clause’ giving an express right to withdrawal.435 This therefore leads 
to the question of whether a state is legally able to withdraw from the Optional Protocol, as the 
US has intended to do. 
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No state party other than the US has purported to withdraw from the Optional Protocol, so 
there is no precedent as to its validity.436 To muddy the waters further, in 2008 when Mexico 
requested that the ICJ provide an interpretation on its judgment in Avena, it did not provide its 
view on the validity of the US’ purported withdrawal from the Optional Protocol.437 
Therefore, what must initially be considered is how a state withdraws from a treaty when there 
is no denunciation clause. By their very nature, ‘exit clauses create a lawful, public mechanism 
for a state to terminate its treaty obligations’.438 While the omission of a denunciation clause 
can ‘rais[e] the possibility that exit may be implicitly precluded as a matter of international 
law’,439 it does not automatically mean there is no right to withdraw. Instead, the VCLT must 
be consulted.440  
Article 56 VCLT provides as follows: 
1. A treaty which contains no provision regarding its termination and which does not 
provide for denunciation or withdrawal is not subject to denunciation or withdrawal 
unless:  
(a) It is established that the parties intended to admit the possibility of denunciation 
or withdrawal; or (b) A right of denunciation or withdrawal may be implied by the 
nature of the treaty. 
2. A party shall give not less than twelve months' notice.441 
In terms of Article 56(1)(a), Quigley noted that the travaux préparatoires of the Optional 
Protocol made no mention of a denunciation clause during the drafting.442 In fact, the US itself 
‘viewed [compulsory dispute settlement] as central to the entire enterprise of concluding a 
consular treaty’,443 suggesting that the parties, and especially the US, did not intend for a 
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol. This indicates that Article 56(1)(a) is not satisfied. In 
terms of Article 56(1)(b), the VCCR protects the right to access consular assistance and 
protection, which does not imply that there would be a right to denunciation as a way of 
avoiding ensuring consular protection for a detained foreign national. Furthermore, Reisman 
and Arsanjani have noted that ‘there are now problems with the denunciation of treaty 
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provisions on jurisdiction where substantive rights have been provided for individuals’.444 It is 
widely considered that the VCCR confers individual rights, the ICJ held as such in LaGrand 
and Avena,445 as has the IACHR,446 the Committee,447 and even in Breard v. Greene SCOTUS 
held that the VCCR ‘arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance following 
arrest’,448 although SCOTUS overruled this decision in Medellín.449 This suggests that Article 
56(1)(b) is not satisfied either. 
However, Anthony Aust has argued that ‘[i]t will usually be possible to withdraw from a general 
treaty for the settlement of disputes between the parties even when it has no withdrawal 
provision’ on the basis that states must consent to be subject to an international jurisdiction.450 
Aust cited the US withdrawal from the VCCR Optional Protocol when asserting that ‘states 
have withdrawn from such optional protocols on dispute settlement to several UN treaties 
without (at least legal) objection, even when they contain no provision for this’.451 However, as 
Quigley noted in 2009 and this thesis has found in 2018, there have been no other withdrawals 
from similar treaties, meaning that Aust could rely on no other examples to substantiate this 
assertion and, further, ‘there is no established procedure for reacting to a denunciation by 
another state party’.452 
Another issue to consider was raised by Reisman and Arsanjani, who found that: 
It appears likely that the [US] felt that states, and, increasingly, non-governmental 
organizations committed to abolitionism, would be able to continue to bring cases 
allegedly arising under Article 36 of the VCCR to an international tribunal that could well 
prove to be increasingly abolitionist in its orientation.453  
However, as Quigley correctly stated, this is ‘no excuse for failing to comply with a treaty 
obligation’.454 Quigley went on to argue that ‘[e]ven if Reisman and Arsanjani are correct in 
their assessment that the ICJ is abolitionist in orientation, the ICJ would have no jurisdiction 
to deal with capital punishment as such’.455 Indeed, the death penalty is not the issue at hand 
in the VCCR cases adjudicated upon by the ICJ, the key issue was whether or not there had 
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been a breach of a multilateral treaty, with the case being expedited due to the finality an 
imminent execution presents. 
If the US’ withdrawal is invalid, the US will still be bound by the Optional Protocol, and will 
therefore remain under the ICJ’s jurisdiction. Alternatively, if the withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol is valid and, given that the US withdrew from the ICJ’s general compulsory jurisdiction 
in 1986,456 this indicates that regarding consular disputes the US cannot sue or be sued. There 
are severe implications from this. Foreign nationals on death row across the US will be further 
negatively impacted as the scope for ensuring their Article 36 rights are afforded to them will 
be narrowed substantially. Moreover, from the US government’s perspective, it lessens the 
consular protections that can be afforded to its own citizens. For example, in ‘the well-known 
cases of the three American hikers…arrested in 2009 on charges of spying in Iran, or Amanda 
Knox, who was arrested and tried for murder in Italy’.457  
Quigley concluded that the US’ ‘position that the VCCR Optional Protocol can be freely 
denounced is difficult to sustain on the basis of VCLT Article 56 and international practice’.458 
Given that there is no denunciation clause in the Optional Protocol, and considering the finding 
that the requirements of Article 56 have not been satisfied, this thesis takes Quigley’s 
assertions further, and directly argues that the US’ purported withdrawal from the Optional 
Protocol was invalid.459 Therefore, although the US is not a party to the ICJ’s compulsory 
jurisdiction, from the analysis above, the US continues to be under the ICJ’s VCCR jurisdiction, 
notwithstanding the purported withdrawal by the US Secretary of State. To substantiate this 
point, in the 2010 UPR, the OHCHR was cited in the Compilation Report as having concerns 
about the execution of Medellín ‘despite an order to the contrary by the International Court of 
Justice’,460 particularly as the ‘OHCHR recalled that the [US] has a legal obligation to comply 
with decisions of the International Court of Justice’.461 This assertion from the OHCHR that the 
US’ legal obligation under the VCCR is still in place came three years after the US purported 
to withdraw from the Optional Protocol, indicating that its belief is also that the withdrawal was 
invalid. 
However, in order to test the argument that the US’ purported withdrawal from the VCCR’s 
Optional Protocol is invalid, another state must initiate proceedings against the US under the 
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Optional Protocol. The ICJ, by way of Article 36(6) of the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, deems itself to be the deciding body when determining a dispute over whether the ICJ 
has jurisdiction.462 Therefore, should a state wish to bring action against the US over a breach 
of the VCCR, an application should be made to the ICJ invoking Article 36(6) and relying upon 
the lack of a denunciation clause and no grounds under Article 56 VCLT, to prove that the US 
has not withdrawn from the Optional Protocol. The ICJ would then be able to adjudicate on 
the validity of the withdrawal through its decision on whether it had jurisdiction or not. This has 
yet to be carried out, despite the withdrawal being thirteen years ago, there being 136 foreign 
nationals on US death row, made up of thirty-five nationalities,463 and there being twelve 
executions of foreign nationals since the purported withdrawal in 2005.464 This is likely due to 
the potentially negative diplomatic repercussions from initiating proceedings against the US in 
the ICJ, particularly when the US has purported to withdraw from the ICJ’s jurisdiction. 
However, this thesis has concluded that the withdrawal is invalid and suggests this theory 
should be tested by a state party with a sound diplomatic relationship with the US, and the 
means to bring a case before the ICJ. A prime candidate to do this would be the UK using the 
case of Linda Carty. Carty holds dual US and UK citizenship and has been on death row since 
2002 after being convicted of the kidnap and murder of her neighbour in Texas in 2001.465 
Carty was not afforded her Article 36 rights and, as such, raised this in her State habeas 
appeal in 2003, which was denied.466 This would be of particular interest to the UK as it is one 
of the few member states that has raised the issue of consular assistance in both US UPRs,467 
indicating that the UK considers it to be a serious human rights issue. 
Additionally, this issue can be further considered through the UPR. To date, the UPR has not 
been utilised to consider the US’ withdrawal from the Optional Protocol, but it would provide a 
more diplomatic, and possibly effective, platform for doing so. Through the UPR, UN member 
states could raise the purported withdrawal as an issue and put forward their views on its 
validity during the advance questions and interactive dialogue, then provide recommendations 
as to the best way forward for the US to protect and promote the consular rights of both foreign 
nationals in the US and US nationals abroad. This would be particularly relevant for those 
states with nationals on US death row and abolitionist states. To encourage member states to 
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provide recommendations on this, Stakeholders should, at the very least, provide information 
in their individual submissions for member states to consult.468 
 
4.5.4 The Universal Periodic Review and the VCCR 
The 2010 US Universal Periodic Review 
Subsequent to the decision in Medellín came the first US UPR in 2010, and the US 
government tackled this issue head on in the National Report, noting that ‘[t]he Administration 
is also committed to ensuring that the [US] complies with its international obligations to provide 
consular notification and access for foreign nationals in [US] custody, including the obligations 
arising from the Avena decision of the [ICJ]’.469 However, this commitment provided by the 
federal government during the UPR is in direct conflict with the SCOTUS decision on the 
Avena judgment in Medellín from 2008, and USHRN was cited in the Compilation Report 
lamenting the US for its ‘the lack of compliance’ with Avena.470 A number of other Stakeholders 
also discussed this issue in their individual submissions.471  
Furthermore, the UK and Mexico asked advance questions and provided recommendations 
urging the US to comply with the Avena decision, and Brazil provided a recommendation for 
the US to generally ensure consular access for migrants,472 all three of which were accepted 
by the US.473 However, the US did not provide any detail about how it would go about 
implementing the recommendations, and AI’s 2015 individual submission noted that ‘US 
support for Mexico’s recommendation to implement the [ICJ’s] 2004 Avena judgment and to 
prevent the execution of those it covers has led to no change and has failed to prevent three 
more such executions in the interim’.474 This indicates the need for reform in the follow-up to 
the review, and adds weight to the argument that the UPR should require the state under 
review to briefly address how it will implement accepted recommendations, which would have 
allowed these accepted recommendations on the VCCR to be measurable by states and 
Stakeholders.475 The mid-term review should also become a core part of the UPR,476 to 
                                                             
468 See, chapter 7.2.3. 
469 National Report 2010 (n 50) para 54. Emphasis added. 
470 Stakeholder Report 2010 (n 52) para 30. 
471 NGO International CURE, ‘Stakeholder Report 2010’ (n 180) Section I, B; USHRN, ‘Stakeholder Report Annex 5 2010’ (n 63) 
para 10; IACHR, ‘Stakeholder Report Annex 2 2010’ (n 69) para 21. 
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474 AI, ‘Stakeholder Submission 2015’ (n 100) 1, emphasis added; HRW also noted this, Human Rights Watch, ‘United States 
Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission’ (2015) 
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encourage the US to submit a mid-term report to provide an update on its progress in 
implementing accepted recommendations, including those related to consular assistance and 
the VCCR. 
The 2015 US Universal Periodic Review 
In the 2015 National Report, the US advised that it had ‘made significant efforts to meet the 
goal of across-the-board compliance with its consular notification and access obligations 
under the [VCCR].477 The US provided examples of this, such as its amendment of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, and stated that: 
[T]o facilitate compliance with our consular notification and access obligations, requiring 
judges to notify all defendants at their initial appearance in a federal case that non-[US] 
citizens may request that a consular officer from the defendant’s country of nationality 
be notified of the arrest, but that even without a defendant’s request, a treaty or other 
international agreement may require consular notification.478  
However, this is just for federal cases, whereas most foreign national death penalty cases are 
State-based. The US delegation went on to advise that it had ‘distributed more than 200,000 
manuals on consular notification and access’479 to law enforcement and had posted online 
other ‘free consular notification and access training materials’.480 Although this is a positive 
move made by the US government, it still does not ensure compliance with the Avena 
judgment as the recommendations stated. 
The key issue highlighted by the US in its National Report in 2015, was that ‘[l]egislation 
supported by the Administration that would bring us into compliance with the ICJ’s judgment 
in Avena has previously been introduced in the Senate, but has not been enacted into law’.481 
This was in reference to the Consular Notification Compliance Act (‘CNCA’), proposed by 
Senator Patrick Leahy in 2011. If passed by Congress, this legislation would bring the US ‘into 
compliance with the ICJ’s judgment in Avena’,482 and it ‘would give federal courts jurisdiction 
to entertain a habeas corpus petition from a foreign national who is under death sentence and 
claims a violation of the obligation of consular notification’.483 In its 2015 Stakeholder 
submission, HRW recommended that the US ‘[c]ontinue to encourage passage of the 
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481 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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[CNCA]’.484 Furthermore, the Obama Administration intervened in the case of Leal Garcia in 
2011, asking that his execution be stayed until Congress had decided upon whether the CNCA 
will be passed,485 although SCOTUS declined to stay Leal Garcia’s execution. 
Again, in the 2015 UPR, the UK and Mexico asked advance questions on this issue,486 and 
the UK and Greece made recommendations that the US should ensure the right to consular 
notification and enact related legislation.487 These recommendations were accepted by the 
US,488 yet in 2018 there has still been no significant progress in Congress to pass the CNCA 
as law, and appeals from death row inmates on the grounds of an Article 36 breach continue 
to be denied.489 
Clearly, consular assistance for foreign nationals on death row in the US is still an issue that 
requires further attention and improvement. A diplomatic way of encouraging the US to comply 
with its consular obligations is through foreign governmental intervention. For example, similar 
to the objections received from states regarding the ICCPR reservations, states have objected 
to the US treatment of the VCCR in various different ways. There have been diplomatic 
protests, foreign diplomats approaching US State governors, and states submitting Amicus 
Curiae briefs in death penalty cases involving foreign nationals, which Quigley says ‘is not 
done lightly, as it implies criticism of the receiving state’.490 The UPR can be an addition to 
this, in particular to add pressure to passing the CNCA, which would be a significant step 
towards ensuring foreign nationals are afforded the right to a fair trial.  
 
4.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed the UPR through the lens of the right to a fair trial in death penalty 
cases. In order to do this, four key areas were examined as to how they are dealt with within 
the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs: the right to counsel, racial discrimination, wrongful convictions, 
and foreign nationals’ right to consular assistance. From this analysis, positives and negatives 
of the UPR mechanism have been identified, and this chapter has argued for a number of 
ways to improve the UPR, whilst also encouraging US adherence to international law, and 
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collating evidence to assist in the facilitation of the abolition of the death penalty in the US. 
Chapter five takes on the same format, this time analysing the categorical exemption for those 
with intellectual disabilities, and the proposed categorical exemption for those with all severe 
mental illnesses.
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CHAPTER FIVE  
THE US DEATH PENALTY, MENTAL HEALTH, AND THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC 
REVIEW 
 
5.1 Categorical Exemptions to the Death Penalty in the US 
The Eighth Amendment of the US Constitution provides that ‘[e]xcessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted’.1 The 
interpretation of this protection has developed over time, with the pivotal 1958 SCOTUS 
decision in Trop v. Dulles2 famously stating that the Eighth Amendment ‘must draw its meaning 
from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society’.3 The 
Eighth Amendment is often relied upon when challenging a particular aspect of capital 
punishment, and one example of this is the growing list of categorical exemptions to the death 
penalty.  
There are two types of categorical exemptions: first, punishment exemptions which exempt 
persons from being executed when they have committed particular crimes,4 and, second, 
person exemptions that prevent certain classes of people being sentenced to death.5 This 
chapter firstly focuses on the current exemption for those with an intellectual disability, 
including both the international standards and domestic US standards, and an analysis of how 
it is dealt with throughout the UPR. Secondly, this chapter examines why there is no exemption 
for severe mental illnesses, and how this has been approached within the UPR. The focus is 
on these issues and not the other categorical exemptions, because they are topical concerns 
for capital punishment in the US,6 and have been considered throughout the US UPRs. 
 
                                                             
1 The United States Constitution, Amendment VIII. 
2 Trop v Dulles 356 US 86 (1958). 
3 Ibid 101. 
4 See, Coker v Georgia 433 U.S. 584 (1977), wherein the Court held that a death sentence for the crime of rape of an adult 
woman was cruel and unusual punishment; Enmund v Florida 458 US 782 (1982), wherein the Court struck down a punishment 
of death for a felony murder crime; and Kennedy v Louisiana 554 US 407 (2008), which extended the decision in Coker exempt 
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5 See, Ford v Wainwright 477 US 399 (1986), which exempted persons who are ‘insane’ from a death sentence; Atkins v Virginia 
536 US 304 (2002), which held that executing the mentally retarded – or intellectually disabled as it is now termed by the American 
Psychiatric Association – is cruel and unusual punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment; and Roper v Simmons 543 US 
551 (2005), which held that executions of those who were under the age of eighteen at the time of the offense are unconstitutional 
contrary to the Eighth Amendment. 
6 Missouri lawmakers heard testimony on a Bill to exempt persons with severe mental illnesses from the death penalty in the 
state on 11 April 2018, Provides a Procedure by which a Defendant May be Found to be not Eligible for the Death Penalty Due 
to Serious Mental Illness, SB 1081 (Missouri 2018); Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Montana Prosecutors Drop Death Penalty 
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5.2 Intellectual Disabilities 
5.2.1 International Law 
There is a categorical exemption from the death penalty in the US for persons with intellectual 
disabilities. At the international level, the ICCPR does not explicitly provide for such an 
exemption. However, Article 6(1) provides that ‘[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his right 
to life’7 and Article 7 protects against ‘cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment’.8 Both 
provisions would be breached by sentencing to death or executing an intellectually disabled 
person.9 Furthermore, the ECOSOC Safeguards explicitly make reference to mental illness 
and the death penalty, with the 1984 Safeguards protecting those who have ‘become insane’ 
from execution.10 The 1989 Additional Safeguards also provide that states should ‘eliminat[e] 
the death penalty for persons suffering from mental retardation or extremely limited mental 
competence, whether at the stage of sentence or execution’.11 
Intellectual disability was previously termed mental retardation.12 The World Health 
Organisation (‘WHO’) defined mental retardation in 1996 as ‘a condition of arrested or 
incomplete development of the mind, which is especially characterized by impairment of skills 
manifested during the developmental period, which contribute to the overall level of 
intelligence’.13 The American Psychiatric Association (‘APA’) also provided a definition and 
criterion of mental retardation in its Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, 
version 4 (‘DSM-IV’).14 The DSM is ‘the standard classification of mental disorders used by 
mental health professionals in the [US]’15 and, in 2013, the APA published its Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, version 5 (‘DSM-V’), which is the latest version.16  
Notably, the term ‘mental retardation’ was replaced with ‘intellectual disability’. The APA 
advised that this was to align the terminology with the WHO’s definition of intellectual 
                                                             
7 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 
171 Article 6(1) [hereinafter referred to as ‘ICCPR’]. Those suffering from a mental illness would also benefit from the move 
towards abolition of the death penalty as identified in ICCPR Article 6(6). 
8 Ibid Article 7. 
9 UN Human Rights Committee, ‘Draft General Comment 36’ on ‘Article 6 Right to Life’ (2017) para 53 [hereinafter referred to as 
‘General Comment 36 2017’]. 
10 ECOSOC ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ ECOSOC Res 1984/50 (25 
May 1984) Number 3 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1984’]. 
11 ECOSOC ‘Implementation of the Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ 
ECOSOC Res 1989/64 (24 May 1989) para 1(d) [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1989’]. 
12 Previously termed ‘mental retardation’. This thesis refers to the term ‘intellectual disabilities’ unless in a direct quote. 
13 World Health Organisation ‘ICD-10 Guide for Mental Retardation’ WHO Doc WHO/MNH/96.3 (1996) 1 
<www.who.int/mental_health/media/en/69.pdf> accessed 24 August 2018. 
14 ‘The essential feature of Mental Retardation is significantly subaverage general intellectual functioning (Criterion A) that is 
accompanied by significant limitations in adaptive functioning in at least two of the following skill areas: communication, self-care, 
home living, social/interpersonal skills, use of community resources, self-direction, functional academic skills, work, leisure, 
health, and safety (Criterion B). The onset must occur before age 18 years (Criterion C)’, American Psychiatric Association, DSM-
IV-TR: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders xxix, 41 (4th edn, 2000) [hereinafter referred to as ‘DSM-IV’]. 
15 American Psychiatric Association, ‘About DSM-5’ <www.dsm5.org/about/pages/default.aspx> accessed 24 August 2018. 
16 American Psychiatric Association, DSM-V-TR: The Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (5th edn, 2013) 
[hereinafter referred to as ‘DSM-V’]. 
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disabilities.17 The WHO defines intellectual disability as ‘a significantly reduced ability to 
understand new or complex information and to learn and apply new skills (impaired 
intelligence). This results in a reduced ability to cope independently (impaired social 
functioning), and begins before adulthood, with a lasting effect on development’.18 The DSM-
V definition is slightly different to DSM-IV, defining intellectual disability as: 
The essential features of intellectual disability (intellectual developmental disorder) are 
deficits in general mental abilities (Criterion A) and impairment in everyday adaptive 
functioning, in comparison to an individual's age-, gender-, and socioculturally matched 
peers (Criterion B). Onset is during the developmental period (Criterion C). The 
diagnosis of intellectual disability is based on both clinical assessment and standardized 
testing of intellectual and adaptive functions.19  
A key difference is that the APA has moved away from a heavy reliance upon a specific IQ 
score in the diagnostic criterion, noting that an IQ test should still be included in the overall 
assessment, but it should not be overemphasised in the diagnosis.20 In concluding that there 
should be a categorical exemption for those who are intellectually disabled, and in regulating 
State application of this exemption, the US has relied upon the DSM. 
 
5.2.2 Domestic Law 
In 1996, Daryl Atkins and William Jones abducted, robbed at gunpoint, and then murdered 
Eric Nesbitt in Virginia.21 Subsequently, Atkins was sentenced to death. His defence attorneys 
introduced one expert witness at trial, a clinical psychologist named Dr Evan Nelson, who 
testified that Daryl Atkins ‘was “mildly mentally retarded”’.22 In fact, Atkins had an IQ score of 
59, well below the national average of 100. Atkins’ appeal to the Supreme Court of Virginia 
was unsuccessful, although Justice Koontz’s dissenting opinion noted that he had ‘a limited 
capacity for adaptive behaviour [and] the cognitive ability or mental age of a child between 9 
and 12 years of age’.23 His dissent went on to note that ‘[t]his [c]ourt has never approved of 
                                                             
17 American Psychiatric Association ‘Intellectual Disability’ (2013). 
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the imposition of the death penalty upon a defendant who is mentally retarded and has an IQ 
as low as 59’.24  
Two years later, Atkins’ case was heard by SCOTUS, and Atkins v. Virginia became the 
landmark ruling on intellectual disabilities and the death penalty.25 SCOTUS held that 
executing those who are intellectually disabled is a cruel and unusual punishment contrary to 
the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution.26 
However, Atkins left the role of implementing its decision to the States, which has led to further 
litigation on this issue. In Hall v. Florida, a 5-4 SCOTUS majority held that a Florida death 
penalty statute requiring an IQ of 70 or below to prove an intellectual disability must be struck 
down, as it could potentially lead to the unconstitutional execution of defendants with 
intellectual disabilities.27 Furthermore, in Moore v. Texas,28 SCOTUS heard another case 
concerning the State application of the Atkins decision, this time relating to Texas and the 
case of Bobby James Moore. SCOTUS found that the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals had 
applied an outdated criterion and definition when it concluded that Moore was not intellectually 
disabled and could be sentenced to death.29 SCOTUS vacated the holding of the Texas court 
and remanded the case back to the lower court for a sentencing rehearing.30 
As identified in Hall and Moore, there continues to be a number of problems in the US with 
intellectual disabilities and the death penalty. In particular, despite the international and 
domestic safeguards, the 2010 and 2015 UPRs saw a number of NGOs allege that the US is 
continuing to execute those with intellectual disabilities.31 Sections 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 will analyse 
how the 2010 and 2015 UPRs approached intellectual disabilities in the US death penalty. 
 
5.2.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Intellectual Disabilities 
In the 2010 US UPR, the issue of the death penalty and intellectual disabilities was raised in 
all three reports. In its National Report, the US referred to the exclusion of those who have 
intellectual disabilities from being executed as a positive factor regarding the decline in the 
                                                             
24 Ibid 394. 
25 Atkins (n 5). 
26 Ibid 321. Atkins abrogated the previous decision of SCOTUS in Penry v. Lynaugh in 1989, wherein the Court had held that 
‘[t]he Eighth Amendment does not categorically prohibit the execution of mentally retarded capital murderers’, see, Penry v 
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28 Moore v Texas 137 S Ct 1039 (2017). 
29 Ibid 1053. 
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31 See, e.g., UNHRC, ‘Summary of Stakeholders Information – United States of America’ (14 October 2010) UN Doc 
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use of capital punishment in the US, citing the Atkins case.32 Furthermore, the Committee was 
referenced in the Compilation Report as welcoming ‘the 2002 Supreme Court decision that 
executions of mentally retarded criminals are cruel and unusual punishments’.33  
Atkins v. Virginia 
In ruling that executing those with intellectual disabilities is unconstitutional in Atkins, the 
majority opinion derived the definition of mental retardation (as it was termed in 2002) from 
the APA’s DSM-IV. In fact, the DSM-IV – the current version when Atkins was heard – had 
three ‘categories’ of mental retardation based around an individual’s IQ score. Between 50-55 
and 70 was considered ‘mild mental retardation’, between 35-40 and 50-55 was ‘moderate 
mental retardation’, between 20-25 and 35-40 was considered ‘severe mental retardation’, 
and below 20 or 25 was ‘profound mental retardation’.34 From this categorisation, it is 
understandable why Dr Nelson testified at trial that Daryl Atkins was ‘mildly mentally retarded’ 
as his IQ score was 59.35 
SCOTUS ruled that it was unconstitutional to execute the intellectually disabled, reversed the 
decision of the lower court, and remanded Daryl Atkins’ case back to the Virginia courts to 
reconsider. However, despite this decision from SCOTUS and the evidence of Daryl Atkins’ 
intellectual disability, his life was eventually spared not due to this ruling, but due to proof of 
prosecutorial misconduct.36 Although generally the decision in Atkins was celebrated, the most 
prevalent criticism of the judgment was that the Court left to the individual States ‘the task of 
developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon [their] execution of 
sentences’.37 The ABA in its ‘The State of the Modern Death Penalty’ report highlighted the 
issue that the Atkins decision ‘does not guarantee that persons with mental retardation will not 
be executed as each [S]tate may promulgate its own procedures for determining whether a 
capital defendant has mental retardation’.38  
Is the US Continuing to Execute the Intellectually Disabled? 
The issue of the US continuing to execute the intellectually disabled, in spite of the Atkins 
decision, was raised during the 2010 UPR. In its Death Penalty Annex to its individual 
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38 American Bar Association, ‘The State of the Modern Death Penalty in America’ 
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submission, USHRN provided the example of Bobby Wayne Woods who was executed in 
2009 ‘despite compelling evidence of mental retardation’.39 USHRN noted that ‘Woods had 
had difficulty completing even the most basic tasks’ to the point that he ‘was never able to live 
by himself and was functionally illiterate as an adult’ as well as having an IQ score of around 
70, which is considered to be a mild mental retardation.40 This was also raised by AI in its 
individual submission, which noted that ‘[d]espite the 2002 [SCOTUS] ruling that people with 
“mental retardation” be exempt from the death penalty, the absence of a single national 
standard has led to arbitrariness and less than full protection in relation to this category of 
offender’.41 However, these key points were not raised in the main Stakeholder Report, 
meaning that the recommending states are unlikely to have read about them. As argued in 
chapter four, to avoid key information being omitted from the main reports, such as the 
continued execution of the intellectually disabled in violation of both international and domestic 
standards, the OHCHR needs to be more transparent in how it compiles its Stakeholder 
Report.42 This change would further benefit the Stakeholders in all UPRs regarding all human 
rights issues when compiling their individual submissions. 
Moreover, during the interactive dialogue ‘Ireland welcomed the [US’] exclusion of the death 
penalty for crimes committed by minors and persons with an intellectual disability’,43 and ‘New 
Zealand…noted with appreciation that the [US] had excluded the death penalty for…those 
with intellectual disabilities’.44 If Ireland and New Zealand had been made aware that this 
categorical exemption was not being adhered to consistently in some US States, they may 
have raised this during the interactive dialogue. Furthermore, no recommendations were 
made on this point, and so the US was not held to account for executing intellectually disabled 
inmates, in breach of both international and domestic laws. To remedy this, the recommending 
states need to be made aware of this issue, potentially through future Stakeholder Reports as 
discussed above. Then, from this information, the member states should provide specific 
recommendations on what the US is doing to ensure intellectually disabled people are not 
sentenced to death or executed.45 This could also include the member states making 
                                                             
39 USHRN, ‘United States Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission Annex 5 Death Penalty’ (2010) 
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40 Ibid. 
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recommendations on this issue directly to the US State governments and judiciaries, in order 
to have as much impact as possible.46 
 
5.2.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Intellectual Disabilities 
Between the 2010 and 2015 UPRs, there was a critical development in the US regarding 
intellectual disabilities and the death penalty through the decision in Hall v. Florida.47 Despite 
the importance of this case, the US made no reference to it in the 2015 National Report, 
although the US stated that capital punishment ‘is barred…for individuals found by a court to 
have a significant intellectual disability’.48 However, the categorical exemption in the US is for 
all persons with any intellectual disability,49 not a ‘significant’ intellectual disability, meaning 
that the federal government has provided an incorrect fact on this to the key UPR actors. 
Hall v. Florida  
The practical repercussions of Atkins were dealt with by SCOTUS in Hall. In this case, Freddie 
Lee Hall had been sentenced to death for the 1978 murders of Karol Hurst and Lonnie 
Coburn.50 Hall fit into all three categories under the DSM-V’s definition of intellectual 
disabilities: there was a deficit in his mental ability as identified by medical professionals (and 
Hall’s counsel had compared Hall to his daughter who was four years old at the time),51 his 
functioning was well below what it should have been as described by Hall’s siblings and 
teachers,52 and this developed when he was below the age of 18.53 However, according to the 
Florida death penalty statute, as upheld by the Florida Supreme Court in 2012, a person would 
only be considered intellectually disabled if their IQ score was 70 or below.54 As SCOTUS  
noted, ‘Hall had received nine IQ evaluations in 40 years, with scores ranging from 60 to 80’, 
although the only scores considered by the sentencing court were between 71 and 80, thus 
putting his IQ score above the Florida threshold.55 
On the basis that the Florida law ‘create[d] an unacceptable risk that persons with intellectual 
disability will be executed’, SCOTUS struck down the statute as unconstitutional.56 The 
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majority opinion provided four reasons for this decision, utilising the same proportionality 
doctrine adopted by the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition.  
First, the Court considered established medical practice, predominantly relying upon the DSM-
V’s definition of intellectual disability.57 The majority found that the Florida statute ‘disregards 
established medical practice’ on the basis that ‘[i]t takes an IQ score as final and conclusive 
evidence of a defendant’s intellectual capacity, when experts in the field would consider other 
evidence’ and, furthermore, it ‘relies on a purportedly scientific measurement of the 
defendant's abilities, his IQ score, while refusing to recognize that the score is, on its own 
terms, imprecise’.58 The Court detailed that it is well-established within the medical community 
that every IQ test has a ‘standard error of measurement’ or ‘SEM’, wherein medical 
professionals calculate the ‘range’ within which a person’s IQ will fall following an IQ test.59 
This is because a person’s IQ score ‘may fluctuate for a variety of reasons’ including ‘the test-
taker's health; practice from earlier tests; the environment or location of the test; the 
examiner's demeanor; the subjective judgment involved in scoring certain questions on the 
exam; and simple lucky guessing’.60 The example the Court gave is that, just as with Hall’s IQ 
test, ‘[a] score of 71…is generally considered to reflect a range between 66 and 76 with 95% 
confidence and a range of 68.5 and 73.5 with a 68% confidence’.61 The Florida statute used 
a fixed score of 70, which did not take into account the SEM, and also did not allow for other 
evidence of an intellectual disability to be considered.62 
Second, the Court found that ‘a significant majority of [S]tates’ do not have a strict cut off limit 
of an IQ score of 70 like Florida, and take the SEM into account.63 This consideration of a 
‘national consensus’ is often used in death penalty cases, particularly regarding categorical 
exemptions, just as it was used by SCOTUS in Atkins.64 Third, the Court pointed to the 
decision in Atkins and that the opinion ‘itself acknowledges the inherent error in IQ testing’,65 
on the basis that ‘[t]he Atkins Court twice cited definitions of intellectual disability which, by 
their express terms, rejected a strict IQ test score cutoff at 70’.66 Fourth, the Court 
acknowledged that its ‘judicial duty’ is to ‘exercise…judicial judgment’.67 In doing so, the 
majority found that ‘[i]n this Court's independent judgment, the Florida statute, as interpreted 
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by its courts, is unconstitutional’,68 particularly considering the ‘inherent error in IQ tests’.69 In 
coming to its conclusion, the majority added that ‘[i]n addition to the views of the States and 
the Court's precedent, this determination is informed by the views of medical experts’.70 
Furthermore, in delivering the majority opinion of the Court, Justice Kennedy stated that 
‘Florida's law contravenes our Nation's commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human 
decency as the mark of a civilized world’.71 Justice Kennedy, and other SCOTUS justices,72  
believed that the US has a duty to teach the world about ‘human decency’. However, the US 
can also learn from the world community, and the UPR is an example of the world teaching 
the US about human rights and decency. Through the UPR, the international community is 
advising the US that they are not following the correct procedures when sentencing people to 
death and subsequently executing them. Adding to this was the majority opinion’s holding that 
‘[t]he States are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the 
basic dignity the Constitution protects’.73 Just as the US States are laboratories within the US 
federal system, the US can be likened to a laboratory within the international field. Following 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, although the US is a laboratory of international experimentation, 
this must not deny the basic dignity that international standards set for states administering 
the death penalty. As some Justices have been receptive to international standards assisting 
in the interpretation of the Constitution,74 the UPR should be utilised to ensure the US is aware 
of its limits as a laboratory, in that its application of the death penalty is curtailed by 
international standards. This can be achieved through member states targeting the judiciary 
when formulating its recommendations, to have as much impact as possible upon future 
interpretations of the Constitution.75 
Is the US Continuing to Execute the Intellectually Disabled? 
Concerns regarding the execution of those with intellectual disabilities were raised again 
throughout the 2015 UPR. In particular, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (‘OSCE’) discussed the problem in Georgia in its background paper on ‘The Death 
Penalty in the OSCE Area’ in 2013.76 The OSCE noted that ‘[o]n 22 May 2013, lawyers of 
Georgian death row inmate Warren Hill filed a petition to [SCOTUS…stating] that all seven 
mental health experts who have examined Hill now agree that he is “mentally retarded”’.77 
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However, despite this, ‘Hill ha[d] been denied a hearing to determine whether the new 
evidence precludes the application of the death penalty in his case by [c]ourts of the State of 
Georgia, the Georgian Board of Pardons and Parole and the Eleventh Circuit Federal Court’.78 
This report provided an important example of the unfairness of the Georgia statute, similar to 
the Florida and Texas laws as examined by SCOTUS, but was not cited in the Stakeholder 
Report. In fact the OSCE only made very brief reference to the report under its ‘Other 
assessments and recommendations’ heading at the end of its individual submission.79 
Therefore, it is very unlikely that recommending states would have read this information, again 
highlighting the positive effect thematic individual Stakeholder submissions could have on the 
UPR, as a themed submission on intellectual disabilities could have raised the troubling case 
of Warren Hill.80 
In its individual submission, JS8 discussed the Hall case, noting that the decision ‘might open 
the doors to allowing the [S]tates to override the federal minimum standard’ on the basis that 
each State will have to ‘redefine the intellectual minimum standard used for sentencing in 
capital punishment cases’ which could lead to those with intellectual disabilities facing 
execution.81 However, the wording of this point in the Stakeholder submission was clumsy and 
difficult to decipher. The OHCHR cannot paraphrase a Stakeholder’s submission as the final 
report is ‘made up of a collection of direct quotes extracted from NGOs’ contributions’.82 
Therefore, if a Stakeholder submission is illogical or ill-worded, it will not be included, and this 
is a key point for the Stakeholders to consider when compiling their reports to improve the 
chances of their work being included in the final Stakeholder Report.83 
The US received one recommendation on the issue of executing those with intellectual 
disabilities. Spain recommended that ‘[w]hen continuing to implement the death penalty, do 
not apply it to persons with intellectual disabilities’.84 The US supported this in part, noting that 
it was supported ‘with respect to measures required to comply with [US] obligations, and with 
respect to persons with certain intellectual disabilities, but not all persons with any mental 
illness’.85 The US delegation clarified in the Annex to the Addendum Report that it follows the 
decision of SCOTUS in Atkins, specifically stating that ‘[w]e do not support this 
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recommendation to the extent it is interpreted differently’.86 This would have been an ideal 
opportunity for the US to discuss the Hall case, to demonstrate that some progression is being 
made regarding the exemption for those with intellectual disabilities. To encourage the US to 
discuss these developments, Stakeholders and UN member states should highlight the Hall 
case in the US UPR 2020. 
Looking to the 2020 US UPR: Moore v. Texas 
Since the 2015 UPR, there has been a further development in this area through Moore v. 
Texas, which should also be further explored by the key actors in the 2020 US UPR. In 1980, 
Moore shot and killed a store clerk in Texas, for which he was convicted of murder and 
thereafter sentenced to death.87 Following a re-trial due to his first conviction being vacated 
as a result of ineffective assistance of counsel, in 2014, Moore’s timely State habeas claim 
that he has an intellectual disability was heard. After following the DSM-V and the American 
Association on Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities (‘AAIDD’) definitions of intellectual 
disability, and the Atkins and Hall decisions, and after Moore showed an average IQ score of 
70.66, the State habeas court ‘recommended that the [Texas Court of Criminal Appeals] 
reduce Moore’s sentence to life in prison or grant him a new trial on intellectual disability’.88 
However, the Court of Criminal Appeals declined to follow the State court’s recommendation, 
instead relying on an outdated version of the AAIDD, which was written in 1992, referred to 
‘mental retardation’, and followed the decision of the 2004 case of Ex parte Briseno.89 In 
following the outdated criterion, and in finding that Moore had an IQ of 74, the Court of Criminal 
Appeals ruled that Moore was not intellectually disabled and therefore his death sentence was 
constitutional.90 
However, when Justice Ginsburg delivered the opinion of the Court in Moore v. Texas, she 
correctly noted that ‘Moore’s score of 74, adjusted for the standard error of measurement, 
yields a range of 69 to 79’ and, as such, the Court of Criminal Appeals ‘had to move on to 
consider Moore’s adaptive functioning’.91 Justice Ginsburg also made it clear that the Court 
should not ‘end the intellectual-disability inquiry, one way or the other, based on Moore’s IQ 
score’, as, following Hall, it is required ‘that courts continue the inquiry and consider other 
evidence of intellectual disability where an individual’s IQ score, adjusted for the test’s 
standard error, falls within the clinically established range for intellectual-functioning deficits’.92 
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Due to the Texas court disregarding current medical practice by following an outdated criterion 
and definition, SCOTUS vacated the holding of the Court of Criminal Appeals and remanded 
the case back to the lower court.93 
Despite this decision from SCOTUS, on 6 June 2018, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in 
a 5-3 decision again affirmed Moore’s death sentence, after applying the current medical 
standards set out in the DSM-V, and finding that Moore is not intellectually disabled.94 This 
issue needs to be addressed by the Stakeholders and UN member states within the 2020 US 
UPR, with a particular focus on targeting recommendations at the judicial branch of 
government, to provide information on the international opinion on executing the intellectually 
disabled.95 
 
5.3 Mental Illness as a Categorical Exemption 
The 1989 ECOSOC Additional Safeguards explicitly provide that states should ‘eliminat[e] the 
death penalty for persons suffering from mental retardation or extremely limited mental 
competence, whether at the stage of sentence or execution’.96 However, in the US, there is 
no categorical exemption for the severely mentally ill, meaning that domestic US law does not 
conform with international standards. This was raised throughout the US UPRs, and the final 
sections of this chapter consider how the UPR has dealt with this to date, suggesting 
improvements to the mechanism to assist in achieving a categorical exemption for the severely 
mentally ill. These improvements to the UPR mechanism will encourage US adherence to 
international death penalty standards whilst it retains the death penalty, and also assist in 
gathering evidence to further the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition.97 
 
5.3.1 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Mental Illness as a Categorical Exemption 
Compilation Report 
As noted in section 5.2.3 above, in the 2010 Compilation Report, the Committee was cited as 
welcoming ‘the 2002 Supreme Court decision that executions of mentally retarded criminals 
are cruel and unusual punishments’.98 Despite the wealth of information available to be 
included in the Compilation Report, it can be no more than ten pages in length.99 For many 
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states, including the US, there is a plethora of documents to consider and summarise in an 
attempt to ensure all important information is included. Due to the scale of this task, it is 
unsurprising that important observations, comments, and recommendations are sometimes 
overlooked. The UPR’s function is not solely to criticise human rights standards – human rights 
achievements and improvements should be celebrated too.100 Therefore, it is understandable 
from consulting only the Compilation Report that the Committee would congratulate the 
decision of SCOTUS in Atkins v. Virginia.101 However, upon reading the report of the 
Committee, it becomes clear that this was not the full extent of its comments on this issue, as 
it had stated that:  
The Committee welcomes [SCOTUS’] decision in Atkins v. Virginia (2002), which held 
that executions of mentally retarded criminals are cruel and unusual punishments, and 
encourages the [s]tate party to ensure that persons suffering from severe forms of 
mental illness not amounting to mental retardation are equally protected.102 
This final section of the paragraph is arguably the most important, as the Committee is 
encouraging an expansion of the Atkins decision to cover all serious mental illnesses, in order 
to bring the US in line with international law. However, this was omitted from the Compilation 
Report and, as there is currently very little literature on how the OHCHR decides on the content 
of the document, there is no answer as to why this was not included. Furthermore, Olivier de 
Frouville has criticised the report for being ‘brief and selective’.103 This presents the question 
of the effectiveness of the Compilation Report: is it a necessary tool to collate UN human rights 
advice and recommendations, or is it just a non-exhaustive replication of work? One of the 
principles of the UPR is to complement but not duplicate the work of the other human rights 
bodies,104 which would potentially be a waste of resources for all involved. However, for the 
Compilation Report, and the UPR process as a whole, to be fully effective, this thesis argues 
that some duplication is necessary. This is particularly important when considering the issue 
of the death penalty, as the Compilation Report presents an opportunity to collate the corpus 
of UN recommendations on capital punishment in the US. 
However, as evidenced above, the report is not exhaustive, and vital information has been 
overlooked. It appears that it is the strict page limit preventing the document from being 
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comprehensive, and this thesis argues that the page limits should be more flexible.105 Although 
the UPR should ‘[n]ot be overly burdensome to the concerned [s]tate or to the agenda of the 
[UNHRC]’,106 there must also be enough information provided for the UPR to be influential on 
human rights on the ground. Adding weight to this argument, Chauville found that the material 
in the Compilation Report ‘has been extensively used by countries making recommendations 
to the state under review’.107 Many states do not have the resources to look through all UN 
documents for every state under review. Therefore, as the Compilation Report is being relied 
upon so heavily, and given that the UPR is designed to be a universal mechanism, it is vital 
that the document is thorough, even if this involves some duplication with other human rights 
mechanisms. 
Stakeholder Reports 
The Stakeholders also identified the issue of the execution of those with severe mental 
illnesses in the 2010 UPR. In the Stakeholder Report, it was noted that USHRN ‘referred 
to…the execution of persons with mental disabilities’108 and ‘AI noted that people with serious 
mental illness continue to be subjected to the death penalty, despite the 2002 [SCOTUS] ruling 
that people with “mental retardation” be exempt’.109 The 1989 ECOSOC Safeguards provide 
that member states should ‘[e]liminat[e] the death penalty for persons suffering from mental 
retardation or extremely limited mental competence, whether at the stage of sentence or 
execution’.110 However, in 2003, the Commission on Human Rights called upon member 
states ‘[n]ot to impose the death penalty on a person suffering from any form of mental 
disorder or to execute any such person’.111 Despite this, other than those who are diagnosed 
as insane or intellectually disabled, those suffering from any other mental disorders will not be 
exempt from the death penalty in the US.  
In the Death Penalty Annex to its individual Stakeholder submission, USHRN highlighted this 
differentiation between mental retardation and other mental illnesses, finding that the US 
‘defines [intellectual disabilities] narrowly, and continues to apply the death penalty to 
individuals who suffer from severe mental illnesses, brain damage, and other mental 
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disabilities’.112 USHRN clarified that ‘[i]n the last ten years, the [US] has put to death dozens 
of prisoners suffering from schizophrenia, bipolar disorder, and other incapacitating mental 
disabilities’,113 which USHRN argued is in contravention of the Convention Against Torture 
and Article 7 ICCPR.114 Furthermore, USHRN cited AI’s finding that ‘one in every ten 
individuals executed in the [US] suffered from a serious mental disorder other than mental 
retardation’.115 USHRN recommended that the US ‘revise its laws to prohibit the imposition of 
the death penalty against those with mental disabilities’.116 This is the kind of recommendation 
or advance question the US would have benefited from receiving, adding weight to the 
argument in this thesis that Stakeholders should be allowed to provide advance questions.117  
Recommendations 
The US received three recommendations on the execution of those with mental illnesses. 
Cuba recommended that the US should ‘[e]nd the prosecution and execution of mentally-ill 
persons and minors’,118 and Ireland made a similar recommendation asking that the US 
‘[e]xtend the exclusion of death penalty to all crimes committed by persons with mental 
illness’.119 The US supported these in part, stating that:  
We cannot support [Cuba’s recommendation] with respect to prosecution. We support 
both recommendations with respect to executions regarding minors and persons with 
certain intellectual disabilities, but not regarding all persons with any mental illness.120  
The wording of these recommendations allowed the US to provide a stock answer and not 
identify why the exemption does not extend to all mental illnesses. This exact question could 
also have been asked during the advance questions. Sweden provided an advance question 
expressing its concern regarding ‘the continued incidence of death sentences against and 
executions of persons in cases in which concerns have been raised over circumstances 
affecting the proceedings, including with regard to the mental health of defendants’.121 
However, a specific question should have been asked to query why the US will not extend the 
categorical exemption to all those suffering from mental illnesses. Even if the reply is simply 
because SCOTUS has not ruled that the execution of all those with severe mental illnesses 
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violates the Eighth Amendment, it would have allowed the member states to formulate more 
specific recommendations in subsequent UPRs.122 
Furthermore, as the recommendation from Venezuela was actually regarding total abolition of 
capital punishment – ‘[a]bolish the death penalty, which is also applied to persons with mental 
disabilities and commute those which have already been imposed’123 – the US ‘noted’ this 
recommendation.124 From the analysis of the 2010 and 2015 UPR, this thesis has identified 
that the US will not accept recommendations asking it to abolish the death penalty or put a 
moratorium in place.125 Instead, states should make specific recommendations regarding 
particular aspects of concern within the US capital system, including the execution of those 
with a severe mental illness.126 If Venezuela had recommended that the US should exempt 
persons with any mental illness from the death penalty, and if the US had been expected to 
provide a response as to why it accepted or noted this recommendation,127 it would have been 
explained within the 2010 UPR why the categorical exemption has not been expanded. This 
would have also strengthened the international aspect of the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition. 
 
5.3.2 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Mental Illness as a Categorical Exemption 
Compilation Report 
The 2015 Compilation Report directly cited the SRE and SRT on the execution of the mentally 
ill in the US, which is an improvement on the 2010 UPR when there was no reference to this 
in the main report. The SRE ‘called on the federal and [S]tate administrations to ensure that 
the death penalty was not imposed on the mentally ill’.128 Both SRs in 2014 ‘stated that 
imposing capital punishment on individuals suffering from psychosocial disabilities was a 
violation of death penalty [S]afeguards’.129 Upon further inspection, this was regarding the 
execution of Scott Panetti in Texas,130 whom the SRs reported was ‘a prisoner with proven 
psychosocial disabilities’.131 Both SRs advised this execution would be a violation of 
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international law,132 but despite this, Panetti’s petition for writ of cert was denied and he was 
executed on 3 December 2014.133 This reinforced the fact that domestic US law is not in line 
with international standards on this issue of executing mentally ill inmates. 
Stakeholder Reports 
The execution of those with a mental illness was raised in the individual Stakeholder 
submissions by AI and JS8, although only AI’s statement that ‘[p]eople with mental illness 
continue to be subjected to the death penalty’134 made it into the final Stakeholder Report. 
However, JS8 had provided more detail, discussing mental illness and the ruling in Atkins and 
Hall.135 A categorical exemption for persons with a mental illness is an issue that needs to be 
explored further in the 2020 UPR. It may be beneficial for a thematic Stakeholder submission 
to be prepared, as it would allow one Stakeholder the opportunity to fully examine the issue of 
people with mental illnesses facing execution in the US.136 
Advance Questions and Recommendations 
The US was asked about how it was preventing the execution of those with mental illnesses 
in the advance questions by Belgium, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland,137 which 
was an improvement on Sweden’s question in 2010. During the interactive dialogue, the US 
responded to this by stating that ‘[n]o defendant found by a court to have significant intellectual 
and adaptive disabilities may be subject to capital punishment, either at the [S]tate or federal 
levels’.138 However, this does not answer the question of how the US is going to prevent the 
execution of the mentally ill, or even simply why it will not extend the categorical exemption. 
This thesis argues that the member states (and potentially the Stakeholders) need to be 
clearer when asking advance questions, and the way advance questions are addressed needs 
further consideration. There is currently no guidance as to how a state should respond to the 
advance questions, which is something that should be improved, particularly through 
strengthening the troika’s role in the process.139 
Two recommendations were made on this point in 2015. As part of a wider recommendation 
on the death penalty, Sweden asked the US to ‘[e]xempt persons with mental illness from 
execution’.140 France also provided a concise recommendation to ‘[e]nsure that no person with 
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a mental disability is executed’.141 The US supported these recommendations in part, but 
provided a similarly vague response as it did in 2010, advising that ‘[w]e support these 
recommendations with respect to measures required to comply with [US] obligations, and with 
respect to persons with certain intellectual disabilities, but not all persons with any mental 
illness’.142 In the Appendix to the Addendum Report, the US sought to clarify its position further 
regarding Sweden and France’s recommendations, stating that ‘[w]e support the part of this 
recommendation asking us to ensure that our implementation of capital punishment complies 
with international human rights obligations and commitments’.143 However, this is misleading, 
as its international human rights obligations and commitments would see the US exempting 
persons with all mental illnesses from the death penalty.144 In order to elicit a better response 
from the US, the recommending states need to reconsider the content of their 
recommendations.145 For example, the member states should consider recommending on how 
the US can go about exempting persons with all mental illnesses from the death penalty, 
including conducting studies led by the DOJ in consultation with medical professionals and 
Stakeholders, or propose changes to federal and State laws. In particular, questions should 
be asked regarding what is it that makes insanity and intellectual disabilities different to mental 
illnesses such as paranoid schizophrenia or personality disorders? No clear answer was given 
by the US in its previous UPRs and this should be explored in the 2020 UPR. 
 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified that it is widely considered that the intellectual disability categorical 
exemption is not broad enough, as it should also encompass those with severe mental 
illnesses. Both international law and the world community, as identified by the analysis of the 
US UPRs, are in support of a categorical exemption from the death penalty for those with 
severe mental illnesses. In order to use the UPR to facilitate such a categorical exemption, 
the changes to the mechanism that are argued for in this chapter and are explored further in 
chapter seven need to be made. It is likely that this categorical exemption would come from 
SCOTUS, using the proportionality doctrine as it has done in Atkins and Roper, and, as 
identified by the Steikers, this may also be used to further the blueprint for complete abolition 
of the death penalty in the US.146
                                                             
141 Ibid para 176.197. 
142 Report of the Working Group Addendum 1 2015 (n 85) para 9. 
143 Report of the Working Group Appendix to the Addendum 2015 (n 86) 8. 
144 Safeguards 1989 (n 11) para 1(d); UNCHR Res 2003/67 (n 110). 
145 See, chapter 7.4.2. 
146 Steiker & Steiker, Courting Death (n 97) 284. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE IMPLEMENTATION OF DEATH: DEATH ROW, EXECUTIONS, AND THE 
UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 
 
The two most challenged aspects of the implementation of a death sentence within the 2010 
and 2015 US UPRs were the time spent on death row and the actual execution. Through an 
analysis of the UPR and international law, this chapter firstly considers the conditions on death 
row, including the use of solitary confinement and the death row phenomenon. Secondly, this 
chapter examines the execution itself, through the methods of execution utilised and the 
related alleged breaches of international and domestic US laws. 
 
6.1 Conditions on Death Row in the US 
The conditions on death row across the US are notoriously harsh.1 This chapter categorises 
the conditions as follows: general conditions on death row, solitary confinement, and the death 
row phenomenon. Examples of the conditions on death row in the US are plentiful, and some 
death rows are considered to be worse than others. For example, in Louisiana, ‘[d]eath row 
inmates are automatically segregated from the general prison population and live in 
permanent solitary confinement, with one hour out per day to exercise, shower, and make 
phone calls’.2 
Moreover, in Mississippi, the Fifth Circuit ruled that some conditions on death row were so bad 
that they violated the inmates’ Eighth Amendment rights.3 This was following the case the 
ACLU’s National Prison Project brought in 2002, which alleged ‘profound isolation, lack of 
exercise, stench and filth, malfunctioning plumbing, high temperatures, uncontrolled mosquito 
and insect infestations, a lack of sufficient mental health care, and exposure to psychotic 
inmates in adjoining cells’.4 
A further example is Oklahoma’s H-Unit, which houses the State’s death row prisoners. The 
facility is underground, made of concrete lacking natural light and air, and ‘is an electronically 
                                                             
1 See, Marah S McLeod, ‘Does the Death Penalty Require Death Row? The Harm of Legislative Silence’ (2016) 77 Ohio St LJ 
525, 537-39, for a recent assessment of the conditions on death row across the US. See, also, William A Schabas, The Death 
Penalty as Cruel Treatment and Torture (Northeastern University Press 1996) 96, 150; Soering v United Kingdom (1989) 11 
EHRR 439; Gates v Cook 376 F 3d 323 (5th Cir 2004); Prieto v Clarke No 1:12-cv-01199 (LMB/IDD) 2013 WL 6019215 (E D Va 
12 Nov 2013). 
2 Elizabeth Compa, Cecelia Trenticosta Kappel & Mercedes Montagnes, ‘Litigating Civil Rights on Death Row: A Louisiana 
Perspective’ (2014) 15 Loy J Pub Int L 293, 300-01. 
3 Gates (n 1). 
4 Ibid 327. 
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controlled facility designed to minimize contact between inmates and prison staff’.5 The 
inmates are kept in solitary confinement, with no work or activities provided.6 Amnesty 
International wrote a damning report on the H-Unit in 1994, arguing that its conditions 
breached international and domestic standards.7 
 
6.1.1 International Law 
Harsh conditions on death row potentially breach a number of international standards. Article 
5 UDHR provides that ‘[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment’,8 and Article 7 ICCPR provides the same protection.9 Case law of 
the Committee, IACHR, and the ECtHR has also held that these protections will be violated 
by harsh conditions on death row.10 
Article 10(1) ICCPR further provides that ‘[a]ll persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’.11 Moreover, the 
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners were first adopted by the UN in 195512 
and, more recently in 2015, these rules were updated and termed the ‘Mandela Rules’.13 The 
Mandela Rules provide for the basic conditions a prisoner should live in, including ‘due regard 
being paid to climatic conditions and particularly to cubic content of air, minimum floor space, 
lighting, heating and ventilation’,14 access to basic sanitation,15 and shower facilities.16 The 
1996 Safeguards also provide that states should ‘effectively apply the Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, in order to keep to a minimum the suffering of prisoners 
under sentence of death and to avoid any exacerbation of such suffering’.17 
 
                                                             
5 Amnesty International, ‘Conditions for Death Row Prisoners in H-Unit, Oklahoma State Penitentiary, USA’ (30 April 1994) 1 
<www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/180000/amr510341994en.pdf> accessed 24 August 2018. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid 28-29. 
8 Universal Declaration of Human Rights (adopted 10 December 1948) UNGA Res 217 A(III), Article 5 [hereinafter referred to as 
‘UDHR’]. 
9 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted 16 December 1966, entered into force 23 March 1976) 999 UNTS 
171, Article 7 [hereinafter referred to as ‘ICCPR’]. 
10 See, e.g., Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin et al v Trinidad and Tobago Judgement of 21 June 2002 UN Doc A/67/279 para 42; 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, Report No 44/14, Case 12.873 para 182; Soering (n 1); Kuznetsov v Ukraine 
Application No 39042/97 (29 April 2003); Nazarenko v Ukraine Application No 39483/98 (29 April 2003); Dankevich v Ukraine 
(2004) EHRR 25; Aliev v Ukraine Application No 41220/98 (29 April 2003); Khokhlich v Ukraine Application No 41707/98 (29 April 
2003); OHCHR, General Comment 20(44): Article 7 (10 March 1994) UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev1/Add3 para 6 [hereinafter referred 
to as ‘General Comment 20(44) 1994’]. 
11 ICCPR (n 9) Article 10(1). 
12 ECOSOC Resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 1957 and ECOSOC Resolution 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977. 
13 United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, UNGA Resolution 70/175, Annex, adopted on 17 
December 2015 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Mandela Rules’]. 
14 Ibid Rule 13. 
15 Ibid Rule 15. 
16 Ibid Rules 16 and 18. 
17 ECOSOC ‘Safeguards Guaranteeing Protection of the Rights of those Facing the Death Penalty’ ECOSOC Res 1996/15 (23 
July 1996) para 7 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Safeguards 1996’]. 
   
 
164 
 
6.1.2 Domestic Law 
Harsh conditions on death row in the US arguably breach the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishment, although this has not been confirmed by SCOTUS. 
Therefore, the UPR has a specific role to play in holding the US to account to its international 
obligations with regards to the conditions on death row, whilst it continues to retain the death 
penalty. 
 
6.1.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Conditions on Death Row 
Stakeholder Report 
There was no specific reference made to the conditions on death row in the US in the 2010 
National Report or Compilation Report. However, there were two references in the 
Stakeholder Report from USHRN and AI. USHRN referred to ‘the inhumane and degrading 
conditions of death row facilities’.18 Notably, the USHRN individual submission mirrored the 
language of Article 7 ICCPR, rather than the Eighth Amendment. This was potentially because 
the UPR is based upon international law, but also because Article 7’s scope reaches to protect 
against harsh conditions on death row, whereas the Eighth Amendment’s does not.19 
The Stakeholder Report further stated that ‘AI also referred to the harsh conditions on death 
rows in many [S]tates’20 but, even in its individual submission, AI did not provide any further 
detail regarding which States and what the conditions are.21 AI is a large, influential NGO that 
covers a breadth of human rights issues in its submission to the US UPR, which is why it is 
more widely cited in the Stakeholder Report than smaller NGOs who also make salient 
points.22 However, AI had not provided the requisite detail in its individual submission, and this 
is an example of where thematic Stakeholder submissions would be appropriate.23 For 
instance, AI could have focused solely on the conditions on death row under its capital 
punishment heading, which would have allowed a full paragraph of information to be included, 
without impeding on the other important human rights issues AI reported on. 
                                                             
18 UNHRC, ‘Summary of Stakeholders Information – United States of America’ (14 October 2010) UN Doc 
A/HRC/WG.6/9/USA/3/Rev1 para 30 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Stakeholder Report 2010]. 
19 See, sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2 above. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Although AI did provide information on the harsh conditions within ‘supermaximum’ security prisons, Amnesty International, 
‘United States Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission’ (2010) 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRUSStakeholdersInfoS9.aspx> para C(ii) accessed 24 August 2018.  
22 Lawrence C Moss, ‘Opportunities for Nongovernmental Organization Advocacy in the Universal Periodic Review Process at 
the UN Human Rights Council’ (2010) Journal of Human Rights Practice Vol 2, Number 1, 122 –150, 132. 
23 See, chapter 7.2.2. 
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Other Stakeholders, which were not referenced in the main report, also provided more detail 
on the harsh conditions on US death row. For example, in its individual submission, HRA noted 
that death row inmates ‘are subjected to…unsanitary conditions, insect and rodent 
infestations, extreme temperatures and exposure to deafening volumes of noise, including the 
screams of mentally insane inmates who are not separated from other death row inmates’.24 
Furthermore, although litigation was successful in the Fifth Circuit,25 this is not commonplace. 
As noted by ACLU in its individual submission: 
Prisoners…seeking the protection of the courts against dangerous or unhealthy 
conditions of confinement, also have been denied any remedy and have had their cases 
thrown out of court due to federal legislation that created numerous burdens and 
restrictions on lawsuits brought by prisoners in the federal courts.26 
The IACHR, in its submitted report on the cases of Medellín, Cardenas, and García, noted 
that the petitioner had described the Polunsky Unit in Texas as having: 
[S]mall cells with a sink, a toilet and a narrow bed, where [the inmates] spend 23 hours 
of isolation per day, segregated from other prisoners in every aspect of their lives. They 
are allowed no physical contact with loved ones or even their attorneys…[and] receive 
no educational or occupational training…[U]nlike any other death row in the US, Texas 
death row does not offer access to television. Radio is the primary source of stimulation 
for semi literate inmates.27 
These examples from the IACHR, ACLU, and HRA highlighted a plethora of issues regarding 
conditions on death row. However, this information was not cited in the final Stakeholder 
Report, supporting the argument in this thesis that the OHCHR needs to be more transparent 
in how it compiles the report.28 Even if thematic Stakeholder submissions are adopted, as 
suggested above, the OHCHR still must provide a briefing document on its method to collate 
the report in order to inform Stakeholders when they are compiling their individual 
submissions. 
 
 
                                                             
24 Human Rights Advocates, ‘United States Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission’ (2010) para 7 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRUSStakeholdersInfoS9.aspx> accessed 24 August 2018. 
25 See, Gates (n 1). 
26 American Civil Liberties Union, ‘United States Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission’ (2010) 1 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRUSStakeholdersInfoS9.aspx> accessed 24 August 2018. 
27 Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, ‘United States Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission Annex 2’ 
(2010) <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRUSStakeholdersInfoS9.aspx> para 60 accessed 24 August 2018. 
28 See, chapter 7.1.1. 
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Conditions on California’s Death Row 
HRA and USHRN highlighted the conditions on California’s death row. Located in San 
Quentin, California has the largest death row population – currently 746 – but has not carried 
out an execution since 2006.29 Despite this, in 2016, California’s electorate voted to retain the 
death penalty and to expedite executions.30 
As HRA outlined, ‘condemned prisoners wait four to five years for appellate counsel to be 
appointed’ and upwards of 150 ‘death-row prisoners in the [S]tate have been there for over 20 
years’.31 Furthermore, Matthew C. Altman has described the conditions in San Quentin, noting 
that the ‘[c]ells in California’s death row are about four feet across, nine feet long, and seven 
feet from floor to ceiling’32 and ‘[m]ost death row inmates must remain in their cells for twenty-
three hours a day or more, and recreational activities for death row inmates have decreased 
recently, as they have been denied materials for pursuing hobbies’.33  
USHRN also cited a monitoring report on San Quentin, carried out by an expert on behalf of 
the California courts, which was visited ‘to assess the treatment of mentally ill prisoners’.34  
The report found that the conditions were: 
[S]ubstandard and included filthy and badly lit cells, with many inmates in poor, 
unsanitary conditions. Several inmates were symptomatically psychotic on sight; 
inmates complained of harassment by other inmates and staff and being compelled to 
make choices between going to health and mental health appointments, visits or yard.35 
Furthermore, USHRN noted that, ‘[p]risoners who are not among the most severely ill, but who 
nevertheless have been diagnosed with a major mental illness, are not offered therapeutic 
mental health counseling, which is available to non-condemned prisoners’.36 This also 
contravenes Rule 24 of the Mandela Rules regarding access to healthcare, which advises that 
those who are incarcerated ‘should enjoy the same standards of health care that are available 
in the community’.37 Again, this vital information was not included in the final Stakeholder 
                                                             
29 Death Penalty Information Center, ‘Death-Row Prisoners by State’ (1 July 2017) <https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/death-row-
inmates-state-and-size-death-row-year> accessed 24 August 2018. Correct as at 1 July 2017. 
30 Kim Bellware, ‘California Votes to Speed Up Death Penalty, rather than Abolish It’ Huffington Post (14 November 2016) 
<www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/california-death-penalty-results_us_581f62bce4b0e80b02caa779> accessed 24 August 2018. 
31 HRA, ‘Stakeholder Submission’ (2010) (n 24) para 8. 
32 Matthew C. Altman, ‘Arbitrariness and the California Death Penalty’ (2016) 14 Ohio St J Crim L 217, 228. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See, Coleman v Wilson 912 F Supp 1282 (ED Cal 1995). 
35 Ibid para 23, citing Special Master’s 20th Monitoring Report, 107, reflecting October 2007 visits, Coleman v Schwarzenegger 
ED Cal No Civ S-90-0520 LKK JFM. 
36 Ibid para 24. 
37 Mandela Rules (n 13) Rule 24. 
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Report, furthering the argument in this thesis that it is imperative that the OHCHR provides 
material on how it collates the final reports.38 
Recommendations 
Despite the concerning information provided throughout the 2010 UPR, no specific 
recommendations were made in 2010 regarding the conditions on death row. However, four 
recommendations were made referring to prison conditions generally, which also relate to 
conditions on death row. The Islamic Republic of Iran recommended that the US should 
‘[g]uarantee the complete prohibition of torture in all prisons under its control’.39 The US 
supported this recommendation, noting that ‘[US] law prohibits torture in all prisons and 
detention facilities under its control’.40 However, this was an example of the US accepting a 
recommendation that it believed would require no further action by the federal government or 
States to implement, regardless of what international law prescribes. It would perhaps have 
led to more meaningful implementation by the US if Iran had provided a more specific 
recommendation, detailing how the US might ensure the prohibition of torture in its prisons in 
line with its international obligations.41  
Furthermore, Austria recommended that the US should ‘[t]ake appropriate legislative and 
practical measures to improve living conditions through its prison systems, in particular with 
regard to access to health care and education’,42 which the US accepted but made no 
comment on.43 Belgium also recommended that the US should ‘[r]educe overcrowding in 
prisons by enlarging existing facilities or building new ones and/or making more use of 
alternative penalties’.44 This was supported by the US although no comment was made.45 
Furthermore, Sweden recommended that the US should ‘[e]nsure the full enjoyment of human 
rights by persons deprived of their liberty, including by way of ensuring treatment in maximum 
security prisons in conformity with international law’.46 This was also supported and no 
comment was made.47 Three recommendations were made that the US accepted and 
provided no comment on. To remedy this problem, this thesis argues that in future UPRs, the 
US should provide an explanation as to how it intends to implement its accepted 
recommendations in the Annex to the Working Group Report, allowing a discussion to take 
                                                             
38 See, chapter 7.1.1. 
39 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America’ (4 January 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/16/11 paras 92.145 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group 2010’]. 
40 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America Addendum’ (8 March 
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/16/11/Add1, para 7 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group Addendum 2010’]. 
41 See, chapter 7.4.2. 
42 Report of the Working Group 2010 (n 39) para 92.70. 
43 Report of the Working Group Addendum 2010 (n 40) para 7. 
44 Report of the Working Group 2010 (n 39) para 92.163. 
45 Report of the Working Group Addendum 2010 (n 40) para 7. 
46 Report of the Working Group 2010 (n 39) para 92.177. 
47 Report of the Working Group Addendum 2010 (n 40) para 8. 
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place during the UNHRC plenary session about this between the US, Stakeholders, and UN 
member states.48 This would also allow the US’ progress on implementation to be more easily 
measured, meaning it could be readily held to account at the next UPR. 
 
6.1.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Conditions on Death Row 
National Report 
In response to the recommendations made in 2010, the US noted in the 2015 National Report 
that it ‘continues to strive to improve living conditions throughout its confinement facilities’.49 
The delegation made a comity differentiation between federal and State prisons, noting that 
‘we ensure that all offenders housed in federal custody have access to medical care on-site, 
and in the community if needed’.50 Furthermore, with regard to US State facilities, it noted that:  
States must certify that all facilities under their operational control, including facilities run 
by private entities on behalf of the [S]tate, fully comply with these regulations; if they do 
not, they lose certain federal funding unless they pledge to devote that funding to 
compliance. Six [S]tates and one [US] territory have been subjected to a five percent 
reduction in federal funding after declining to provide an assurance or certification of 
compliance.51  
However, in terms of death rows across the US States, it appears these minimum standards 
for State facilities are not being adhered to. As discussed above, there are death rows across 
the US that fall below the required standard of Article 7 ICCPR. AI also further highlighted this 
point in its individual submission, noting that the ‘[h]arsh conditions on death rows in many 
[S]tates add to the inherent cruelty of the death sentence’.52 Furthermore, the US delegation’s 
assertions should have been directly addressed within the 2015 UPR. 
Recommendations 
During the interactive dialogue and prior to the recommendations being made, Ireland stated 
that it ‘was concerned by harsh death row conditions’.53 However, Ireland did not follow up its 
concern by providing a recommendation and the US did not respond to it during the interactive 
                                                             
48 See, chapter 7.5.1. 
49 UNHRC, ‘National Report of the United States of America’ (13 February 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/22/USA/1 para 43 
[hereinafter referred to as ‘National Report 2015’]. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid para 45. 
52 Amnesty International, ‘United States Universal Periodic Review Stakeholder Submission’ (2015) 
<www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRUSStakeholdersInfoS22.aspx> 3 accessed 24 August 2018. 
53 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America’ (20 July 2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/30/12 para 152 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group 2015’]. 
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dialogue. This thesis argues that there are two ways to elicit a response from the US, and 
other states, in future UPRs. First, states should use the advance questions to ask the US 
delegation specific questions on conditions on death row,54 and second, they should follow 
that up with specific recommendations on ways to remedy the harsh conditions.55 In fact, no 
recommendations were made in 2015 specifically regarding conditions on death row, although 
a general recommendation was made regarding prison conditions, which encompasses death 
row. Japan recommended that the US ‘[t]ake further steps to improve the current conditions 
of its prisons’.56 The US supported this recommendation,57 and during the consideration of the 
Outcome Report made sure to note that it had ‘supported recommendations to improve 
conditions in prisons and places of detention’.58 However, there was no discussion of how this 
would be implemented. The acceptance of this recommendation must lead to implementation 
on the ground and, to date, there is no evidence to suggest any action has been taken. 
Therefore, this thesis argues that the follow-up to the review part of the UPR requires 
improvement. This can be carried out in three ways: one, through ensuring states explain why 
they accepted or noted a recommendation, two, making the mid-term reports a pivotal part of 
the UPR, and, three, considering the creation of a specific, thematic mandate for a UPR 
special procedure.59 
 
6.2 Solitary Confinement 
Solitary confinement is defined by the US DOJ as ‘a highly restrictive, high-custody housing 
unit within a secure facility, or an entire secure facility, that isolates inmates from the general 
prison population and from each other’, with inmates being locked up for 22-24 hours per 
day.60 Solitary confinement became a popular method of controlling inmates in the 1980s and 
90s ‘as prison populations skyrocketed’ and ‘supermax’ prisons were built that were ‘designed 
for isolated confinement’.61 There is no official US governmental record of how many inmates 
are in isolation at any given time. However, the UK government estimated in 2013 that over 
80,000 US prisoners were in some kind of solitary confinement,62 and a collaborative report 
                                                             
54 See, chapter 7.3.2. 
55 See, chapter 7.4.2. 
56 Report of the Working Group 2015 (n 53) para 176.236. 
57 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America Addendum 1’ (14 
September 2015) A/HRC/30/12/Add1, para 8 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group Addendum 1 2015’]. 
58 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Human Rights Council on its Thirtieth Session’ (10 May 2016) UN Doc A/HRC/30/2, para 354 
[hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the UNHRC Thirtieth Session’]. 
59 See chapter 7.5. 
60 Chase Riveland, Supermax Prisons: Overview and General Considerations (US Department of Justice National Institute of 
Corrections 1999) 12. Emphasis removed. 
61 Elizabeth Alexander, ‘“This Experiment, So Fatal”: Some Initial Thoughts on Strategic Choices in the Campaign against Solitary 
Confinement’ (2015) 5 UC Irvine L Rev 1, 10. 
62 Ministry of Justice, Monthly Bulletin-November 2013 (November 2013) <www.gov.uk/government/publications/prison-
population-figures> accessed 24 August 2018. 
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between the Association of State Correctional Administrators and Yale Law School estimated 
that ‘80,000 to 100,000 people were, in 2014, in segregation’, and that figure was not including 
‘people in local jails, juvenile facilities, or in military and immigration detention’.63 There are a 
number of reasons for a person to be placed in solitary confinement in the US, including 
because of a death sentence.64 
 
6.2.1 International Law 
This use of solitary confinement on death row exacerbates claims of cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading treatment under Article 7 ICCPR and Article 5 UDHR. In its General Comment 20, 
the Committee found that ‘prolonged solitary confinement of the detained or imprisoned 
person may amount to acts prohibited by [A]rticle 7’.65 It can also lead to a breach of the 
Convention Against Torture, as explicitly stated by the SRT.66 
Furthermore, when the Mandela Rules were revised in 2015, rule 43(1) was added, providing 
that ‘[t]he following practices…shall be prohibited: (a) Indefinite solitary confinement; (b) 
Prolonged solitary confinement; (c) Placement of a prisoner in a dark or constantly lit cell’.67 
In fact, rule 43(1) also states that, ‘[i]n no circumstances may restrictions or disciplinary 
sanctions amount to torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.68 
This suggests that if this rule is breached – as it often is by the US – it will amount to torture 
and a breach of international law. 
The Mandela Rules also clarify that ‘solitary confinement shall refer to the confinement of 
prisoners for 22 hours or more a day without meaningful human contact’ and that ‘[p]rolonged 
solitary confinement shall refer to solitary confinement for a time period in excess of 15 
consecutive days’.69 Furthermore, the rules state that it should only be used ‘in exceptional 
cases as a last resort’ and should ‘not be imposed by virtue of a prisoner’s sentence’.70 The 
US is in clear breach of these rules, as prisoners often find themselves in prolonged and 
indefinite solitary confinement, solely on the basis that have been sentenced to death.71  
                                                             
63 The Liman Program Yale Law School & Association of State Correctional Administrators, ‘Time in Cell: The ASCA-Liman 2014 
National Survey of Administrative Segregation in Prison’ (August 2015) ii <https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/asca-
liman_administrative_segregation_report_sep_2_2015.pdf> accessed 24 August 2018. 
64 Alexander (n 61) 11. 
65 General Comment 20(44) 1994 (n 10) para 6. 
66 UNHRC, ‘Compilation of UN Information – United States of America’ (2 March 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/22/USA/2 para 26 
[hereinafter referred to as ‘Compilation Report 2015’], citing OHCHR, Press release, “California jails: Solitary confinement can 
amount to cruel punishment, even torture” – UN rights expert” (23 August 2013) <www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/Display 
News.aspx?NewsID=13655&LangID=E> accessed 24 August 2018. 
67 Mandela Rules (n 13) rule 43(1). 
68 Ibid. 
69 Ibid rule 44. 
70 Ibid rule 45(1). 
71 Alexander (n 61) 11. 
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6.2.2 Domestic Law 
The ACLU, in its report on solitary confinement on US death rows, stated that ‘[m]ost death 
row prisoners in the [US] are locked alone in small cells for 22 to 24 hours a day with little 
human contact or interaction; reduced or no natural light; and severe constraints on visitation, 
including the inability to ever touch friends or loved ones’.72 The prolonged use of solitary 
confinement is potentially a breach of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of cruel and unusual 
punishment, and the due process clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. However, 
in 1995 in Sandin v. Conner, SCOTUS found that the use of solitary confinement in Hawaii did 
not give rise to a liberty interest.73 Despite this, in 2005, SCOTUS ruled in Wilkinson v. Austin 
that the use of ‘supermax’ prisons, which involve very similar conditions to solitary 
confinement, did give rise to a liberty interest under the due process clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.74 Though SCOTUS distinguished the facts in Wilkinson from Sandin on the basis 
that, in Sandin, the solitary confinement was limited to 30 days, and did not affect the issue of 
parole,75 the harsh conditions in supermax were likened to the harsh conditions of solitary 
confinement by the majority opinion, delivered by Justice Kennedy.76 
Furthermore, the ABA has provided a ‘Standards for the Treatment of Prisoners’, with a 
specific section on death row, noting in standard 23-2.4(b) that:  
A prisoner should not be separated from the general population or denied programmatic 
opportunities based solely on the prisoner’s offense or sentence, except that separate 
housing areas should be permissible for prisoners under sentence of death. If convicted 
capital offenders are separately housed based solely on their sentence, conditions 
should be comparable to those provided to the general population.77 
In the majority of death row facilities in the US, the conditions are much more severe than in 
general population prisons, as highlighted in cases such as Prieto v. Clarke.78 This suggests 
the Standards set by the ABA are not being met in the US. In fact, the conditions on death row 
are often so unbearable that some inmates waive their right to appeal on the basis that death 
is a better option compared with a prolonged stay on death row.79 Since the death penalty was 
                                                             
72 American Civil Liberties Union, A Death Before Dying: Solitary Confinement on Death Row (July 2013). 
73 Sandin v Conner 515 US 472, 486 (1995). 
74 Wilkinson v Austin 545 US 209, 220-21 (2005). 
75 Ibid 224. 
76 Ibid 223-24. 
77 American Bar Association, ABA Standards for Criminal Justice: Treatment of Prisoners (3rd edn, ABA 2011).  
78 Prieto (n 1). 
79 See, Amy Smith, ‘Not “Waiving” but Drowning: The Anatomy of Death Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution’ (2008) 
17 B U Pub Int L J 237. 
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reinstated in 1976, 147 people executed have been volunteers.80 For example, in November 
2016, Steven Spears waived his right to further appeals and was executed in Georgia, 
because he said he would rather die than continue living on death row.81 Although a 
competency hearing must take place before someone can be voluntarily executed, the bar for 
proving competency has been set very low.82 
In 2015 in a speech to the NAACP, President Obama said that he had asked the ‘Attorney 
General to start a review of the overuse of solitary confinement across American prisons’.83 
He added that, ‘[t]he social science shows that an environment like that is often more likely 
to make inmates more alienated, more hostile, potentially more violent’.84 However, there is 
no evidence of this study being carried out, perhaps due to the Trump Administration taking 
office in 2017, which has different priorities to the Obama Administration. 
 
6.2.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Solitary Confinement  
Stakeholder Reports 
The issue of solitary confinement on death row has been discussed throughout the US UPR. 
However, in the 2010 main Stakeholder Report, AI was cited only in reference to the conditions 
of the supermaximum prisons in the US,85 and USHRN was cited regarding its reference to 
‘prisoners who endure solitary confinement’ generally in the criminal justice system.86  
However, in the Death Penalty Annex to its individual submission, USHRN provided further 
detail about what solitary confinement on Texas’ death row entails. It asserted that inmates at 
the Polunsky Unit ‘eat alone, exercise alone and worship alone’, noting that the only form of 
‘[c]ommunication between prisoners on death row [is] accomplished by yelling between cells 
[which] is extremely difficult’.87 Furthermore, it stated that ‘[t]he conditions on Texas’ death row 
are harsher than those found in many of the nation’s highest security prisons and segregation 
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units’,88 and only the ‘best behaved’ inmates get to spend two hours outside of their cell a day, 
where they ‘are ordinarily given access to small indoor or outdoor “cages”’.89 For those inmates 
considered to be badly behaved, usually those with mental health issues, they ‘are allowed 
outside of their cells only three to four hours per week.’90 USHRN had provided evidence of 
solitary confinement on death row in the US, but, as it was an Annex document to the 
USHRN’s individual submission, it was not cited in the final report and it is very unlikely that 
member states would have read this individual document. This is further evidence of the 
beneficial impact thematic Stakeholder submissions could have, as one Stakeholder could 
have used its individual submission to provide detailed information on solitary confinement 
within the death penalty, increasing the chance of this issue being referenced in the main 
Stakeholder Report.91 
In the 2010 UPR, all other references to solitary confinement were in relation to prisons 
generally, and not to death row specifically. However, a number of important points were 
raised that are also relevant to death row. For example, HRW focused on mental illnesses and 
solitary confinement. It noted in its individual submission that ‘in recent years, prison officials 
have increasingly turned to solitary confinement (or segregation or supermaximum security 
confinement) as a way to manage prisoners deemed difficult or dangerous, including many 
with mental illness’.92 In fact, HRW found that, generally across the prison system, ‘25 percent 
of men in solitary confinement in Washington State have a serious mental illness; in Georgia 
33 percent of men and 67 percent of women in solitary confinement have a serious mental 
illness, and in Colorado 30-35 percent of all prisoners have a serious mental illness’.93   
This further links to the conditions on death row and access to healthcare. HRW noted in its 
individual submission that ‘[t]he conditions of social isolation, high security controls, abnormal 
environmental stimulus, and extremely limited recreational or educational opportunities that 
characterize solitary confinement can exacerbate mental illness or prevent recovery’.94 Adding 
to this, studies have shown that ‘the indefinite use of solitary confinement to hold prisoners 
exacerbates or in some cases generate mental illness in men living under those conditions for 
long stretches of time’.95 In relation to this, HRW provided a recommendation:  
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The US should not hold any prisoner who has or develops symptoms of a serious mental 
illness under conditions of solitary confinement for more than a brief period of time; and 
should carefully monitor the mental health of all prisoners in solitary confinement to 
detect any deterioration in mental health [and the US] should ratify ICESCR and 
CRPD.96  
No similar recommendation was made by the UN member states at the UPR, meaning that 
no response to this was required from the US. If the Stakeholders could ask advance 
questions, as this thesis argues they should, this may have been addressed by the US, 
allowing follow-up work to be carried out according to the response received.97 
Advance Questions and Recommendations 
During the 2010 UPR, Sweden provided an advance question, asking the US to ‘elaborate on 
the measures it is taking to ensure the full enjoyment of human rights persons deprived of their 
liberty, including by way of ensuring treatment in maximum security prisons in conformity with 
international law?’98 Furthermore, during the interactive dialogue, ‘Algeria noted that prison 
overcrowding was the norm and that prisons housed 60 per cent more inmates than they had 
been designed for’.99 Moreover, ‘Belgium noted with regret that the death penalty was still 
applied by some 35 states [and] expressed concern at the situation in the prison system, 
including violence against detainees; prison overpopulation and overrepresentation of some 
ethnic groups’.100 The US did respond to these questions and comments during the interactive 
dialogue, stating that it ‘is committed to meeting its obligations under both international and 
domestic law for proper treatment of persons detained or incarcerated in the criminal justice 
system, including those in maximum security facilities’.101 However, from the consideration of 
solitary confinement on death row in section 6.2, it is clear that the US falls short of its 
obligations under international law. The US should have been held to account through a 
specific follow-up recommendation by Sweden, Algeria, or Belgium, but this did not happen, 
and there were no recommendations made in 2010 on solitary confinement.102 
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6.2.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Solitary Confinement 
Compilation Report 
In 2015, the Compilation Report cited three different UN bodies that had discussed the 
concerns surrounding solitary confinement, which is positive compared to in 2010 where there 
was no mention of it. The report cited the SRT, which had ‘urged the Government to ensure 
that solitary confinement was only imposed, if at all, in very exceptional circumstances, and 
indicated that keeping a person in solitary confinement for more than four decades clearly 
amounted to torture’.103 Furthermore, the Report cited that both the Committee Against Torture 
(‘CAT’) and the Human Rights Committee ‘were concerned about the practice of prolonged 
solitary confinement, and recommended, inter alia, that solitary confinement regimes be 
banned’.104 
Stakeholder Reports 
There was more discussion of solitary confinement cited in the Stakeholder Report, which is 
another positive step compared to 2010. First, the report noted that ‘JS41 and JS24 
recommended banning prolonged solitary confinement’.105 Second, in relation to the US 
supporting Sweden’s recommendation from 2010 regarding the full enjoyment of human rights 
for prisoners,106 ‘PHR recommend[ed] ceasing the use of solitary confinement as a disciplinary 
tool and allow independent organizations to visit inmates’.107 This provided a more specific 
recommendation, compared to Sweden’s broad recommendation from 2010. 
The further discussions in the individual submissions from JS2, JS24, and JS41 were 
predominantly regarding solitary confinement generally, not specifically related to those 
sentenced to death, although much of the information provided also relates to death row. In 
particular, the Stakeholders noted the psychological damage solitary confinement can cause 
or exacerbate, which leads on to the death row phenomenon discussed in section 6.3 below. 
JS2 stated that, ‘[a]ccording to psychologists familiar with the subject, solitary confinement 
leads to “isolation panic,” “long-term depression and hopelessness,” the slow decline of 
“cognitive ability, as the prisoners’ intellectual skills begin to decay,” and often ultimately “a 
complete break-down”’.108 JS2 recommended that the US ‘[t]ake appropriate legislative and 
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practical measures to improve living conditions through its prisons systems, in particular with 
regard to access to health care and education’.109 This was identical to the recommendation 
from Austria in the 2010 UPR, showing that the Stakeholders take note of the previous UPRs 
and respond accordingly. 
JS41 noted in its individual submission that ‘[s]olitary confinement is well-known to result in 
severe psychological and physical harm and it is disproportionately used against prisoners of 
color, and other vulnerable incarcerated populations like the mentally ill’.110 JS41 also raised 
the fact that ‘no specific recommendation was made regarding solitary confinement during the 
2010 UPR’, but did identify that ‘the [US] government accepted recommendation 177 to 
“ensure the full enjoyment of human rights by persons deprived of their liberty…”’.111 This is 
further evidence showing that broad recommendations will not be fully implemented, and this 
thesis argues that the specificity of recommendations needs to be increased in future UPRs.112  
Furthermore, JS41 also provided a cogent recommendation to the US on the issue of solitary 
confinement in its Annex to its individual submission, that ‘[p]rolonged solitary confinement (in 
excess of 15 days) in US prisons, jails, and detention centers should be banned, except under 
exceptional circumstances’.113 This mirrors Mandela Rules 44 and 45(1), and is an important 
point raised by JS41. However, it is unlikely that many, if any, member states will have read 
this individual document. Instead, in order for the Stakeholders to achieve their full potential 
impact, this thesis argues that they should be allowed to submit this type of recommendation 
in the form of advance questions.114 
However, it appears that Joint Submission 24 (‘JS24’), provided the key Stakeholder 
submission with regards to solitary confinement. JS24 found that:  
The extensive use of solitary confinement in US prisons, jails, and detention centers 
implicates concerns about torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment, abuses in the criminal justice system, due process violations, racial 
discrimination, and discrimination on the basis of gender identity and sexual 
orientation.115  
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It also provided important evidence regarding the psychological harm solitary confinement 
provokes. This includes a ‘persistent and heightened state of anxiety, and paranoid and 
persecutory fears, as well as hallucinations, headaches, ruminations and irrational anger, 
violent fantasies, oversensitivity to stimuli, extreme lethargy, and insomnia’.116 Notably, JS24 
also found that ‘[t]hese are also the psychological issues that are often found in death row 
inmates who spend their time in solitary confinement’.117 
JS24 went on to describe the conditions those in solitary confinement face, which are very 
similar to death row. The ‘[c]ells often contain a toilet and a shower, and a slot in the door only 
large enough for a guard to slip a food tray through’,118 ensuring that there needs to be no 
movement from the cell to use the bathroom or to eat. The time out of their cell usually ‘involves 
being escorted, frequently in handcuffs and shackles, to another solitary cell where prisoners 
can pace alone for an hour before being returned to their cell’.119 Moreover, those in solitary 
‘are frequently deprived of meaningful access to visits and telephone calls home, furthering 
their isolation and despair and preventing them from maintaining the family and community 
ties pivotal to their ability to successfully reintegrate into society upon release’.120 Although 
those on death row are very unlikely to be reintegrated into society, the lack of human contact 
leads to the effects of the death row phenomenon being exacerbated, as discussed in section 
6.3 below. 
JS24 provided four well-reasoned recommendations on the issue of solitary confinement: 
1. Prolonged solitary confinement (i.e. in excess of 15 days) in US prisons, jails, and 
detention centers should be banned, except under exceptional circumstances. Where 
solitary confinement is used, its duration must be as short as possible and for a definite 
term that is properly announced and communicated. The practice of solitary confinement 
in pre-trial detention should also end.     
2. The US Government must ensure that those prisoners who are sent to solitary 
confinement are only sent for the most serious disciplinary infractions, where no other 
less restrictive alternatives exist, and receive meaningful process prior to such 
confinement.    
3. The US Government must develop standards to ensure that actual or perceived race, 
political affiliation, religion, association, vulnerability to sexual abuse, and challenging 
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violations of one’s rights as a prisoner plays no role in the decision to confine a prisoner 
to solitary confinement. 
4. Federal, [S]tate, and local governments should compile data on the use of solitary 
confinement in their jurisdictions, including data on the effect of isolation on detainees.121  
Currently, these recommendations are not being acknowledged by the US, as they are 
provided by a Stakeholder and not a UN member state. However, JS24 made significant points 
about the use of solitary confinement, furthering the argument in chapter 7.2.1 that 
Stakeholders should be able to submit advance questions that the US would respond to during 
the interactive dialogue. One criticism of these otherwise cogent recommendations provided 
by JS24, is that there is no mention of death row, despite the report referencing the 
psychological effects of solitary confinement on death row.122 JS24 could have added ‘death 
row’ to its list of places where solitary confinement is used in recommendation one, to ensure 
solitary confinement on death row got the attention it requires.123 
Given that JS24 provided a great deal of information and persuasive recommendations 
regarding solitary confinement, the other Stakeholders essentially just provided duplicated 
materials. It would have been more beneficial for JS24 to have provided a thematic individual 
submission on solitary confinement, and the other Stakeholders to have focused on other 
important areas of capital punishment, in order to avoid repetition and improve Stakeholder 
impact on the US UPR.124  
Advance Questions and Recommendations 
In its advance question posed to the US, Azerbaijan reiterated the discussion from the 
Compilation Report regarding the SRT, CAT, and the Committee.125 This is important because 
this provides proof that the states are reading the Compilation Report and formulating their 
advance questions and recommendations based upon the content, making it even more 
important that the OHCHR provides clear guidance on how it compiles its reports.126 However, 
the US did not respond to this during the interactive dialogue. This suggests there is a need 
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for the advance questions process to be formalised, including furthering the role of the troika, 
particularly as no recommendations were made specifically on solitary confinement.127 
 
6.3 Death Row Phenomenon 
The death row phenomenon is a legal term that is widely agreed upon to include three prongs: 
(1) harsh conditions on death row, (2) a prolonged wait for execution, (3) the adverse 
psychological effect of being sentenced to death.128 There are also factors that will influence 
these three prongs, including ‘the age of the inmate, his mental state upon incarceration, the 
incarceration conditions on death row, treatment on death row, the length of the incarceration 
period, and method of execution’.129  
However, whilst judicial decisions have generally considered the death row phenomenon to 
relate to the prolonged wait on death row following conviction and sentence of death,130 Yorke 
has argued ‘that there still appears to be scope for greater clarity on the status of the capital 
charge, moratoriums, and execution methods’ within the death row phenomenon.131 This 
thesis agrees with Yorke’s assertions, and also argues for more scientific and psychological 
research into the phenomenon. This would be beneficial for the general understanding of the 
death row phenomenon and its effects, and would also add more weight to legal arguments, 
particularly in the US.132 
 
6.3.1 International Law 
Soering v. United Kingdom 
The death row phenomenon was first acknowledged in the case of Kirkwood v. United 
Kingdom by the European Commission on Human Rights in 1984.133 The current leading case 
on the death row phenomenon is Soering v. United Kingdom, heard by the ECtHR in 1989.134 
Jens Soering, a German national detained in the UK, was facing extradition to the 
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Commonwealth of Virginia for the double homicide of his girlfriend’s parents.135 Soering 
petitioned the ECtHR on the grounds that, if the UK extradited him to the US, he would be 
sentenced to death and would be subject to the death row phenomenon, in violation of Article 
3 ECHR, which prohibits inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment.136 
In support of his claim, Soering produced evidence of ‘extreme stress, psychological 
deterioration and risk of homosexual abuse and physical attack undergone by prisoners on 
death row, including Mecklenburg Correctional Center’ where Soering would be housed on 
Virginia’s death row.137 The ECtHR concluded that it was likely Soering would face a death 
sentence if he were extradited.138 Furthermore, in considering the length of time spent on 
death row in Virginia (six to eight years in 1989), the conditions of death row, and Soering’s 
age and mental state, the ECtHR concluded that if the UK extradited Soering to Virginia, there 
would be a risk of the death row phenomenon which would breach Article 3.139  
The ECtHR also briefly made reference to Article 7 ICCPR, in noting that the Article 3 standard 
is accepted worldwide in various treaties and conventions.140 In fact, when the US acceded to 
the ICCPR in 1992, the SFRC confirmed that its reservation against Article 7 was lodged due 
to the Committee and ECtHR both concluding that ‘prolonged judicial proceedings in cases 
involving capital punishment could in certain circumstances constitute [inhuman and 
degrading] treatment’.141 It was following this decision that the death row phenomenon began 
to be frequently referred to.142 
Decisions of the Human Rights Committee and the Privy Council 
Other international courts and bodies have differing views on the death row phenomenon. For 
example, the Committee has generally taken a narrower approach to the ECtHR, in that 
‘prolonged delays in the execution of a sentence of death do not per se constitute cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment’, but will take each case on its merits.143 In Howard Martin v. 
Jamaica, the Committee found that ‘prolonged periods of detention under a severe custodial 
regime on death row cannot generally be considered to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading 
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treatment if the convicted person is merely availing himself of appellate remedies’.144 The 
Committee took the same approach in Kindler v. Canada, citing its decision in Howard 
Martin.145 Furthermore, the Committee has found that it is better to be alive than dead, even 
for a prolonged period in harsh conditions.146 This was held in Johnson v. Jamaica, where the 
Committee held that there was no evidence to show a violation of Article 7, despite Johnson 
being on death row for over eleven years.147 In Johnson, Christine Chanet provided an 
individual opinion disagreeing with the finding that it is better to be alive than dead,148 stating 
that the ‘psychological torture’ of a prolonged wait on death row in harsh conditions must be 
reduced to prevent it from being a breach of Article 7.149 Moreover, in Francis v. Jamaica, the 
Committee found that twelve years on death row in Jamaica, plus the harsh conditions and 
the abuse Francis suffered during that time, had led to a serious deterioration of his mental 
health and therefore amounted to a breach of his Article 7 rights.150 Similarly, in Reece v. 
Jamaica, twelve years on death row in extremely harsh conditions breached Reece’s right to 
be treated with humanity, in breach of Article 10 ICCPR.151  
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (‘Privy Council’) has also ruled upon the delay 
between sentence of death and execution.152 The Privy Council ruled in Pratt & Morgan v. 
Attorney General for Jamaica that the death row phenomenon may be present if there was a 
delay of more than five years between sentence and execution.153 Furthermore, the Ugandan 
Supreme Court found that a delay of three years on death row amounted to inhuman and 
degrading treatment,154 and the Zimbabwean Supreme Court has found that delays of fifty-
two and seventy-two months also constitute inhuman and degrading treatment.155 
 
6.3.2 Domestic Law 
In the US, the term ‘death row phenomenon’ itself has not been used by the courts. However, 
its effect was considered as early as 1959 in People v. Chessman by the Supreme Court of 
California.156 Although the court agreed that spending more than eleven years on death row 
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awaiting execution would cause mental suffering, the court concluded that it did not constitute 
cruel and unusual punishment.157 
Furthermore, in 1972 in the case of People v. Anderson,158 the California Supreme Court held: 
The cruelty of capital punishment lies not only in the execution itself and the pain incident 
thereto, but also in the dehumanizing effects of the lengthy imprisonment prior to 
execution during which the judicial and administrative procedures essential to due 
process of law are carried out.159  
These decisions were early acknowledgements of the effects of the ‘death row phenomenon’, 
even before the ECtHR’s decision in Soering. However, despite this, ‘[US] domestic courts 
generally remain unpersuaded by, if not outright hostile to, the logic of the death row 
phenomenon’.160  
Lackey v. Texas 
The key US case on the effect of the death row phenomenon is Lackey v. Texas, which was 
a denied writ of certiorari to SCOTUS on the grounds of excessive delays in execution.161 
Although Lackey did not explicitly use the term ‘death row phenomenon’, the case was 
concerned with its effect. Lackey had spent seventeen years on death row in Texas awaiting 
execution, and argued that it constituted cruel and unusual punishment. This was on the 
grounds that, considering the evolving standards of decency and international law and practice 
on this (in particular Pratt & Morgan), such a delay in execution would have been considered 
cruel and unusual punishment by the Framers,162 and the time spent on death row in the harsh 
conditions amounted to ‘tortuous psychological punishment’.163 Lackey’s writ of cert was 
denied, which saw the Court taking the same approach as the Committee in Johnson, finding 
that it is better to be alive and on death row than be dead, and that a prolonged stay on death 
row is not an Eighth Amendment issue, just as the Committee found that it was not an Article 
7 issue. 
However, Justice Stevens provided a memorandum attached to the denial of certiorari, 
wherein he noted the practices of foreign nations and their prohibitions against lengthy delays 
on death row.164 Justice Stevens made sure to point out that this denial of cert was not ‘a ruling 
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on the merits’ and stated that this particular issue of the psychological effects of long stays on 
death row warranted further examination by the States in their capacity as ‘laboratories of 
democracy’.165  However, since Lackey, every writ of certiorari made on the same grounds 
has been denied.166  
It must now be considered how the death row phenomenon can be remedied.167 As Schabas 
has noted, apart from death penalty volunteers, it is unlikely a person facing execution will 
want to speed up the process.168 Kara Sharkey asserted that, ‘[a]lthough it is not a complete 
solution, another way to partially resolve the problems underlying the Lackey claim is to 
improve the conditions of confinement on death row’.169 However, simply improving the 
conditions on death row only removes one of the three elements of the death row phenomenon 
– the fear of death will still be there. The only real way to eradicate the death row phenomenon 
is to abolish the death penalty in its entirety and, as Justice Breyer noted in his dissent in 
Glossip, the death row phenomenon is one example of how the capital system is so flawed 
that it requires abolition.170 
 
6.3.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and the Death Row Phenomenon  
In the 2010 UPR, it was only the Stakeholders in their individual submissions that mentioned 
the death row phenomenon. This is despite that fact that, in 2006, CAT had provided its views 
on the death row phenomenon in its conclusions and recommendations to the US.171 However, 
its views were not cited in the Compilation Report. CAT had found that the Detainee Treatment 
Act 2005, which was enacted by the US Congress, ‘prohibits cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
treatment and punishment of any person, regardless of nationality or physical location, in the 
custody or under the physical control of the State party’.172 Although the US placed a 
reservation against Article 7 ICCPR, it uses the same language regarding prisoners in its 
domestic law. However, despite these international and domestic standards being in place, 
CAT remained ‘concerned about the prolonged isolation periods detainees are subjected to, 
the effect such treatment has on their mental health, and that its purpose may be retribution, 
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in which case it would constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.173 
This was key information regarding the death row phenomenon that member states may have 
used to prepare their recommendations, further pointing to the need for transparency from the 
OHCHR as to how this report is compiled.174 
Stakeholder Reports 
As noted above, the Stakeholders provided information regarding the death row phenomenon 
in their individual submissions, but these references did not make it into the final Stakeholder 
Report. For example, USHRN noted in its Death Penalty Annex that ‘prolonged incarceration 
on death row amid unendurable conditions of confinement violates the [US’] obligations to 
treat individuals with dignity’, in violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) ICCPR and the Convention 
Against Torture.175 USHRN also argued that the death row phenomenon has ‘tortuous 
effects’,176 giving the example of César Roberto Fierro Reyna, a Mexican national on death 
row in Texas who had ‘been scheduled for execution on [fourteen] separate occasions [and] 
[s]ix times, he has come within days of execution before receiving a court-ordered reprieve’.177 
Fierro Reyna had ‘contacted the prison's psychiatric department for the first time on May 15, 
1986, stating that he was hearing voices and he might injure himself’.178 HRA gave further 
examples of those who have been affected by both solitary confinement and the death row 
phenomenon. For example, ‘Cecil Johnson was executed in 2009 after [twenty-nine] years in 
solitary confinement on Tennessee’s death row’.179 
USHRN discussed California’s death row in the Death Penalty Annex to its individual 
submission, noting that ‘[t]he cumulative effect of the conditions on San Quentin’s death row 
is clearly aggravated by the length of time that California prisoners typically await their 
executions’.180 Citing statistics about death row in California, USHRN stated that ‘[a]s the 
population of California’s death row has grown, the length of the delay between sentence and 
disposition of appellate reviews has grown as well’.181 In fact, the conditions in San Quentin 
were so poor that the US District Court for the Central District of California held that the 
exceptionally lengthy delays with no set execution dates on California’s death row violated the 
Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment.182  
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HRA went into detail about the death row phenomenon in its individual submission, noting that 
‘[t]hough many international judicial bodies have recognized the death row phenomenon as a 
violation of human right[s] law, [SCOTUS] has refused to hear appeals in cases alleging cruel 
and unusual punishment due to extremely long delays on death row’.183 In order to encourage 
courts in the US to hear appeals pertaining to the death row phenomenon, this thesis argues 
that, within the UPR, member states should target their recommendations towards the 
judiciary.184 
Furthermore, HRA stated in its individual submission that ‘[t]he manner in which the death 
penalty process is carried out in the [US] constitutes a violation of the ban on torture’ including 
through ‘the death row phenomenon’.185 This is due to the fact that ‘[w]hen decades of 
incarceration precede execution, a prisoner effectively serves two sentences: a death 
sentence and a life sentence marked by prolonged psychological torture’.186 HRA ‘urged the 
federal government to remind the [S]tates of their obligations under international law regarding 
the prohibition of torture and to urge them to commute death sentences to life sentences where 
violations exist’.187 Despite this cogent recommendation from a Stakeholder, no member state 
recommendations were made on the death row phenomenon in the 2010 UPR. This indicates 
that urgent changes need to be made to the UPR. This thesis argues that, first, the information 
Stakeholders are providing in their individual submissions must be logical enough to be 
transferred into the Stakeholder Report.188 Second, the OHCHR must provide transparency 
as to how it decides upon the content of its reports to assist the Stakeholders.189 
 
6.3.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and the Death Row Phenomenon 
In the 2015 UPR, there was no direct reference made to the death row phenomenon. As the 
death row phenomenon continues to pose a problem within the US capital system, this needs 
to be remedied before the 2020 UPR. In particular, the UPR can be utilised as a tool to 
highlight the death row phenomenon, allowing it to be considered under the second prong of 
the blueprint for abolition: the court’s own judgment.190 This has already been considered to 
some extent by Justice Breyer in Glossip v. Gross. In calling for the Court to hear a case on 
whether the death penalty itself is unconstitutional in his dissent in Glossip, Justice Breyer 
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made reference to the death row phenomenon albeit not by name.191 He cited ‘excessive 
delays’ and the effects of such delays as being contrary to the ‘cruel’ element of the Eighth 
Amendment prohibition of ‘cruel and unusual punishment’.192  
In order to encourage discussion of the death row phenomenon in future UPRs, this thesis 
argues that four key changes should be made to the mechanism. First, thematic Stakeholder 
submissions would allow one Stakeholder to consider the death row phenomenon in detail, as 
USHRN and HRA did in 2010.193 Second, more transparency from the OHCHR as to how the 
Stakeholder Report is compiled would help Stakeholders when compiling the thematic 
submission.194 Third, member states should utilise the advance questions to raise the death 
row phenomenon as an issue.195 Fourth, member states should consider targeting specific 
recommendations on the death row phenomenon to the judiciary, to further Justice Breyer’s 
argument regarding excessive delays in the capital system.196 
 
 
6.4 Methods of Execution in the US and the Universal Periodic Review 
The final stage of the implementation of a death sentence is the execution itself, at least for 
the person on death row.197 The most common method of execution currently used in the US 
is the lethal injection, as it is considered to be the most humane.198 The final part of this chapter 
will examine the international and domestic standards relating to the method of execution, and 
the role the UPR plays in ensuring US adherence with Article 7 ICCPR.  
 
6.4.1 International Law 
To comply with Article 7 ICCPR, an execution ‘must be carried out in such a way as to cause 
the least possible physical and mental suffering’.199 Furthermore, the Safeguards provide that 
the death penalty ‘shall be carried out so as to inflict the minimum possible suffering’.200 The 
UN Secretary-General in his 2015 quinquennial report cited the SRT’s finding that ‘there is no 
categorical evidence that any method of execution in use today complies with the prohibition 
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of torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’.201 The SRT stated that, ‘even if the 
required safeguards are in place, all methods of execution currently used can inflict inordinate 
pain and suffering’.202 
The Committee has stated that the US ‘must take into account the prohibition against causing 
avoidable pain and recommends the [s]tate party to take all necessary steps to ensure respect 
of [A]rticle 7 of the Covenant’.203 The Committee has also ruled upon cases regarding methods 
of execution. In Ng v. Canada, Ng was facing extradition to the US, where he would be 
subjected to death by gas chamber, which the Committee found to be ‘contrary to 
internationally accepted standards of humane treatment’ and would be a violation of Article 
7.204 Despite this, the Committee has declined to rule that the lethal injection per se violates 
Article 7,205 although it found in its General Comment 36 that the use of the ‘injection of 
untested lethal drugs’ is a violation of Article 7.206 
The ECtHR has also ruled upon methods of execution, which provides an insight into the views 
of courts outside of the US.207 For instance, in Öcalan v. Turkey, the court advised that the 
method of execution used must ‘not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity 
exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering’ in order not to violate Article 3.208 Furthermore, 
in Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. The United Kingdom, the ECtHR noted that ‘[w]hatever the 
method of execution, the extinction of life involves some physical pain’.209 This was a pivotal 
observation made regarding methods of execution, and is the type of engagement with this 
area that is required within the US UPR. 
 
6.4.2 Domestic Law 
Prior to the introduction of the lethal injection, methods of execution utilised by the US have 
been hanging, the electric chair, the gas chamber, and firing squad.210 Notably, no method of 
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execution has ever been ruled to be unconstitutional by SCOTUS.211 The US has seen an 
evolution of methods of execution, particularly through the medicalisation of the death 
penalty.212 There has been a development from hanging, which saw the mutilation of the 
outside of the body, to lethal injection, which has led to the mutilation of the inside of the body, 
as discussed below. However, whilst it is espoused that new methods of execution are created 
to be more humane, the driving force is usually policy rather than humanity. A practical 
decision will be made to adopt a new method of execution to avoid criticism and 
condemnation, thus allowing the death penalty to be retained. In order to achieve abolition of 
the death penalty in the US, this factor must be acknowledged. Moreover, the UPR has not 
yet engaged with methods of execution on this level, as demonstrated by sections 6.4.3 and 
6.4.4. 
6.4.2.1 Lethal Injection 
First adopted in 1977 by Oklahoma and first used by Texas in 1982,213 the most common 
method of execution in the US today is the lethal injection.214 It was considered a reliant 
method of execution until 2011, when US States began to struggle to procure the requisite 
drugs, predominantly because the only domestic US company that made sodium thiopental, 
Hospira, ceased its production.215 Some US States then replaced sodium thiopental with 
pentobarbital. However, also in 2011, Lundbeck, a Danish pharmaceutical company, restricted 
the sale of its pentobarbital drugs for use in executions, following lobbying from the NGO 
Reprieve and UK-based doctors.216 Since then, a number of pharmaceutical companies have 
followed suit and prohibited the sale of its drugs for use in executions, including Pfizer in 2016, 
one of the worlds’ largest pharmaceutical manufacturers.217 Furthermore, in late 2011, the EU 
Commission banned the sale of drugs from EU countries to be used in executions.218  
Steffi Yellin has noted that in the US, ‘[p]rotocols have become erratic and inconsistent due to 
the non-manufacture and shortages of drugs, the use of compounded drugs from non-FDA 
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approved sources, and the introduction of new drugs’,219 and Deborah Denno has referred to 
the lethal injection issues as ‘chaos’.220 Difficulties in procuring execution drugs have 
culminated in the serious problem of US States using a lethal injection protocol that potentially 
breaches the Eighth Amendment and Article 7 ICCPR, including the use of untested drugs 
such as midazolam, etomidate, and fentanyl. This has sparked litigation on this issue, as 
discussed in sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 below. 
 
6.4.3 The 2010 Universal Periodic Review and Methods of Execution in the US 
National Report: Baze v. Rees 
There was no discussion of methods of execution or the lethal injection by the US government 
in its 2010 National Report, despite the important case of Baze v. Rees being decided by 
SCOTUS in 2008. Baze was a 7-2 decision in favour of Kentucky’s lethal injection, which was 
a three-drug protocol using sodium thiopental, pancuronium bromide, and potassium 
chloride.221 The petitioners in the case were not challenging the drugs used in the lethal 
injection – they accepted that the drugs in and of themselves would not be a violation of their 
Eighth Amendment rights222 – instead they argued that the protocol itself was unconstitutional 
‘because of the risk that the protocol’s terms might not be properly followed, resulting in 
significant pain’.223 
The majority opinion, delivered by Chief Justice Roberts, found that the petitioners had not 
shown that Kentucky’s ‘lethal injection protocol creates a demonstrated risk of severe pain’ or 
that the risk of severe pain ‘is substantial when compared to the known and available 
alternatives’.224 Furthermore, the Court found that ‘[t]he risks of maladministration [the 
petitioners] suggested – such as improper mixing of chemicals and improper setting of IVs by 
trained and experienced personnel – cannot remotely be characterized as “objectively 
intolerable”’.225 The Court noted that ‘[s]ome risk of pain is inherent in any method of execution 
– no matter how humane – if only from the prospect of error in following the required 
procedure’.226 
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During the interactive dialogue, the US noted that ‘[r]ecently, [SCOTUS] has narrowed the 
class of individuals that can be executed, the types of crimes subject to the penalty, and the 
manner by which the punishment is administered so that it is not cruel and unusual’.227 Yet, 
as shown by the decision in Baze, there had been no decisions from SCOTUS limiting the 
‘manner’ or method of execution.  
Compilation Report and Stakeholder Reports 
Despite the silence in the National Report, the Compilation Report cited CAT, which had 
recommended that the US ‘should carefully review its execution methods, in particular lethal 
injection, in order to prevent severe pain and suffering’.228 AHR’s individual Stakeholder 
submission similarly noted that ‘[d]eath by lethal injection can result in severe and excruciating 
pain violating human rights obligations related to torture and cruel and unusual punishment’.229 
AHR also acknowledged the decision in Baze, and cited the execution of Romell Broom in 
Ohio in 2009, wherein ‘officials spent over two hours attempting to locate a suitable vein to 
use for the lethal injection before finally postponing his execution’.230 AHR provided a 
recommendation on this issue in its individual submission that, due to the ‘potential pain and 
torture inflicted during lethal injection procedures, and the execution of innocent individuals, 
[the US] and [US] [S]tates should immediately abolish the death penalty and commute all 
death sentences to a life imprisonment term’.231 This adds to the argument in this thesis that 
Stakeholders providing advance questions would assist the UPR in facilitating the abolition of 
the death penalty in the US.232 Although recommendations on abolishing the death penalty 
have had no measurable impact on the US,233 given that there were no recommendations 
made and no discussion within the main reports, an advance question on methods of 
execution from AHR would have illuminated this as an issue to the member states. 
Furthermore, the IACHR, in its submitted report on the cases of Medellín, Cardenas, and 
García, noted that the petitioners asserted that the ‘lethal injection as currently practiced in 
Texas fails to comport with the requirements that a method of execution cause “the least 
possible physical and mental suffering”’.234 This assertion indicated that Texas could be in 
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contravention of Article 7 ICCPR. However, although both AHR and the IACHR had raised 
methods of execution in their individual submissions, this was not included in the main 
Stakeholder Report.  
Advance Questions and Recommendations 
The lack of discussion within the Stakeholder Report may have contributed to the absence of 
advance questions or recommendations regarding methods of execution in 2010. There were 
also other relevant factors including that, prior to the 2010 UPR, botched executions were 
rare, and so there was a lack of media attention alerting the key UPR actors to this issue.235  
However, this thesis argues that this provides a striking example of where fundamental 
changes must be made to the UPR in order for it to function effectively as a human rights 
mechanism generally, and also to hold the US to account in terms of its international 
obligations, whilst gathering evidence to facilitate the abolition of the death penalty in the US. 
First, the content of the individual submissions must be cogent in order for the OHCHR to 
include it in the final report.236 Second, the OHCHR must provide transparency regarding how 
it compiles the Stakeholder Report, perhaps through a briefing note on its website.237 Third, 
Stakeholders should consider submitting thematic reports, as an attempt to ensure that 
important points, such as methods of execution, are not overlooked.238 
 
6.4.4 The 2015 Universal Periodic Review and Methods of Execution in the US 
Botched Executions 
Due to the number of botched executions and the widespread media attention they garnered, 
method of execution was likely to feature more heavily in the 2015 UPR. The botched 
executions came about due to US States struggling to procure the requisite drugs for the lethal 
injection, and instead turning to the use of other, available drugs to execute people on death 
row. This has included using midazolam as a replacement for the anaesthetic.  
Clayton Lockett was executed by the State of Oklahoma in 2014. Due to the cuts he had made 
to his arm on the morning of his execution, the IV drip had to be inserted in a vein close to his 
groin.239 After Lockett had been injected with midazolam, and he had been declared 
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unconscious, the two other drugs were injected.240 However, at this point Lockett woke up and 
‘[v]arious witnesses reported that Lockett began to writhe against his restraints, saying, “[t]his 
s* * * is f* * *ing with my mind,” “something is wrong,” and “[t]he drugs aren't working.”’241 At 
that point, ‘the Warden asked if Lockett could be resuscitated. The doctor explained that CPR 
could save him, but Lockett would need to be transferred to an emergency room 
immediately’.242 Following this, ‘State officials ordered the blinds lowered, then halted the 
execution’, however, ‘[ten] minutes later—approximately 40 minutes after the execution 
began—Lockett was pronounced dead’.243 In the post-execution autopsy, it was determined 
that ‘the concentration of midazolam in Lockett's blood was more than sufficient to render an 
average person unconscious’, despite the State of Oklahoma providing a ‘report identifying a 
flaw in the IV line as the principal difficulty’.244 
Charles Warner was also executed in Oklahoma in 2015, using the revised execution 
safeguards that were put into place following Lockett’s botched execution.245 Despite this, after 
Warner had been injected with midazolam, he said ‘my body is on fire’.246 In fact, nine months 
after the execution, the State of Oklahoma became aware that it had used the wrong drug in 
his execution, instead of potassium chloride, potassium acetate was used.247 Following an 
investigation into this, a grand jury found that when the State attempted to execute another 
Oklahoma inmate, Richard Glossip, a State official noticed that they had the incorrect 
potassium, but allowed the drugs to be passed to the execution team anyway. It was only 
when the error was noticed by a member of the execution team that Glossip’s execution was 
halted.248 Despite this, there were no indictments handed down by the grand jury and, in March 
2018, after carrying out no executions since Warner’s in January 2015, Oklahoma confirmed 
it would be seeking to pursue executions by nitrogen gas.249  
Furthermore, Joseph Wood was executed in Arizona in 2014, and, ‘[d]espite being given 750 
milligrams of midazolam [subsequently] Wood gasped and snorted for nearly two hours’.250 In 
2016, Alabama executed Ronald Smith using midazolam as the anaesthetic, and he ‘heaved, 
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gasped and coughed while struggling for breath for 13 minutes after the lethal drugs were 
administered, and death was pronounced 34 minutes after the execution began’.251 
National Report 
In the 2015 National Report, although the US government did not refer to the botched 
executions directly, it did state that ‘[t]here are strict prohibitions against the use of any method 
of execution that would inflict cruel and unusual punishment’.252 Furthermore, the National 
Report made reference to the Glossip litigation, advising that SCOTUS had ‘agreed to hear 
an argument, and is expected to rule in June 2015, on whether the lethal injection protocol 
used in execution by Oklahoma constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment of our Constitution’.253 This appeared to be an attempt to placate the international 
community on this point. However, during the UNHRC plenary session in September 2015 
following the Glossip judgment, Ireland noted that it ‘continued to be concerned about the 
manner in which the death penalty is implemented [and] also regretted that [SCOTUS] had 
recently upheld the use of the lethal injection’.254 
Glossip v. Gross 
The Glossip case was brought before SCOTUS following the botched executions of Clayton 
Lockett and Joseph Wood, to rule upon whether the use of midazolam was cruel and unusual 
punishment contrary to the Eighth Amendment, as the petitioners argued it ‘fails to render a 
person insensate to pain’.255 In a 5-4 ruling, the majority affirmed the decision of the Oklahoma 
District Court and Tenth Circuit, holding that the petitioners had not established that the 
increased dose of midazolam now used by Oklahoma following Lockett’s execution ‘entails a 
substantial risk of severe pain’.256 Further, relying upon its decision in Baze v. Rees,257 the 
Court held that the Eighth Amendment required the petitioners to ‘identify a known and 
available alternative method of execution that entails lesser risk of pain’, which they had not 
done.258 This burden on the petitioners to find an alternative method for their own execution in 
order for it to have a lesser risk of pain would arguably be a breach of Article 7,259 although 
Article 7 was not mentioned in the Glossip case by the majority or the dissenting justices. This 
may be because the US has placed the reservation against Article 7, and the ICCPR is a non-
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self-executing treaty. Although this did not prevent the majority from considering Article 6 when 
SCOTUS determined the juvenile death penalty to be unconstitutional in 2005.260 Furthermore, 
seemingly in direct conflict with Article 7 ICCPR, the majority held that ‘some risk of pain is 
inherent in any method of execution’.261 In acknowledgement of the issue of the prohibition of 
cruel and unusual punishment, the majority held that if ‘the Eighth Amendment demands the 
elimination of essentially all risk of pain [it] would effectively outlaw the death penalty 
altogether’.262 This is not in line with international law, which provides that there must be 
minimal suffering.263 
Justice Sotomayor stated in her dissent that ‘[n]othing compels a State to perform an 
execution. It does not get a constitutional free pass simply because it desires to deliver the 
ultimate penalty’.264 In fact, Justice Breyer used his dissent to argue that the death penalty per 
se is a breach of the Eighth Amendment and welcomed a case challenging the constitutionality 
of capital punishment.265 To make this argument, Justice Breyer carried out a review of capital 
punishment within the US. Whilst the vast majority of his review was based upon US 
constitutional principles, he did engage with examples from international domestic courts.266 
Given that the UPR can provide a complete assessment of the death penalty, it may have 
furthered Justice Breyer’s argument to cite the US UPR both as an examination of the US 
death penalty, and regarding international consensus.267 This would also have increased the 
exposure of the UPR.268  
However, when a petition for a writ of cert was presented to SCOTUS in Hidalgo v. Arizona, 
asking the Court to consider whether capital punishment is a violation of the Eighth 
Amendment protections, SCOTUS declined to hear the case.269 Should the Court decide in 
the future to hear such a case, reference to the UPR would be beneficial to further the 
argument for abolition of capital punishment. 
The Glossip oral arguments had been heard at the time of the 2015 US UPR, but judgment 
had not been handed down by SCOTUS before the review took place. Therefore, this thesis 
argues that the outcome of this case, the ramifications of which potentially breach Article 7 
ICCPR, must be addressed in the 2020 UPR by all key actors. 
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Drug Secrecy Laws 
In the Compilation Report, the Secretary-General’s report on a moratorium on the death 
penalty was cited, finding that ‘[t]he Secretary-General stated that the use of untested means 
of execution had demonstrably increased the risk of execution amounting to cruel and unusual 
punishment’.270 Upon further inspection of the Secretary-General’s report briefly cited in the 
Compilation Report, the Secretary-General had gone into much more detail about the issues 
surrounding the lethal injection in the US, including highlighting specific problem-States in the 
US271 and concerns over drug secrecy laws.272  
The secrecy surrounding lethal injection drugs is a particularly concerning aspect of the 
method of execution debate. As noted in section 6.4.2.2 above, some pharmaceutical 
companies have been blocking the sale of its drugs for executions. Other companies have 
attempted to block executions due to States illegally procuring their drugs.273 For example, in 
Nevada, Alvogen successfully stayed the execution of Scott Dozier due to the State unlawfully 
obtaining fentanyl from the pharmaceutical company.274 The predominant reason for this 
reaction from drug companies is likely because a company's association with the death 
penalty can have financially detrimental effects, as ‘[c]onsumers may not want to purchase 
drugs that are linked to executions’.275 To shield pharmaceutical companies from the problems 
associated with selling execution drugs, ‘a substantial number of [S]tates have enacted 
secrecy provisions that shield the identity of medical professionals, pharmaceutical 
companies, and pharmacies involved with the execution process’.276 The lack of execution 
drugs has also led to States attempting to import drugs, particularly sodium thiopental, from 
abroad. It was discovered in 2011 that Dream Pharma, a company operating from the back of 
a London-based driving school, had supplied Arizona with compounded sodium thiopental that 
had been used in numerous executions.277 The issue with using compounded drugs is that 
they may not be FDA-approved, as required by law.278 This has led to the FDA confiscating a 
number of imported drugs from different States, including Texas and Arizona, who had 
attempted to import compounded sodium thiopental from India. Arizona took an even more 
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bizarre approach in 2017, by inviting death row inmates to bring their own drugs for the lethal 
injection to their execution.279  
Although not cited in the Compilation Report, the Secretary-General went on to discuss 
Georgia’s Secrecy Act, noting that ‘[t]he [A]ct makes the identities of companies and 
individuals who manufacture and supply lethal injection drugs, and the identities of the doctors 
hired by the [S]tate to oversee executions, a “[S]tate secret” shielded from disclosure to the 
public, the media and even the judiciary’.280 This was also a concern for JS17 in its individual 
UPR submission, and two states recommended on this point.  
JS17 noted that to ensure the continued use of the drugs, ‘[s]everal [US] [S]tates have passed 
secrecy laws to conceal the identities of these drug suppliers, thus allowing [S]tates to withhold 
critical information to detainees seeking assurances about the drugs’ quality and effectiveness 
and barring them from bringing a legal challenge to the method of execution’.281 The issue for 
abolitionists is not only the obvious problems with drug secrecy laws – that we are unaware of 
what drugs are being injected into a person and their effects – but also that more 
pharmaceutical companies may be willing to supply the drugs if there is anonymity, as this will 
lift the pressure of the financial effects of selling drugs for executions.  
Furthermore, Sweden noted that its advance question regarding the lethal injection was not 
answered282 and therefore made a recommendation which, among other issues, asked the 
US to ‘[c]ommit to ensuring that the origin of drugs being used is made public’.283 The US 
‘supported this recommendation in part’,284 but confirmed that the US government did not 
support ‘the part of this recommendation concerning the origin of drugs used for purposes of 
capital punishment’.285 However, there was no explanation as to why the US will not commit 
to ensuring the transparency of lethal injection drug origins. Similarly, France recommended 
that the US ‘[c]ommit to full transparency on the combination of medicines used during 
executions by injection’.286 The US noted this recommendation and did not provide any 
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reasoning as to why,287 adding to the argument in this thesis that the state under review should 
be required to provide reasons why they accept and note recommendations.288 
Stakeholder Reports 
There was no reference made to methods of execution in the Stakeholder Report, which is 
surprising considering the number of botched executions that had taken place across the US. 
This had also been discussed within the individual Stakeholder submissions, providing content 
for the OHCHR to reference.289 
JS41 cited the botched execution of Joseph Wood in Arizona, noting that the State used ‘a 
dubious process and without the disclosure of the drug sourcing’, finding that ‘Wood was 
pronounced dead nearly two hours after the drugs’ initial administration, though the lethal 
injection process normally lasts only 10 or 11 minutes’.290 In JS41’s Annex, it provided a 
recommendation on this issue that ‘federal legislation should be adopted to ensure lethal 
injections are carried out via well-tested procedures that do not cause unnecessary pain using 
drugs approved by the [US] FDA; with full oversight and transparency of the sourcing and 
administration of the drugs’.291 This thesis argues that, if JS41 had had the opportunity to 
provide an advance question on this, rather than the information being only in JS41’s Annex 
document and not in the main Stakeholder Report, it would have placed more pressure on the 
US to address the lethal injection problem during the interactive dialogue.292 
JS17 went into great detail regarding the lethal injection and botched executions.293 However, 
despite the amount of important information provided by JS17, none of it was cited in the main 
Stakeholder Report. It noted the outcome of Baze was that the lethal injection was 
constitutional, ‘[d]espite a spate of horrific executions’.294 However, JS17 further advised that 
‘[c]hallenges to other [US] [S]tates’ lethal injection procedures have since been brought in 
other [S]tate courts and, in some cases, have halted executions pending litigation’.295 This has 
included the In re Ohio Execution Protocol Litigation case.296 Despite SCOTUS setting the 
precedent on the constitutionality of the lethal injection drugs in Glossip, in January 2017, the 
District Court for the Southern District of Ohio ruled that ‘the use of midazolam as the first drug 
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in Ohio’s present three-drug protocol will create a “substantial risk of serious harm” or an 
“objectively intolerable risk of harm” as required by Baze and Glossip’.297 
JS17 also asserted that ‘several foreign governments and the [EU] have restricted the supply 
of drugs used in executions’,298 citing the examples provided above. Due to the shortage of 
drugs, JS17 noted that ‘[US] [S]tates have turned to other drugs to administer a lethal dose’.299 
This has then led to ‘pharmaceutical companies [refusing] to supply these drugs for execution 
purposes in the [US]’.300 JS17 also highlighted the issue discussed above of States procuring 
execution drugs from ‘questionable sources’,301 including ‘[w]hen supplies of sodium thiopental 
were scarce in 2010, Arizona executed Jeffrey Landrigan with drugs purchased from [Dream 
Pharma which was] operating in the back of a London driving school’.302 Specific problems 
with drugs outside of the FDA’s approval were highlighted by JS17 to include ‘a greater 
likelihood of tampering, improper labeling, and diminished potency, quality, and efficacy of 
those drugs—factors which elevate the risk of a botched execution’.303 
JS17 took the reins on this issue, which is a positive indication that thematic Stakeholder 
submissions have the potential to be successful. However, given that the information provided 
by JS17 did not make it into the final Stakeholder Report, what is needed now is clear guidance 
on how the OHCHR decides what will make it into the Stakeholder Report, as argued for in 
chapter 7.1.1.  
Furthermore, what these examples of botched executions and litigation show is that the lethal 
injection is failing; Florida has not only had to forego sodium thiopental and pentobarbital, but 
it has now abandoned the use of midazolam. In August 2017, Florida executed Mark Asay, 
the first person to be executed in eighteen months in the State, using the untested anaesthetic 
etomidate, the paralytic procuronium bromide, and potassium acetate which was mistakenly 
used in the Charles Warner execution in Oklahoma.304 It is important that these botched 
executions and failings of the lethal injection are conveyed within the UPR, and in order to do 
this, the changes argued for throughout section 6.4 need to be made. 
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Advance Questions and Recommendations 
Despite the lack of discussion in the main documents, two advance questions were asked 
regarding the methods of execution and the secrecy of drugs in 2015, suggesting that the 
media attention around these issues may have had some influence on the UPR.305 Belgium 
asked the US to ‘give an overview of…[t]he evolution since the first UPR cycle in the mode of 
administering capital punishment and more information on the particularly worrisome 
reintroduction of the fire squad’.306 Sweden asked that the US elaborate on ‘new measures’ 
ensuring ‘that the origin of the drugs used for executions is made public’.307 However, neither 
of these advance questions were answered by the US during the interactive dialogue. This 
provides evidence for the argument in this thesis that the advance questions require reform, 
including formalising the process and having the troika encourage the state under review to 
acknowledge the questions.308  
Furthermore, during the interactive dialogue, ‘Portugal was concerned at recent cases where 
executions by lethal injection had inflicted cruel and unusual punishment’.309 However, there 
was no response from the US delegation, and Portugal did not follow this up with a 
recommendation.310 The Democratic Republic of Congo recommended that the US 
‘reconsider the use of methods which give raise to cruel suffering when this punishment is 
applied’.311 The US supported this recommendation in part, advising that ‘[w]e support the 
second part of this recommendation to the extent provided for under our Eighth Amendment, 
which prohibits imposition of cruel and unusual punishment’.312 However, Article 7 provides a 
broader protection than the Eighth Amendment, and this should be addressed within the 2020 
US UPR. 
 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has considered the punishment of death in terms of the harsh conditions on death 
row whilst awaiting execution, and the method of carrying out the execution. The harsh 
conditions on death row encompass solitary confinement and the death row phenomenon, 
which are topical concerns within the US death penalty that require urgent attention. Whilst 
the US retains the death penalty, the UPR can be used to ensure the US is adhering to 
international standards regarding conditions on death row and the limiting of the effects of the 
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death row phenomenon. Furthermore, it also collates a repository of information to advance 
on Justice Breyer’s argument in Glossip and the Steikers’ blueprint for the inevitable abolition 
of the death penalty in the US. Furthermore, this chapter identified the issue of botched 
executions and the lethal injection does not get sufficient coverage in both UPRs. However, 
this should change in the 2020 US UPR, particularly given the widespread media attention the 
issue has garnered recently. The analysis conducted in this chapter on the UPR and the 
punishment of death in the US has highlighted the shortfalls of the mechanism. As such, it has 
suggested changes that should be made to the UPR, in order to improve its efficacy, as argued 
in chapter seven.
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CHAPTER SEVEN  
RECOMMENDATIONS TO STRENGTHEN THE UNIVERSAL PERIODIC REVIEW 
 
Part II of this thesis provided an analysis of the three broad themes identified within the US 
UPRs regarding capital punishment: the right to a fair trial, intellectual disabilities and mental 
health, and the implementation of a death sentence. On the basis of that analysis, this thesis 
now recommends a number of key ways in which the UPR can be strengthened. If 
implemented, these suggested improvements would increase the effectiveness of the UPR in 
facilitating the abolition of the death penalty in the US, and also benefit the mechanism 
generally, for the protection and promotion of human rights globally. Moreover, these 
recommendations fill a lacuna in the scholarship and policy approaches to the UN. 
Six areas of the UPR have been identified as requiring reform: one, the role of the OHCHR, 
two, the role of the Stakeholders, three, the advance questions, four, the recommendations 
process, five, the follow-up to the review, and, six, publicising the UPR. The next sections of 
this chapter will address each of these in turn. 
 
7.1 The Role of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights 
The OHCHR is responsible for compiling two of the three documents that each member states’ 
UPR is based upon – the Compilation Report and the Stakeholder Report. These two 
documents are essential to each review because their contents shape the recommendations 
made by the other member states.1 Therefore, it is vital that they are as comprehensive as 
possible, in order to ensure the UPR is working effectively and fulfilling its mandate. However, 
as noted in Part II, key information regarding the death penalty was not included in these 
reports in the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs, which had ramifications for the content of the 
recommendations made by the UN member states.2 Therefore, this thesis proposes two ways 
to overcome this shortcoming of the UPR process: one, the OHCHR needs to be more 
transparent in how it compiles its documents, and two, the strict limits on page numbers need 
to be relaxed.  
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7.1.1 Transparency of OHCHR Reports 
The OHCHR needs to be more transparent in how it compiles the Compilation Report and 
Stakeholder Report, and how it determines what information will be included and excluded 
from them. The OHCHR already provides information on how the Stakeholders should compile 
their individual submissions and the content they should include.3 Therefore, realising this 
recommendation would not be a particularly onerous task for the OHCHR. However, this 
relatively small task could have a wide-ranging impact upon the efficacy of the UPR, both for 
the entire UPR mechanism and specifically in terms of the abolition of the death penalty in the 
US. Pertinent information that is currently being omitted from the two reports would have a 
better chance of being included in future UPRs if UN mechanisms and Stakeholders were 
aware of how the OHCHR decides on the content of its reports. This could potentially lead to 
real change for human rights on the ground, as the UPR was mandated to achieve.4 To 
implement this change, the OHCHR could provide a briefing paper on how it compiles each 
report, in a similar format to its information on the content of Stakeholder submissions, making 
the briefing paper available on its UPR repository on the UN website.  
 
7.1.2 Page Limits of the OHCHR Reports 
The strict page limits on the two documents – both can be no more than ten pages5 – should 
be relaxed, particularly for member states that receive high numbers of individual Stakeholder 
submissions and recommendations from UN bodies. This is certainly the case for the US, 
which received 103 individual Stakeholder submissions in 2010 and ninety-one in 2015.6 
Relaxing the page limits would allow the OHCHR to transfer more information into the final 
reports, which would help to avoid important information regarding capital punishment being 
omitted. This would also benefit the UPR process more generally, by allowing other member 
state reports to be as comprehensive as possible on other significant human rights issues. 
To implement this change, it would require a review of the UPR mechanism from the UN. The 
UNHRC was mandated in Resolution 60/251 to ‘review its work and functioning five years 
after its establishment and report to the General Assembly’.7 This was a beneficial task that 
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led to Resolution 16/21 and UNHRC decision 17/119, both of which made necessary 
improvements to the UPR process, such as increasing the cycles to four and a half years8 and 
attempting to tackle the issue of politicisation by modifying the approach to state speakers 
during the interactive dialogue.9 Unfortunately, there was no ten-year review mandated for 
2016, although it is clear from the analysis in Part II that the UPR would have benefited from 
such an appraisal to further develop and improve the mechanism. 
 
7.2 Role of the Stakeholders 
The Stakeholders are integral to the successful functioning of the UPR, as they provide honest 
and unbiased accounts of the human rights situation on the ground. They engender 
authenticity and legitimacy to the UPR by generally being impartial from the state under review 
and the UN mechanisms. As UPR Info has noted, ‘[t]he true power of the UPR lies in the 
universality of its [S]takeholders’.10 The Stakeholders currently contribute through various 
channels including the Stakeholder Report, lobbying the member states to influence their 
recommendations, providing oral comments on the Outcome Report at the UNHRC plenary 
session, and participating in the UPR Pre-sessions. However, the analysis in Part II discovered 
that there is the potential for the Stakeholders to have much greater influence over, and impact 
upon, the UPR. This is especially true of the death penalty in the US. As noted above, 
important information has been missed when the OHCHR is collating the Stakeholder Report 
and there were many examples of vital evidence regarding the US death penalty in the 
individual Stakeholder submissions that were overlooked when the final report was compiled. 
This has highlighted the need for reform, and this thesis argues that this should be carried out 
in three ways: first, the Stakeholders should be allowed to submit advance questions, second, 
thematic Stakeholder submissions should be encouraged, and, third, Stakeholders should 
tailor the content of their individual submissions. These proposals also apply equally to other 
areas of human rights under review at the UPR. 
 
7.2.1 Stakeholders and Advance Questions 
At present, the Stakeholders are not given the opportunity to take the floor during the review. 
They can do this during the consideration and adoption of the Outcome Report, but it is then 
too late to have an impact on that cycle’s recommendations. Although, ideally, the 
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Stakeholders would be able to take the floor during the review process and provide 
measurable recommendations, factors of time and resources must be considered. Instead, it 
would be more realistic to allow the Stakeholders to submit advance questions prior to the 
review – just as other UN member states currently do. The state under review would then be 
able to respond to these Stakeholder questions during the interactive dialogue. This would 
allow the Stakeholders to have further impact on the review, without needing to extend time 
limits or incur significant travel costs for NGOs travelling to Geneva for the review.  
There were many examples identified in Part II supporting this argument that Stakeholders 
should play a greater role in the UPR through submitting advance questions.11 It would be 
particularly useful in ensuring the UPR was being used as a tool to facilitate the abolition of 
the death penalty in the US, as it would allow the Stakeholders to voice the work they are 
already carrying out on the ground and present their concerns regarding the capital system 
directly to the US. Although they already provide individual submissions, these are unlikely to 
be read in full by the US delegation and, even if they are read, they can be easily ignored by 
the US, particularly if they raise uncomfortable issues about the death penalty. In contrast, the 
advance questions would be read by the US, and some would be responded to during the 
review in front of the UNHRC, just as they have been in the 2010 and 2015 UPRs. 
Furthermore, the Stakeholders’ specialist knowledge could be utilised to formulate important 
questions which they believe will ensure adherence with international law and ultimately lead 
to the abolition of the death penalty in the US. This would also allow the Stakeholders’ input 
to be more measurable than it is at present, further legitimising the role the Stakeholders play 
in the UPR. 
In order to implement this change to allow Stakeholders to submit advance questions, this 
would require a formal change to the UPR process through a Resolution or decision of the 
UNHRC, similar to the outcome of the five-year review as noted above. Such a review should 
be scheduled before the end of cycle three, to implement the relevant changes before cycle 
four begins in 2022.  
 
7.2.2 Thematic Stakeholder Submissions 
A further way for the Stakeholders to increase the impact they can have upon the UPR and 
the abolition of the death penalty in the US is through thematic individual submissions. 
Generally, Stakeholders submit reports on a plethora of human rights issues, not just on the 
death penalty. However, the individual submissions that reported on capital punishment in the 
                                                             
11 See, chapters 4.2.3, 4.2.4, 4.3.3, 4.3.4, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 4.5.3.2, 5.3.1, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4. 
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US UPRs saw a great deal of repetition, which often meant that the required detail on the key 
issues within the capital system was missing. Although it would be an ambitious task, this 
thesis proposes that, for the Stakeholders that provide a ‘death penalty’ section of their 
individual reports, each Stakeholder (or joint submission) should take one theme or issue and 
report on that in detail. These thematic submissions would allow each area of concern 
regarding the death penalty in the US to be investigated thoroughly, which may also lead to 
these issues being more widely cited in the final Stakeholder Report by the OHCHR. 
There were many examples throughout the analysis in Part II that showed where particular 
issues would have benefited from thematic submissions.12 However, this suggestion would be 
more difficult to realise in practice, as it would involve a collaboration between the different 
Stakeholders, which would potentially take up their valuable and limited time. Perhaps in the 
first instance, the larger Stakeholders that are already more widely cited in the UPR can work 
together to produce thematic reports, such as ABA, ACLU, AI, HRA, HRW, and USHRN. There 
could also be one central co-ordinator to facilitate this between the larger Stakeholders. If this 
became a regular feature for the US UPR, such Stakeholders may also see the benefit of 
adopting this tactic with other UPR submissions, meaning that this change would impact the 
UPR mechanism as a whole, as well as benefiting the facilitation of the abolition of the death 
penalty in the US. 
 
7.2.3 Content of Stakeholder Submissions 
Although in general, the Stakeholder submissions are well-drafted and informative, Part II 
uncovered a potential barrier to information being included in the final Stakeholder Report, 
namely, poorly-drafted content or lack of content in the individual submissions.13 Guidance is 
available from the OHCHR on what the content should include,14 but this problem also needs 
to be directly communicated to the relevant Stakeholders, in order for them to alter future 
submissions accordingly. Potentially, this could be achieved through the UPR Pre-sessions 
organised by UPR Info, as the Pre-sessions see many Stakeholders in attendance. 
 
 
 
                                                             
12 See, chapters 4.2.4, 4.4.4, 5.2.4, 5.3.2, 6.1.3, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.4, and 6.4.3. 
13 See, chapters 4.5.3.2, 5.2.4, 5.3.2, 6.2.3, 6.2.4, 6.3.3, and 6.4.3. 
14 OHCHR, ‘Universal Periodic Review: A Practical Guide for Civil Society’ (n 3); OHCHR, ‘Universal Periodic Review (Third 
Cycle): Information and Guidelines for Relevant Stakeholders’ Written Submissions’ (n 3). 
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7.3 Advance Questions 
7.3.1 State Under Review Responses to the Advance Questions 
The advance questions have the potential to be a more functional part of the UPR process. 
As they are submitted in advance of the review, they can shape the content of the interactive 
dialogue and even impact upon the recommendations. However, this thesis has identified that 
the advance questions process as it currently stands is quite informal and lacking impact in 
comparison with the rest of the UPR. For example, the documents uploaded to the UPR 
webpage for each member state are just simple Microsoft Word documents, they do not have 
their own UN document number and are only in one language, not the usual six working 
languages of the UN. Furthermore, the state under review is not currently required to provide 
a response to the advance questions, and it is not always evident during the interactive 
dialogue when the state under review is responding to the advance questions, unless it 
explicitly says so. In other circumstances, the state under review will simply ignore the 
advance questions entirely. 
In order for the advance questions to be as influential on the UPR as possible, and particularly 
if Stakeholders are to be invited to submit advance questions, this process needs to be 
formalised. This would include giving the documents a UN document number and translating 
them into the six official UN languages, using the same template as the other UPR documents. 
The formalisation of the advance questions would indicate to the UN member states that this 
is a part of the UPR that is to be taken seriously, and would allow states, Stakeholders, and 
members of the public who speak all six UN languages, to engage with this part of the UPR, 
enhancing the transparency of the mechanism. Moreover, the troika should play a particular 
role in ensuring that the state under review acknowledges the advance questions during the 
interactive dialogue. This is not to say that the state under review must respond substantively 
to the advance questions; engagement with the UPR is voluntary and it should remain this 
way to ensure 100% co-operation from member states. However, the state under review 
should at least acknowledge that the question was asked. If the question is then not answered 
in full, member states (and potentially Stakeholders) would be able to consider why, and could 
then identify how it can reword its recommendations during the review or future advance 
questions, in order to elicit a meaningful response. 
This would be particularly beneficial for the abolition of the death penalty in the US because, 
as identified in Part II, there were many advance questions on capital punishment that were 
ignored by the US delegation.15 This would also require a formal change to the UPR process 
                                                             
15 See, chapters 4.3.4, 4.4.3, 4.4.4, 6.2.4, and 6.4.4. 
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through a Resolution or decision of the UNHRC, similar to the outcome of the five-year review 
as noted above. As the UPR is a relatively new mechanism, it would be sensible to have 
regular reviews such as this, to allow the process to be amended where needed.  
 
7.3.2 Encouraging Member States to Use the Advance Questions 
To ensure the advance questions are achieving their full potential, UN member states 
participating in the UPR need to engage with them and provide questions to the state under 
review. For example, currently, member states ask advance questions and, if the state under 
review ignores the question or does not answer it in full, the member state rarely follows this 
up with a related recommendation.16 More member states should use the advance questions 
and, following in the footsteps of the Stakeholders, they could also collaborate to submit joint 
advance questions on key issues. In the context of the death penalty, this could include 
questions on the possibility of a categorical exemption for the mentally ill, or the method of 
execution being used, and examples of this were identified throughout Part II.17 To implement 
this change, the UPR Pre-sessions arranged by UPR Info are the ideal platform to encourage 
better use of the advance questions, as they attract wide state delegation attendance. 
Furthermore, this could also provide the opportunity for joint advance questions to be 
formulated, as side briefing sessions with numerous government delegations take place at the 
Pre-sessions, creating an environment for collaboration. 
 
7.4 Recommendations  
The recommendations stage is one of the most critical and also most criticised of the UPR 
process.18 The two main criticisms are that, one, there are too many recommendations made 
and, two, they are too broadly drafted to have sufficient impact.19 Therefore, to tackle these 
concerns, this thesis proposes three ways the recommendations process should be improved. 
First, the recommendations should be thematically grouped together to remove the issue of 
over-burdening the state under review, second, the specificity of the recommendations should 
be increased to encourage implementation, and, third, recommending states should place 
more focus on the target audience. 
                                                             
16 See, chapters 6.1.3 and 6.2.3. 
17 See, chapters 4.3.4, 5.3.1, 6.1.3, 6.1.4, and 6.3.4. 
18 See, Hilary Charlesworth & Emma Larking, ‘Introduction: The Regulatory Power of the UPR’ in Hilary Charlesworth and Emma 
Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP 2015) 15; Emma Hickey, ‘The UN’s 
Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights Situation on the Ground?’ (2013) ICL Journal, 
Vol 7, No 4, 6. 
19 Chauville (n 1) 97-99. 
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7.4.1 Number of Recommendations 
The US received 571 recommendations in total across the 2010 and 2015 reviews. Although 
the US is a wealthy country with many resources at its disposal, as Hickey stated, a high 
number of recommendations means that the ‘more critical issues will tend to get diluted’,20 
which in turn allows the US to be selective over which issues it addresses first.21 In order to 
reduce the number of recommendations when collating the Outcome Report, the troika should 
group them together thematically. The troika already has the option to collate identical and 
very similar recommendations, but this is not being carried out consistently. For example, in 
the 2015 UPR, the troika grouped together the following recommendations as one: 
Impose a moratorium on executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty at the 
federal and state levels (Namibia) / Institute a moratorium on the application of the death 
penalty with a view to abolition (Togo) / Establish, at the federal level, a moratorium on 
executions with a view to abolishing the death penalty (France) / Establish an official 
moratorium on the use of the death penalty (Montenegro) / Establish a moratorium on 
the application of the death penalty (Spain) / Impose a moratorium on executions and 
abolish the death penalty in all states of the United States (Turkey) / Ensure the 
establishment of a moratorium of the death penalty in those states that have not 
abolished it yet (Chile).22 
This turned seven individual recommendations into one, which lowered the total number the 
US received. The same process could have been carried out for other recommendations 
regarding international obligations and ratification of treaties. For example, four 
recommendations were made in 2010 asking the US to withdraw its reservation against Article 
6 ICCPR,23 and a further five could have been grouped together in 2015 asking the US to ratify 
the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR aiming at the abolition of the death penalty.24 By 
collating recommendations thematically, this would avoid over-burdening the recommending 
states as they would be free to recommend on any issue at any time, but would crucially 
reduce the final number of recommendations made to the state under review. Therefore, this 
                                                             
20 Emma Hickey, ‘The UN’s Universal Periodic Review: Is it Adding Value and Improving the Human Rights Situation on the 
Ground?’ (2013) ICL Journal, Vol 7, No 4, 6. 
21 Charlesworth & Larking (n 18) 15-16. 
22 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America’ (20 July 2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/30/12, para 176.175 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group 2015’]. 
23 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America’ (4 January 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/16/11 para 92.48 (France), para.92.49 (Uruguay), para.92.50 (Austria), 92.118 (Sweden) [hereinafter referred to as 
‘Report of the Working Group 2010]. 
24 Report of the Working Group 2015 (n 22) para 176.13 (Australia), para 176.11 (Chile), para.176 14 (Gabon), para 176 12 
(Namibia) and para.176 10 (Timor-Leste). 
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would encourage states to engage with all recommendations, preventing it from being 
selective over which human rights issues it does and does not address. 
In its report, ‘The Butterfly Effect’, UPR Info made some persuasive arguments as to why a 
high number of recommendations is actually helpful, such as, they ‘do not overburden the 
[s]tate under [r]eview as they call for a similar action’,25 and ‘[t]he more recommendations are 
repeated, the more pressure will be put on the [s]tate to implement [them]’.26 Furthermore, in 
her study of UPR recommendations made to eight particular states on domestic violence, 
Sarah Tufano found that ‘the more recommendations that name this issue...the more 
substantive the changes following the UPR’.27 Alan Desmond also argued that larger numbers 
of recommendations will put ‘greater pressure’ on a state to implement them.28 However, by 
grouping the recommendations together as suggested above, this will continue to put pressure 
on the state under review, but will prevent the state relying upon the high number of 
recommendations as an excuse for prioritising certain human rights issues, whilst avoiding 
others.  
Furthermore, De la Vega and Lewis suggested that, rather than listing each recommendation 
made, the troika should provide ‘a key set of recommendations that cover the principal 
concerns noted during the review’, in order to avoid the high number of recommendations 
having a negative impact upon the UPR.29 However, by removing the verbatim 
recommendations and allowing the troika to summarise, this may lose the authenticity of the 
intergovernmental nature of the UPR, and also encourage politicisation. For example, 
recommending states may believe the troika is overlooking certain recommendations and 
including others, on the basis of politics rather than human rights. Instead, as this thesis 
argues above, keeping the verbatim recommendations as at present, but grouping them 
together thematically, will reduce the number of recommendations without attracting 
politicisation. 
This change to the recommendations would be particularly beneficial for the death penalty, as 
it would encourage the US to consider specific issues substantively, such as access to counsel 
and conditions on death row. Furthermore, if the US received fewer recommendations but 
ones that are detailed and provided specifics on implementation, it would highlight the 
                                                             
25 UPR Info, ‘The Butterfly Effect’ (n 10) 21. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Sarah Tufano, ‘The “Holy Trinity” of the United Nations Universal Periodic Review: How to Make an Effective Recommendation 
Regarding Women’s Rights’ (2018) 21 U Pa L J & Soc Change 187, 188. 
28 Alan Desmond, ‘The Triangle that could Square the Circle? The Un International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of 
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, the Eu and the Universal Periodic Review’ (2015) European Journal of 
Migration and Law 17, 39-69, 65. 
29 Constance de la Vega and Tamara N Lewis, ‘Peer Review in the Mix: How the UPR Transforms Human Rights Discourse’ in 
M Cherif Bassiouni and William A Schabas (eds) New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN 
Treaty Body System and the Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia 2011) 381. 
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shortcomings of the death penalty system and force the US to acknowledge the prospect that 
the system cannot be remedied and abolition is the only recourse. This would also help to 
gather pertinent evidence to further the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition, through the UPR. 
The grouping together of recommendations could be implemented through a formal change, 
for example, through a review of the UNHRC and its mechanisms, or it could be a more simple 
arrangement of the UNHRC asking the troika before each UPR to ensure it groups similar 
recommendations together. Given that this is already happening, albeit inconsistently, this 
would not involve a significant change in practice. 
 
7.4.2 Content of Recommendations 
Part II provided many examples of poorly-worded recommendations having little to no effect 
upon the UPR,30 which highlighted the need for reform. It is important to note that there are 
already factors in place to ensure the recommendations process is improved. For example, 
UPR Info provides helpful guidance for recommending states on how to phrase 
recommendations in order to ensure implementation, suggesting that states should use the 
SMART recommendations technique, i.e. they should be specific, measurable, achievable, 
relevant and time-bound.31 In her study on the eight states’ UPRs and domestic violence 
recommendations, Tufano argued that ‘recommendations should also outline a specific course 
of action that is easy to follow and difficult to evade’.32 Building on from these points, this thesis 
argues that the way in which recommendations are provided by states, along with the drafting 
and content, should be reconsidered, both generally and with the abolition of the death penalty 
in mind. 
In particular, the focus should be on the ‘specific’ element of the SMART recommendations. 
Part II identified that recommendations suggesting that the US abolish the death penalty or 
place a moratorium on it will be outright rejected.33 Instead, recommendations should identify 
the key issue, provide the recommendation (which may still be ‘abolish the death penalty’), 
and then consider ways in which the state under review can implement it. This does not have 
to be in any great detail, and in fact the time limits on the states during the review will not allow 
                                                             
30 See, chapters 4.2.4, 4.3.3, 5.2.3, 5.3.1, 5.3.2, 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.2.4, and 6.4.4. The chapters also identified areas in which there 
had been no recommendations, but specific recommendations would have been beneficial. 
31 UPR Info, ‘A Guide for Recommending States at the UPR’ (2015) <www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/general-
document/pdf/upr_info_guide_for_recommending_states_2015.pdf> 27-29 accessed 24 August 2018. 
32 Tufano (n 27) 210-11. 
33 See, chapter 3.2.3.1; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of 
America Addendum’ (8 March 2011) UN Doc A/HRC/16/11/Add1 para 9 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group 
Addendum 2010’]; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America 
Addendum 1’ (14 September 2015) A/HRC/30/12/Add1 para 10 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group 
Addendum 1 2015’]; See, also, Appendix. 
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for this. Instead, for example, death penalty abolitionist states (particularly states with a federal 
system like the US) could reflect upon the steps they took to abolish the death penalty, while 
also briefly sharing best practices.34 Again, this could be implemented through the UPR Info 
Pre-sessions, where this could be filtered down to the government delegations to ensure that 
their recommendations are having the desired impact. 
 
7.4.3 Target Audience of Recommendations  
A further point for member states to consider is the target audience of their recommendations. 
Usually, in the case of the US, they would be made to the federal government, as that is the 
delegation that attends the UPR as a state under review and a recommending state. However, 
thought should be given to making recommendations directly to the US States on the abolition 
of the death penalty, particularly as chapter four noted that ‘[t]he US States are carrying out a 
punishment that is regulated by the ICCPR and, as such, the often-used reliance upon 
federalism as a barrier to abolition should be challenged through the UPR’.35 Examples of this 
practice of UN member states working with US States was discussed in chapter four in relation 
to the climate change deal between California and China,36 and the Oklahoma and Nevada 
courts engaging with the international social contract in death penalty cases at the State 
level.37 Therefore, recommendations regarding acceptance of international opinion and 
practice targeted at specific retentionist US States would be a nuanced and potentially 
effective use of the UPR in the context of the abolition of the death penalty. 
Alongside aiming recommendations at the individual US States, this thesis argues that they 
should also be targeted towards the judiciary. The US noted in its Addendum to the 2015 
Outcome Report that, ‘[w]ith respect to judicial remedies, we note that we cannot make 
commitments regarding, and do not control, the outcome of court proceedings’.38 Therefore, 
in noting that the federal government cannot control the outcome of litigation, member states 
should make recommendations directly to the courts. In the context of the death penalty, this 
could have a two-fold outcome. First, this could lead to attorneys discussing the UPR in briefs 
and, thereafter, could lead to domestic US courts citing the UPR, as to date no court has made 
reference to the mechanism.39 Second, it could further the second prong of the Steikers’ 
                                                             
34 See, De la Vega and Lewis (n 29) 367, noting the importance of peer review, as in the UPR, for ‘knowledge transfer’, as it 
allows states to ‘benefit from seeing how other [s]tates have tackled similar problems in their country’. 
35 See, Chapter 4 page 125. 
36 See, ibid. 
37 See, Chapter 4 page 133-35. 
38 Report of the Working Group Addendum 1 2015 (n 33) para 3. 
39 Correct as at 24 August 2018. 
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‘blueprint for abolition’,40 by giving examples of the international consensus on capital issues 
such as racial discrimination and wrongful convictions. This could eventually have a positive 
impact upon the abolition of the death penalty through a SCOTUS decision, as Justices Breyer 
and Ginsburg in particular have acknowledged the importance of international law and the 
practice of other nations.41 Furthermore, if Justice Breyer’s review of the death penalty in his 
dissent in Glossip42 had referenced the review of the US death penalty that the UPR provides, 
this would have added to his argument towards abolition.43 If a future case is heard by the 
Court on the constitutionality of the death penalty, the UPR should be cited, as should the 
specific death penalty recommendations from UN member states, as it furthers both prongs 
of the proportionality doctrine as per the blueprint for abolition.  
In order to disseminate recommendations made to the US States and judiciary, or the 
equivalent in other UN member states, the national consultations with civil society and the 
general public should be utilised. As noted in chapter three, the state under review is 
‘encouraged to prepare the information through a broad consultation process at the national 
level with all relevant [S]takeholders’ prior to its submission of the National Report.44 In 
preparation for both UPRs, the US federal government engaged in consultations with civil 
society and members of the public.45 This would provide the opportunity for any 
recommendations made to the States or judiciary to be circulated and acted upon. 
Part II of the thesis noted that numerous sections of the US UPRs would have benefited from 
recommending states aiming its recommendations to US States or the judiciary.46 Again, this 
change to how the UN member states approach recommendations could be addressed 
through a briefing at the UPR Pre-sessions. 
 
7.5 Follow-Up to the Review 
The reliance upon recommendations accepted in the previous review as a means of follow-up 
is hindering the positive role the UPR can play in the death penalty abolition movement. For 
example, is currently futile for a state to recommend that the US should abolish the death 
penalty, as the US will simply note the recommendation and take no further action. Therefore, 
this thesis argues that there are three potential ways this could be remedied to allow the UPR 
                                                             
40 Ibid 271, 278. 
41 See, Roper v Simmons 543 US 551, 575-78 (2005); Stephen Breyer, The Court and the World: American Law and the New 
Global Realities (Vintage Books 2015) 7. 
42Glossip v Gross 135 S Ct 2726, 2755 (2015) (Breyer, J dissenting). 
43 See, chapter 6.4.4. 
44 UNGA Res 5/1 (n 4) para 15(a). 
45 UNHRC, ‘Annex II: Selected Civil Society Consultations’ (2015) UN Doc A/HRC/WG6/22/USA/1/USA/AnnexII/E; US 
Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2015 UPR Report Fact Sheet on U.S. Process’ (6 
Feburary 2015) <www.state.gov/j/drl/upr/2015/237251.htm> accessed 24 August 2018. 
46 See, chapters 4.5.1.2, 5.2.3, 5.2.4, 6.3.3, 6.3.4, and 6.4.4. 
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to have more impact on the capital system in the US, and generally on human rights across 
the globe.  First, through responses to accepted and noted recommendations, second, through 
engagement with the mid-term reporting, and, third, by potentially creating a new thematic 
special procedures mandate specifically for the follow-up to the UPR. 
 
7.5.1 Responses to Recommendations 
The US, in both 2010 and 2015, provided an Addendum to the Outcome Report detailing 
which recommendations were accepted, noted, and accepted in part.47 In the Addendum, the 
US delegation also provided reasons why the ‘accepted in part’ recommendations were not 
fully accepted, which was helpful for the key UPR actors as it provided some clarity on what 
the barriers were preventing the US from fully accepting and implementing some 
recommendations. This thesis further argues that, in subsequent reviews, the state under 
review could be asked to provide short reasons why the remaining recommendations were 
accepted or noted, and outline practical steps they are going to take to implement the accepted 
recommendations. In doing so, this would allow a discussion to take place during the UNHRC 
plenary session between the state under review, UN member states, and Stakeholders 
regarding the reasons why the noted recommendations were not accepted. This would inform 
the other key UPR actors as to the barriers blocking the remedy of specific human rights issues 
in the US and would allow them to formulate their advance questions and recommendations 
for the next UPR accordingly. It would also allow the Stakeholders to disseminate this 
information locally to affect change on the ground. There were a number of examples identified 
in Part II where this improvement to the UPR would have benefited the facilitation of the 
abolition of the death penalty in the US.48 
This would involve a formal change to the UPR process through a Resolution or decision of 
the UNHRC, but does not mean that the focus of the subsequent reviews would not be 
predominantly on the recommendations accepted in the previous review. It is important that 
this remains the leading focus to ensure the continued 100% cooperation from member states. 
However, a discussion regarding why the recommendations were noted would potentially 
prevent states from being tactical in what human rights issues they do and do not address. 
Currently, the effectiveness of the UPR is being hindered due to recommendations being 
noted and thereafter ignored, and others accepted partially or in full but not being acted upon. 
                                                             
47 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America Addendum 1’ (8 March 
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/16/11/Add1; Report of the Working Group Addendum 1 2015 (n 33). 
48 See, chapters 4.2.4, 4.3.3, 4.4.4, 4.5.4, 5.3.1, 6.1.3, 6.1.4, 6.2.3, and 6.4.4. 
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If the government delegation provides responses to recommendations, it will ensure the state 
under review can be held to account. 
 
7.5.2 Mid-Term Reports 
The mid-term reporting provides the ideal platform to report back on the implementation of the 
accepted recommendations in between reviews. For example, the UK’s first mid-term report 
lists some of the recommendations it accepted in cycle one and the UK action taken to date 
to implement each recommendation.49 This is useful for Stakeholders and member states, 
both of which play an active role in the implementation of recommendations. The mid-term 
reports are described as voluntary, however, participation in the entire UPR itself is voluntary 
as there is no obligation on a state to take part in the process. Despite this, in the first cycle 
all 193 states cooperated in the review process, but only fifty-five states submitted mid-term 
reports.50 The US declined to submit a mid-term report.51 
Chauville argued that ‘the lack of an independent United Nations-led assessment mechanism’ 
is a weakness of the UPR.52 To remedy this to some extent, through a review of the UNHRC 
and its mechanisms, the mid-term reports should be made a core part of the UPR process, to 
be considered as important as the National Report currently is. Although this still may not 
attract 100% cooperation, particularly as ‘[m]any developing countries resisted…the proposal 
that the informal practice of mid-term reporting on the progress of implementing accepted UPR 
recommendations be made mandatory’,53 it should, at the very least, improve the submission 
numbers of mid-term reports. Also, if states were to provide details on how they intend to 
implement accepted recommendations as suggested above, the mid-term report would be a 
way of specifically measuring the progress made between reviews. 
The issue of the US submitting a mid-term report also needs to be considered during the 2020 
US UPR. There would be the opportunity to discuss this during the initial three reports, through 
advance questions, during the interactive dialogue, and at the UNHRC plenary session. The 
                                                             
49 United Kingdom Mission, ‘Universal Periodic Review Mid-Term Progress Update by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland on its Implementation of Recommendations Agreed in June 2008’ (2010) 
<http://lib.ohchr.org/HRBodies/UPR/Documents/Session1/GB/UKmid_term_report2010.pdf> accessed 24 August 2018. 
50 See, UNHRC, ‘UPR Mid-term Reports’ <www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/UPR/Pages/UPRImplementation.aspx> accessed 24 
August 2018. 
51 Ibid. 
52 Chauville (n 1) 87-88. 
53 Jane K Cowan & Julie Billaud, ‘Between Learning and Schooling: 
The Politics of Human Rights Monitoring at the Universal Periodic Review’ (2015) 36 Third World Q 1175-90, 1184. 
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UPR is not a ‘naming and shaming’ mechanism,54 but it is there to identify ways in which a 
state’s human rights record can be improved, including through a mid-term report.  
Despite the US not submitting a mid-term report between its first and second reviews, 
Stakeholders still assessed the US’ cooperation with recommendations. For example, in 2013, 
UPR Info undertook its own mid-term assessment of the US to consider its implementation of 
the 2010 recommendations.55 From this assessment, UPR Info found that none of the death 
penalty recommendations had been implemented, even partially.56 Adding to this, Part II 
identified areas of the US UPRs that would have benefited from the submission of a mid-term 
report from the US.57 In particular, the lack of implementation of accepted, or partially 
accepted, recommendations could be remedied and recommendations may be further 
implemented if the US were to provide a mid-term report. It would allow civil society, other 
member states, and the OHCHR to keep up with the efforts being made to implement the few 
recommendations regarding the death penalty that were accepted by the US. The mid-term 
reports have the potential to be a way to ensure improvement to human rights on the ground, 
just as Resolution 5/1 stated the UPR should. 
 
7.5.3 Creating a ‘UPR’ Thematic Special Procedure 
In order to have a UN-led monitor of implementation of recommendations, Chauville 
suggested that ‘[a]n objective assessment by the OHCHR, published one month before the 
review in the format of a report, would be an effective way to fill this gap’.58 Another possible 
solution to encourage meaningful follow-up by the state under review, would be to create a 
new, thematic special procedure mandate specifically to monitor implementation of the UPR 
recommendations. This would be a way of ensuring UN-led scrutiny, but from an independent 
source. It would require the creation of a new thematic special procedure mandate, and the 
need for a qualified Special Rapporteur or Working Group to be hired.  
From a practical perspective, this could be controversial, as the UPR has been criticised for 
overshadowing the important work of the special procedures. However, the UPR can be, and 
has been, used to reinforce the findings of the special procedures and encourage 
                                                             
54 See, Elvira Domínguez Redondo, ‘The Universal Periodic Review – Is There Life beyond Naming and Shaming in Human 
Rights Implementation?’ (2012) 4 NZ L Rev 673 (2012). 
55 UPR Info, ‘United States of America: Mid-Term Implementation Assessment’ (1 July 2013, as amended 16 July 2013) 
<www.upr-info.org/followup/assessments/session22/united_States/MIA-United_States.pdf> 4-10 accessed 24 August 2018. 
56 Ibid. 
57 See, chapters 4.5.4 and 6.1.4. 
58 Chauville (n 1) 96. 
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engagement.59 This suggests that the mechanisms working together would benefit human 
rights on the ground. 
 
7.6 Publicising the UPR 
Currently, the UPR is not as well-known as the other UN mechanisms, particularly to the 
general public. In order to improve its effectiveness, both generally, and specifically in the 
context of the abolition of the death penalty in the US, the UPR needs to be more widely 
publicised. This would be particularly beneficial given James E. Coleman’s argument that, in 
order for the abolition of the death penalty in the US to be realised, there must be the 
‘continued erosion of public confidence in the death penalty’.60 Furthermore, in July 2018, a 
‘call to action’ was published by two social workers, providing actionable recommendations as 
to how social workers can assist with the abolition of the death penalty.61 Other professions 
could use this as a model to take forward, using the UPR as a repository of information 
regarding the US death penalty. In order to do this, the publicity of the mechanism must be 
improved. 
 
7.6.1 Role of Key Actors 
A number of key actors can assist in providing the UPR mechanism with meaningful publicity, 
to ensure that it can be as impactful as possible for human rights on the ground. These include 
UN member states, Stakeholders, practitioners, academics, courts, and the media.62  
The UN member states and Stakeholders can promote the UPR within the wider community 
by engaging with the general public in preparation for each review, as the US has already 
done prior to the 2010 and 2015 reviews.63 It is good practice for both member states and 
Stakeholders to consult with the general public regardless of publicising the mechanism, as 
the UPR is there to promote and protect the human rights of citizens across the globe. 
However, as well as being good practice for the authenticity and legitimacy of the National and 
                                                             
59 Ingrid Nifosi-Sutton, ‘The System of the UN Special Procedures: Some Proposals for Change’ in M Cherif Bassiouni and William 
A Schabas (eds) New Challenges for the UN Human Rights Machinery: What Future for the UN Treaty Body System and the 
Human Rights Council Procedures? (Intersentia 2011) 397-98. 
60 James E Coleman, ‘One Way Or Another the Death Penalty Will be Abolished, but Only After the Public No Longer Has 
Confidence in its Use’ (2018) 13 Duke J Const L & Pub Poly 15, 16. 
61 L Lauren Brown & Sarah Graham McGee, ‘Social Work and Capital Punishment: A Call to Action’ (2018) Journal of Human 
Rights and Social Work, pp 1-11, 1. 
62 See, chapters 4.4.4, 6.4.3, and 6.4.4. 
63 UNHRC, ‘Annex II: Selected Civil Society Consultations’ UN Doc A/HRC/WG6/22/USA/1/USA/AnnexII/E; US Department of 
State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, ‘2015 UPR Report Fact Sheet on U.S. Process’ (6 Feburary 2015) 
<www.state.gov/j/drl/upr/2015/237251.htm> accessed 24 August 2018. 
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Stakeholder Reports, it would also allow the general public to engage with the UPR and 
increase the public’s knowledge of the mechanism.  
Furthermore, if the UPR recommendations were targeted towards the courts and not just the 
federal government, as stated above, this could lead to the UPR being cited in briefs by 
practitioners. Thereafter, the courts may cite the UPR in its judgments, which would raise the 
profile and publicity of the UPR in the US.  
Academics can also be of assistance to the publicity of the UPR by conducting further research 
on the mechanism. Following this thesis, the author intends to carry out more research on the 
UPR, both generally, and specifically on the US and the abolition of the death penalty. 
Moreover, human rights education is imperative for the future of the promotion and protection 
of global human rights, and the UNHRC and its mechanisms should be part of this education. 
Particularly at university-level, modules focusing on human rights and/or the UN should 
include the UPR. 
Finally, the media has a role to play in publicising the UPR, particularly US media outlets 
regarding the US UPRs and follow-up. If the media began to report on the UPR more 
frequently, this would be a way to widely increase the general public’s awareness of the 
mechanism, whilst also positively influencing the discussion of the death penalty in the US 
UPRs. 
 
7.7 Practical Implementation of the Recommendations 
This chapter has suggested recommendations to improve the UPR mechanism, and ways the 
key UPR actors can put them into practice. However, these recommendations have been 
formulated from a legal scholar’s perspective, and so there will be practical considerations to 
be made in order for them to be implemented.  
Before there can be any implementation of these recommendations, they must be transferred 
from the thesis into the wider world. As such, in order for these recommendations to be 
considered by the key actors, a dialogue must be started, for example with the OHCHR, the 
UN member states, and the Stakeholders. In the first instance, it is proposed that the author 
will approach UPR Info with the suggested recommendations, to discuss the viability of them 
being realised in practice, and for UPR Info’s expert opinion as to how this can be facilitated. 
From there, dialogues will be created with Stakeholders to discuss the findings of this research 
and the recommendations it makes. Although the Stakeholders are likely already aware of the 
shortfalls of the UPR process, to provide them with evidence and suggested ways to improve 
Stakeholder engagement with the UPR, may encourage changes from them, such as, through 
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co-ordinating thematic individual submissions. Once this research, in particular the 
recommendations, has been published, and networks have been created with UPR Info and 
other Stakeholders, the OHCHR can also be approached to facilitate a discussion about more 
formal changes to the UPR process. 
Clearly, there will be limitations to whether these recommendations can be realised in practice, 
due to the inherently political nature of an intergovernmental mechanism such as the UPR. 
However, by starting dialogues, and providing evidence for why the UPR should be changed 
through the findings of this research, it will start discussions and hopefully see positive 
changes made for the protection and promotion of human rights across the globe. 
 
7.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has identified the areas of the UPR that this thesis argues can be modified in 
order to improve the mechanism to ensure it is fulfilling its mandate to help protect and promote 
human rights globally. Furthermore, these proposed changes to the UPR would encourage 
US adherence to international law whilst it continues to administer capital punishment. It will 
also help to gather the evidence needed to pursue the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition, which 
will further the ultimate goal that this research is hoping to contribute to – the abolition of the 
death penalty in the US.
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
CONCLUSION 
 
8.1 Key Findings of the Thesis 
Through a qualitative review of the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs in the context of the abolition of 
the death penalty, this thesis has filled a gap in the current academic discourse. In carrying 
out the analysis of the first two US UPR cycles, the author identified three broad themes 
regarding capital punishment. One, the right to a fair trial and due process, two, intellectual 
disabilities and mental health, and, three, the implementation of a death sentence. 
Furthermore, from this review of the three themes within the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs, the 
author identified recommendations to strengthen the UPR mechanism.  
By improving the UPR as suggested in this thesis, its impact will be three-fold. First, it will 
assist in ensuring the US is held to account to its international obligations whilst it retains the 
death penalty. This thesis has demonstrated how the UPR can be utilised to facilitate this. 
Second, it will further the Steikers’ ‘blueprint for abolition’, by gathering evidence to show the 
arbitrary application of the death penalty in the US in violation of international and domestic 
laws. This is in preparation for SCOTUS hearing a case on the constitutionality of the death 
penalty in the future. Third, the strengthening of the UPR will benefit the mechanism generally, 
for the protection and promotion of human rights globally. 
This section of the chapter provides an overview of the key findings of this thesis. This includes 
a summary of the main arguments in each chapter, how the analysis met the three aims of the 
thesis, and the recommendations proposed from the outcome of the analysis. 
 
Chapter Two 
Before the analysis of the UPR could take place, given that it is based upon international law, 
an examination of the US’ relationship with international law was carried out in chapter two. 
From the outset, it was clear that the US has a thorny relationship with international law, owing 
in part to American exceptionalism, also outlined in the chapter. In terms of treaties, this thesis 
has been predominantly concerned with the ICCPR, given its role in the international death 
penalty framework, and the US ratified but attached a number of RUDs to the ICCPR.1 
However, from the examination of its reservations against Articles 6 and 7, this thesis found 
that the reservations are invalid, as they go against the object and purpose of the ICCPR, and 
                                                             
1 See, chapter 2.3. 
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are therefore severable from the US accession to the treaty.2 As such, the analysis of the UPR 
within Part II took into account that Articles 6 and 7 are binding upon the US. 
This thesis argued that the abolition of the death penalty can be achieved through the Steikers’ 
‘blueprint for abolition’, which utilises the ‘proportionality doctrine’.3 This doctrine is two-fold, 
involving firstly, ‘objective evidence’ and secondly, SCOTUS’ ‘own judgment’ on Eighth 
Amendment issues.4 International law can provide assistance to further the blueprint,5 and the 
UPR can be used to gather the requisite evidence. Although the appointment of Justice 
Gorsuch to the Court in 2017, and the retirement of Justice Kennedy in 2018 is a setback for 
the fulfilment of this blueprint for abolition, it was argued this is not a closed door. For example, 
there is the possibility that another conservative justice, just like Justice Kennedy, will 
gradually move further towards the centre of the Court. 
 
Chapter Three 
The complex and exceptional relationship the US has with international law was also 
demonstrated by its engagement with the UN and its human rights mechanisms.6 The most 
recent example of this was the Trump Administration’s withdrawal from the UNHRC.7 
Through an introduction to the UPR, chapter three highlighted some preliminary strengths and 
weaknesses of the mechanism, even before the analysis in Part II. For example, the fact that 
the US had consulted with members of the public prior to both the 2010 and 2015 UPRs was 
a positive, as this had never been seen before.8 Furthermore, the post-UPR Working Groups 
created by the US provided a response to each UPR recommendation, whereas there were 
no responses to the treaty body and special procedure recommendations, indicating the 
positive effect of the UPR compared to the other human rights mechanisms.9 However, some 
preliminary criticisms that would be built upon in Part II were also identified. These included: 
the fact that the page limits on documents were having negative effects on the UPR,10 
repetition of content in the individual Stakeholder submissions,11 the lack of transparency from 
                                                             
2 See, chapter 2.3.2. 
3 See, chapter 2.5.3; Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Courting Death The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment (HUP 
2016) 271, 278. 
4 Ibid 282, 278. 
5 See, chapter 2.5.3. 
6 See, chapter 3.1. 
7 BBC News, ‘US Quits ‘Biased’ UN Human Rights Council’ (20 June 2018) <www.bbc.co.uk/news/44537372> accessed 24 
August 2018. 
8 See, chapter 3.2.2.1. 
9 See chapter 3.2.5. 
10 See, chapter 3.2.2.3. 
11 Ibid. 
 
   
 
221 
 
the OHCHR when compiling the Compilation and Stakeholder Reports,12 the informal process 
of the advance questions,13 the broad content of recommendations,14 the repercussions of a 
state receiving a high number of recommendations,15 and the US’ refusal to submit a mid-term 
report.16 
 
Part II 
Part II was where the analysis of the 2010 and 2015 US UPRs took place, in the context of 
the death penalty. To do this, the author identified three broad areas of capital punishment 
that were significant within the US UPRs: chapter four examined the death penalty and the 
right to a fair trial, chapter five considered intellectual disabilities as a current categorical 
exemption to the death penalty and mental illnesses as a potential categorical exemption, and 
chapter six reviewed the implementation of a death sentence. From this analysis, chapter 
seven set out a number of recommendations proposed by this thesis, in order to improve the 
UPR mechanism. 
 
Chapter Four 
The Right to Counsel 
The analysis of the right to counsel in capital cases within the 2010 US UPR identified a 
number of ways in which the UPR could be improved. For example, allowing Stakeholders to 
provide advance questions would have allowed more information regarding access to capital 
counsel to be relayed to UN member states when they formulated their recommendations.17 
Furthermore, the IACHR’s case report on Medellín, Cardenas, and Leal García provided clear 
evidence of the ineffective assistance of counsel many capital defendants and appellants face 
in breach of both international and domestic laws.18 However, this key information was not 
transferred into the final Stakeholder Report, making it difficult for the US to be held to account 
to its international obligations. Moreover, a direct link between a lack of information in the 
Compilation Report and no recommendations being made was identified.19 To remedy this, it 
was suggested that the OHCHR needs to provide more transparency regarding how it 
                                                             
12 Ibid. 
13 See, chapter 3.2.3. 
14 See, chapter 3.2.3.1. 
15 See, chapter 3.2.3.2. 
16 See, chapter 3.2.5. 
17 See, chapter 4.2.3. 
18 Ibid. 
19 See, ibid; Roland Chauville, ‘The Universal Periodic Review’s First Cycle: Successes and Failures’ in Hilary Charlesworth and 
Emma Larking (eds), Human Rights and the Universal Periodic Review: Rituals and Ritualism (CUP 2015). 
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compiles the Compilation and Stakeholder Reports, which would also benefit the UPR 
mechanism generally.20 
In the 2015 UPR, the sharp reduction in discussion on the right to counsel, particularly from 
the Stakeholders, indicated that thematic Stakeholder submissions could be beneficial. They 
would ensure that every pivotal issue within the capital system could be addressed in the 
individual submissions, with the ABA being an obvious candidate to tackle IAC.21 Also, the 
acceptance without comment of Poland’s recommendation on effective capital counsel 
pointed to a flaw in the follow-up to the review. It was argued that the state under review should 
be expected to briefly address in the Addendum to the Working Group Report how it will 
implement accepted recommendations, and why it did not accept noted recommendations.22 
In future UPRs, this would allow the key actors to provide assistance in implementing the 
recommendations and would provide a basis for advance questions and recommendations in 
subsequent reviews.  
Furthermore, the fact that only one recommendation was made on access to counsel in both 
the 2010 and 2015 UPRs was proof of two problems within the recommendations. One, there 
are too many recommendations made and, two, they are too broadly drafted to have sufficient 
impact. It was suggested that the troika needs to group identical or similar recommendations 
together to lower the final number of recommendations a state receives.23 Moreover, member 
states should be more specific with the recommendations they provide to encourage action 
on the ground.24 
Racial Discrimination 
Section 4.3 examined racial discrimination within the capital system. A particular issue that 
was raised in the 2010 US UPR was that the domestic definition of racial discrimination did 
not accord with international law, as the domestic law definition did not include non-intentional 
discrimination.25 The US noted a recommendation from China which suggested it bring its 
definition in line with ICERD,26 stating that ‘[w]e believe that our law is consistent with our 
[I]CERD obligations’.27 This provided an example of American exceptionalism, as the US 
                                                             
20 See chapter 4.2.3. 
21 See, chapter 4.2.4. 
22 See, ibid; UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America Addendum 1’ 
(14 September 2015) A/HRC/30/12/Add1 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group Addendum 1 2015’]. 
23 See, chapter 4.2.4. 
24 Ibid. 
25 See, chapter 4.3.3. 
26 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America’ (4 January 2011) UN Doc 
A/HRC/16/11 para 92.63 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group 2010’]. Bolivia also provided a similar 
recommendation at para 92.62. 
27 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America Addendum’ (8 March 
2011) UN Doc A/HRC/16/11/Add1 para 30 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group Addendum 2010’]. 
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delegation sought to differentiate between its obligations and other member states’ obligations 
under ICERD. However, in 2015, the US UPR saw a positive change on this point. Ghana 
made a similar recommendation to China’s from 2010,28 which the US supported in part, noting 
that ‘although we recognize there is always room for improvement, we believe that our law is 
consistent with our [I]CERD obligations’.29 Albeit small, progress was made between the two 
UPRs, as the recommendation had progressed from being noted in 2010 to accepted in part 
in 2015, with the US acknowledging that the law could be improved. Stakeholders and UN 
member states now need to consider how they can approach this issue in 2020 to ensure 
future recommendations on this point will be accepted and implemented.30 This is particularly 
important if the UPR is to be used to encourage US adherence with international standards 
when implementing the death penalty. 
The analysis of the 2015 US UPR showed a positive improvement on 2010, in that all key 
actors came together to further France’s 2010 recommendation to undertake studies on racial 
discrimination in the death penalty. This was an example of good practice in the UPR, as the 
key actors provided information and recommendations on the same issue in order to affirm its 
importance to the US, which in turn will put pressure on the US to implement France’s 
recommendation. This can also be used as a model for future UPRs on other issues. It was 
further argued that France should use the advance questions in the 2020 US UPR to ask how 
its recommendation in 2015 was implemented, particularly given that a new Administration 
with different priorities has taken over since it made the recommendation.31 However, it was 
also argued that, in practice, the use of conducting more studies on race and the death penalty 
would be limited. Instead, it would be more beneficial for UN member states to recommend 
on how the findings of these studies can be implemented to reduce racial discrimination.32 In 
fact, this would provide proof that the death penalty is flawed beyond repair, adding to the 
evidence to further the Steikers’ blueprint for abolition. 
There were examples of Stakeholders providing cogent recommendations to the US on racial 
discrimination within both UPR cycles.33 This provided another example of why Stakeholders 
should be permitted to provide advance questions, to ensure that important issues such as 
racially discriminate juries are raised and not just left unread by member states in individual 
submissions.34 Four advance questions were asked on racial discrimination in the 2015 UPR, 
                                                             
28 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America’ (20 July 2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/30/12 paras 176.122 [hereinafter referred to as ‘Report of the Working Group 2015’]. 
29 Report of the Working Group Addendum 1 2015 (n 22) 5-6. 
30 See, chapter 4.3.4. 
31 See, chapter 4.3.4. 
32 Ibid. 
33 See, chapters 4.3.3 and 4.3.4. 
34 See, chapter 4.3.3. 
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but the unsatisfactory responses from the US indicated the need for the advance questions to 
be reformed. This thesis suggested the troika should have a more prominent role in directing 
the state under review to the advance questions during the interactive dialogue to ensure they 
are acknowledged.35  
The analysis further demonstrated the positive link between a high volume of discussion within 
the main reports, and an increase in recommendations. In 2015, the US received fifty-seven 
recommendations on racial discrimination36 compared with thirty in 2010.37  
Wrongful Capital Convictions 
Section 4.4 analysed wrongful convictions within capital punishment. Although a plethora of 
information was provided by the Stakeholders on wrongful convictions, there was a 
disappointing lack of discussion in the main reports, which led to no recommendations being 
made.38 This added to the argument that the OHCHR needs to be more transparent in how it 
decides upon the content of its reports, to ensure this does not happen in future UPRs 
regarding all human rights issues. 
In the 2015 UPR, there was an increase in discussions on wrongful convictions, particularly 
focused upon compensation following an exoneration from death row.39 Germany asked a 
question about compensation which was not addressed by the US during the interactive 
dialogue, highlighting the ineffectiveness of the advance questions and the need for reform.40 
JS17 provided a corpus of information regarding wrongful convictions and compensation, 
including cogent recommendations for the US, but these were not transferred into the 
Stakeholder Report. This added to the argument that allowing the Stakeholders to provide 
advance questions, and produce thematic Stakeholder submissions, could improve the impact 
Stakeholders can have on the UPR.41  
                                                             
35 Ibid. 
36 Report of the Working Group 2015 (n 28) paras 176.90 (Chile); 176.91 (Namibia); 176.92 (Cuba); 176.93 (Iran); 176.94 (South 
Africa); 176.95 (Cape Verde); 176.118 (Korea); 176.119 (Bangladesh); 176.120 (Lebanon); 176.121 (Kazakhstan); 176.122 
(Ghana); 176.123 (Senegal); 176.124 (Serbia); 176.125 (Iran); 176.126 (Egypt); 176.130 (Namibia); 176.131 (Singapore); 
176.132 (Nigeria); 176.133 (Israel); 176.134 (Singapore); 176.135 (Niger); 176.136 (Azerbaijan); 176.137 (Maldives); 176.140 
(Algeria); 176.141 (France); 176.142 (Malaysia); 176.143 (Bolivia); 176.144 (Malaysia); 176.145 (Nigeria); 176.146 (Russia); 
176.147 (Azerbaijan); 176.148 (Togo); 176.149 (Pakistan); 176.150 (Bangladesh); 176.151 (Brazil); 176.152 (Egypt); 176.153 
(Holy See); 176.154 (Mexico); 176.155 (Pakistan); 176.156 (China); 176.157 (Croatia); 176.158 (Democratic People’s Republic 
of Korea); 176.159 (Iran); 176.160 (Turkey); 176.161 (Indonesia); 176.195 (France); 176.198 (Belgium); 176.220 (Angola); 
176.221 (Argentina); 176.222 (Australia); 176.224 (Democratic Republic of the Congo); 176.225 (Ireland); 176.226 (Cuba); 
176.232 (Iceland); 176.276 (Ghana); 176.277 (Poland); 176.278 (Libya). 
37 Report of the Working Group 2010 (n 26) paras 92.3 (Russia); 92.45 (Venezuela); 92.62 (Bolivia); 92.63 (China); 92.64 (Egypt); 
92.67 (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); 92.68 (Democratic People’s Republic of Korea); 92.79 (Guatemala); 92.82 
(Venezuela); 92.94 (Cuba); 92.95 (France); 92.96 (Austria); 92.97 (Haiti); 92.98 (Egypt); 92.99 (Bangladesh); 92.100 (Libya); 
92.101 (Mexico); 92.102 (Sudan); 92.103 (Ecuador); 92.104 (Vietnam); 92.106 (Bangladesh); 92.107 (Ghana); 92.108 (Mexico); 
92.110 (Ecuador); 92.111 (Qatar); 92.151 (China); 92.190 (Iran); 92.207 (Cuba); 92.219 (Qatar); 92.220 (Algeria). 
38 See, chapter 4.4.3. 
39 See, chapter 4.4.4. 
40 Ibid. 
41 Ibid. 
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Three recommendations were made on wrongful convictions in 2015, again showing the 
positive link between the content of the main reports and recommendations made.42 However, 
they were accepted without comment by the US, adding evidence to the argument that the 
state under review should be required to address how it will implement accepted 
recommendations, and why it did not accept noted recommendations.43 Furthermore, it was 
argued that the recommending states should consider the target audience of their 
recommendations, looking to the individual US States or courts to have further impact.44 
Foreign Nationals’ Rights 
Section 4.5 considered foreign nationals’ rights under the VCCR. In this section, the key VCCR 
cases were outlined, including the ICJ decisions against the US and the treatment of the ICJ 
judgments by domestic US courts. It analysed the ramifications of these decisions and the role 
of the UPR in ensuring this due process right is adhered to. Furthermore, the purported 
withdrawal from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR was analysed, arguing that the withdrawal 
is invalid, based upon the application of Article 56 VCLT and the parties’ intentions.45 However, 
in order to test the argument that the US’ withdrawal was invalid, another state must initiate 
proceedings against the US under the Optional Protocol. This thesis argued that an ideal test 
case would be from the UK regarding British grandmother, Linda Carty, who is on death row 
in Texas and was not advised of her Article 36 rights.46 To further this argument, the author 
will approach the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office with the findings, encouraging 
them to take the case to the ICJ. The UPR can also be utilised to encourage the UK to bring 
a test case against the US in the Linda Carty case.47  
The analysis identified that consular assistance and the death penalty had been raised 
throughout both US UPRs.48 However, the US accepted recommendations during the two 
UPRs but provided no comment on them, and thereafter did not implement them. This added 
to the argument that the state under review should be required to detail how it will implement 
accepted recommendations and state why it did not accept noted recommendations.49 It was 
also suggested that the mid-term reports should become a core part of the UPR. This would 
encourage member states, such as the US, to submit a mid-term report, providing an update 
on its progress in implementing accepted recommendations, including those related to 
consular assistance and the VCCR.50 
                                                             
42 Ibid. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Ibid. 
45 See, chapter 4.5.3.2. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid. See, also, Carty v Thaler 583 F 3d 244, 251 (5th Cir La 2010). 
48 See, chapter 4.5.4. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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Chapter Five 
Intellectual Disabilities 
In both US UPRs, the Stakeholders raised the disturbing point that the US States are 
continuing to execute the intellectually disabled, in spite of the Atkins decision.51 However, this 
was not transferred into the main report. To avoid key information being omitted from the main 
documents, such as the continued execution of the intellectually disabled in violation of both 
international and domestic standards, the OHCHR needs to be more transparent in how it 
compiles its Stakeholder Report.52 This would encourage US adherence to international law, 
but would also benefit Stakeholders in all UPRs regarding all human rights issues when 
compiling their individual submissions. Furthermore, it was proposed that member states 
should make specific recommendations on this issue, alongside considering the intended 
audience of its recommendations.53 On the issue of States continuing to execute persons with 
an intellectual disability, recommendations aimed at the State governments and judiciaries 
would be particularly helpful.  
In the 2015 US UPR, the analysis discovered that misinformation had been provided by the 
US government in its National Report: the US stated that capital punishment ‘is barred…for 
individuals found by a court to have a significant intellectual disability’.54 However, the 
categorical exemption in the US is for all persons with any intellectual disability,55 not a 
‘significant’ intellectual disability. This should have been addressed throughout the rest of the 
2015 UPR and is something the key actors should look out for in future UPRs for all human 
rights issues. 
Between the 2010 and 2015 UPRs, SCOTUS handed down its judgment in Hall v. Florida.56 
In the majority opinion, Justice Kennedy found that ‘Florida's law contravenes our Nation's 
commitment to dignity and its duty to teach human decency as the mark of a civilized world’.57 
However, this thesis argued that the US has much to learn from the world community, and the 
UPR is an example of the world teaching the US about human rights and decency, particularly 
regarding capital punishment. Adding to this was the majority opinion’s holding that ‘[t]he 
States are laboratories for experimentation, but those experiments may not deny the basic 
                                                             
51 See, chapter 5.2.3 and 5.2.4. Atkins v Virginia 536 US 304 (2002), 
52 See, chapter 5.2.3. 
53 Ibid. 
54 UNHRC, ‘National Report of the United States of America’ (13 February 2015) UN Doc A/HRC/WG.6/22/USA/1 para 49 
[hereinafter referred to as ‘National Report 2015’]. 
55 See, Atkins (n 51). 
56 Hall v Florida 134 S Ct 1986 (2014). 
57 Ibid 2001. 
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dignity the Constitution protects’.58 Just as the US States are laboratories within the US federal 
system, this thesis likened the US to a laboratory within the international field. Following 
Justice Kennedy’s reasoning, it was argued that, although the US is a laboratory of 
international experimentation, this must not deny the basic dignity that international standards 
set for states administering the death penalty. As some justices have been receptive to 
international standards assisting in the interpretation of the Constitution,59 this thesis argued 
the UPR should be utilised to ensure the US is aware of its limits as a laboratory, in that its 
application of the death penalty is curtailed by international standards. It was proposed that 
this can be achieved through member states targeting the judiciary when formulating its 
recommendations.60  
Other Mental Illnesses 
Section 5.3 moved on to consider the possibility of a categorical exemption for those with 
severe mental illnesses, as prescribed by international law.61 In analysing this area of the 
death penalty, it provided a poignant example of a particular shortfall of the UPR: the page 
limits on the main reports are preventing key information, such as a need for a categorical 
exemption for all mental illnesses, being included.62 As such, it was argued that the strict page 
limits need to be relaxed, and that some duplication in the Compilation Report with other UN 
mechanisms should be expected, as the Compilation Report presents an opportunity to collate 
the corpus of UN recommendations on capital punishment in the US.63  
In 2010, three recommendations were made regarding the execution of those with any mental 
illness. The US accepted the recommendations in part, but failed to identify why the exemption 
does not extend to all mental illnesses.64 It was argued that utilising the advance questions in 
future UPRs to query why the US will not extend the categorical exemption to all those 
suffering from mental illnesses would seek to elicit a response from the US, which would allow 
more specific recommendations to be formulated in future UPRs.65 Linked to this was 
Venezuela’s recommendation that the US should ‘[a]bolish the death penalty, which is also 
applied to persons with mental disabilities and commute those which have already been 
imposed’,66 which the US ‘noted’.67 The analysis identified that the US will not accept 
                                                             
58 Ibid. 
59 For example, Justice Stevens in Atkins, Atkins (n 51) FN21. and Justice Ginsburg in oral arguments during Roper v Simmons 
543 US 551 (2005). 
60 See, chapter 7.4.3. 
61 See, chapter 5.3. 
62 See, chapter 5.3.1. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Report of the Working Group 2010 (n 26) para 92.133. 
67 Report of the Working Group Addendum 2010 (n 27) para 9. 
 
   
 
228 
 
recommendations asking it to abolish the death penalty or implement a moratorium. Instead, 
the thesis argued that states should make specific recommendations regarding particular 
aspects of concern within the US capital system, including the execution of those with a severe 
mental illness.68 This would encourage the US to adhere to international law by extending the 
categorical exemption to cover those with all mental illnesses, whilst gathering evidence to 
further the second prong of the Steikers’ blueprint. Specific recommendations from UN 
member states would also benefit the UPR mechanism in general. 
Although, in 2015, five advance questions were asked on the issue of mental illness as a 
categorical exemption, they still did not query why the US will not extend the categorical 
exemption, and the US then provided a vague response. Therefore, it was argued that the 
member states (and potentially the Stakeholders) need to be clearer when asking advance 
questions, and the way advance questions are dealt with requires reform.69 Two 
recommendations were made in 2015, but again, they failed to include the relevant detail 
needed, adding to the argument for the need for specific recommendations.70 In this context, 
it was suggested that the member states should consider recommending on how the US can 
go about exempting persons with all mental illnesses from the death penalty, including 
conducting studies led by the DOJ in consultation with medical professionals and 
Stakeholders, or propose changes to federal and State laws.71 
 
Chapter Six 
Chapter six examined the implementation of the death sentence from two aspects: the 
conditions on death row and methods of execution. Under the heading of conditions on death 
row, chapter six considered general conditions on death row, solitary confinement, and the 
death row phenomenon.  
Conditions on Death Row 
In the 2010 UPR, AI was cited in the Stakeholder Report as it ‘referred to the harsh conditions 
on death rows in many [S]tates’.72 However, it did not provide any further detail in its individual 
submission. Therefore, it was argued that this is further evidence to suggest that thematic 
Stakeholder submissions would be of benefit, allowing one Stakeholder to go into detail about 
each capital issue.73 Moreover, three Stakeholders provided relevant information regarding 
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the harsh conditions on death row generally, and two Stakeholders provided information 
specifically regarding California’s death row, that were not included in the final report. Even if 
the Stakeholders adopt the thematic submissions, it is imperative that the OHCHR provides 
clarity, potentially through a briefing document, on how it compiles these reports to allow the 
Stakeholders to have this information when compiling their submissions in future UPRs.74  
Four recommendations were made regarding prison conditions generally, which can also be 
related to death row. However, the US accepted the recommendation from Iran on the 
prohibition of torture in its prisons, on the basis that it believed would require no further action 
to implement, regardless of what international law prescribes. This thesis argued that it may 
have led to more meaningful implementation by the US if Iran had provided a more specific 
recommendation, detailing how the US might ensure the prohibition of torture in its prisons, to 
bring it in line with its international obligations.75 
In 2015, Ireland stated its concerns about conditions on death row during the interactive 
dialogue, but the US did not address this. To remedy this in future UPRs, it was suggested 
that first, member states should use the advance questions to ask the US delegation specific 
questions on conditions on death row,76 and second, they should follow that up with specific 
recommendations on ways to remedy the harsh conditions.77 There was also a 
recommendation made by Japan on general prison conditions, which the US accepted but has 
shown no sign of implementing. This thesis argued that the follow-up to the review part of the 
UPR requires improving, through ensuring states explain why they accepted or noted a 
recommendation, making the mid-term reports a pivotal part of the UPR, and considering the 
creation of a specific mandate for a UPR Special Procedure.78 
Solitary Confinement 
Section 6.2 dealt with solitary confinement on death row. In the 2010 UPR, USHRN had 
provided a corpus of information regarding solitary confinement in its Death Penalty Annex to 
its individual submission. However, as this was an Annex document, it was not cited in the 
final report and it is very unlikely that member states would have read this individual document. 
This furthered the argument that thematic Stakeholder submissions should be encouraged, 
as one Stakeholder could have used its individual submission to provide detailed information 
on solitary confinement within the death penalty, increasing the chance of this issue being 
referenced in the main Stakeholder Report.79  
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The remainder of the discussions on solitary confinement in 2010 were regarding prisons 
generally, not death row. HRW had made a specific recommendation on solitary confinement 
in its individual submission, but this was not measurable, adding to the argument that 
Stakeholders should be permitted to submit advance questions to raise key issues such as 
this.80 Although Sweden made a general recommendation regarding prisoners’ rights, this was 
very broad and was therefore not implemented, furthering the argument that member states 
need to increase the specificity of their recommendations.81  
In 2015, there was more discussion of solitary confinement in the US UPR. Similar to the HRW 
recommendation in 2010, JS41 provided another in its individual submission, which again 
adds to the argument that Stakeholders providing advance questions would raise awareness 
of the issue of solitary confinement, whilst encouraging the US to adhere to international 
standards.82 The analysis identified that JS24 was the main Stakeholder that submitted 
information on solitary confinement in 2015, indicating that organised thematic submissions 
could reduce the amount of duplication between Stakeholders.83 Furthermore, JS24 provided 
four cogent recommendations, providing additional evidence for allowing Stakeholders to 
submit advance questions.84 However, this thesis provided one criticism of these otherwise 
clear recommendations provided by JS24, in that there was no mention of death row, despite 
the report referencing the psychological effects of solitary confinement on death row.85 JS24 
could have added ‘death row’ to its list of places where solitary confinement is used, to ensure 
solitary confinement on death row attracted the attention it requires.86  
Azerbaijan asked an advance question, based upon the information in the Compilation Report, 
providing more practical evidence that the member states are utilising the main reports when 
collating their advance questions or recommendations. This thesis argued that this evidence 
makes it even more important that the OHCHR provides clear material on how it compiles its 
reports.87 Furthermore, the US did not respond to this advance question, and it was argued 
that the advance questions process requires formalising to have the most impact upon key 
human rights issues. 
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Death Row Phenomenon 
Section 6.3 considered the death row phenomenon, which is widely agreed upon to include 
three prongs. One, harsh conditions on death row, two, a prolonged wait for execution, and 
three, the adverse psychological effect of being sentenced to death.88  
In the 2010 US UPR, only the Stakeholders in their individual submissions discussed the death 
row phenomenon. For example, both USHRN and HRA went into detail about the effects of 
the death row phenomenon and gave specific examples, including the particular problem on 
California’s death row. However, none of this information was conveyed in the final report.89 
Furthermore, the Compilation Report provided no information regarding the death row 
phenomenon. This was despite the fact that, in 2006, CAT had provided a report on the US 
which documented its concerns over the effects of the death row phenomenon.90 It was argued 
that this was key information regarding the death row phenomenon that member states may 
have used to prepare their recommendations, and it pointed to the need for transparency from 
the OHCHR as to how this report is compiled.91  
Furthermore, no recommendations were made by member states on the death row 
phenomenon. It was argued that, in order to encourage US courts to entertain appeals on the 
grounds of the death row phenomenon, the UN member states should make specific 
recommendations directed towards the judiciary within the US UPR.92 
However, disappointingly, there was no reference to the death row phenomenon whatsoever 
in the 2015 US UPR.93 In order to encourage discussion of the death row phenomenon in 
future reviews, and other human rights issues generally within the UPR, this thesis argued 
that four key changes should be made to the mechanism. First, thematic Stakeholder 
submissions would allow at least one Stakeholder to consider the death row phenomenon in 
detail, as USHRN and HRA did in 2010.94 Second, more transparency from the OHCHR as to 
how the Stakeholder Report is compiled would help Stakeholders when compiling the thematic 
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submission.95 Third, member states should utilise the advance questions to raise the death 
row phenomenon as an issue.96 Fourth, member states should consider targeting its 
recommendations to the judiciary, to further Justice Breyer’s argument regarding excessive 
delays in the capital system.97  
Methods of Execution 
Section 6.4 analysed methods of execution. In 2010, there was one reference to potential pain 
and suffering caused by the lethal injection by CAT in the Compilation Report, but no 
discussion of methods of execution in the main Stakeholder Report, despite AHR and IACHR 
reporting on it.98 This also potentially led to the lack of advance questions and 
recommendations on methods of execution in the 2010 UPR. It was argued that this provided 
a striking example of where fundamental changes must be made to the UPR in order for it to 
function effectively as a human rights mechanism generally, to hold the US to account to its 
international obligations when administering the death penalty, and also to facilitate the 
abolition of capital punishment in the US. First, the content of the individual submissions must 
be cogent in order for the OHCHR to include it in the final report.99 Second, the OHCHR must 
provide transparency regarding how it compiles the Stakeholder Report, perhaps through a 
briefing note on its website.100 Third, Stakeholders should consider submitting thematic 
reports, as an attempt to ensure that important points, such as methods of execution, are not 
overlooked.101  
There was much more discussion of methods of execution in 2015, most likely due to the 
number of botched executions that took place between the 2010 and 2015 UPRs. For 
example, in the National Report, the US addressed the fact that SCOTUS was hearing a case 
about the constitutionality of the lethal injection.102 However, during the UNHRC plenary 
session in September 2015 following the Glossip judgment, Ireland noted that it ‘continued to 
be concerned about the manner in which the death penalty is implemented [and] also regretted 
that [SCOTUS] had recently upheld the use of the lethal injection’.103 It was also argued that 
because the Glossip judgment had not been handed down before the review in 2015, the US 
2020 UPR must address the judgment and its ramifications.104 
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The Compilation Report cited the UN Secretary-General’s report on a moratorium on the death 
penalty and the comments about the uncertainty of untested methods of execution.105 
However, upon reading the full report of the UN Secretary-General, it had gone into much 
more detail, particularly about drug secrecy laws in the US. JS17 also noted the secrecy 
surrounding drugs, and Sweden and France provided recommendations on the origin of lethal 
injection drugs.106 However, the US noted these recommendations and provided no reasons 
why. It was therefore argued that the state under review should be required to provide reasons 
why they accept and note recommendations to encourage transparency.107  
JS17 took the reins on this issue in its individual submission, which was a positive indication 
that thematic Stakeholder submissions could be successful. However, given that the 
information provided by JS17 did not make it into the final Stakeholder Report, this made it 
even more important for clear guidance to be provided on how the OHCHR decides on the 
content of the Stakeholder Report.108 Sweden and Belgium asked advance questions on 
methods of execution, but these were not addressed by the US. It was argued that the advance 
questions require reform, including formalising the process and having the troika encourage 
the state under review to acknowledge the questions.109  
 
Chapter Seven 
Chapter seven collated together the recommendations made to improve the UPR throughout 
chapters four, five, and six, and provided possible ways of implementing them. Six areas of 
the UPR that require reform were identified: (1) the role the OHCHR plays, (2) the role of the 
Stakeholders, (3) the advance questions, (4) the recommendations process, (5) the follow-up 
to the review, and (5) the publicity of the UPR. These recommendations provide a contribution 
to the scholarship and policy approaches to the UPR. 
The role of the OHCHR requires improvement in two ways. First, it needs to be more 
transparent in how it collates its two reports, potentially through publishing a briefing paper on 
its UPR repository.110 Second, the page limits on the documents need to be relaxed particularly 
for member states that receive high numbers of individual Stakeholder submissions and 
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recommendations from UN bodies. To implement this, it was suggested that a formal review 
of the UPR would be required.111  
The role of the Stakeholders can be reformed in three ways. First, the Stakeholders should be 
allowed to submit advance questions, which would involve a formal review of the UPR.112 
Second, thematic Stakeholder submissions on capital punishment should be encouraged. 
Although this would be harder to realise in practice, in the first instance, the larger 
Stakeholders that have more resources could work together to produce thematic reports.113 
Third, Stakeholders should carefully consider the content of their individual submissions, 
which can be conveyed to the Stakeholders during the Pre-sessions conducted by UPR 
Info.114  
Furthermore, the advance questions require formalising. This would include giving the 
documents a UN document number and translating them into the six official UN languages, 
using the same template as the other UPR documents. The troika should also play a particular 
role in ensuring that the state under review acknowledges the advance questions during the 
interactive dialogue.115 To implement this, it would require a formal review of the UPR. Member 
states also need to engage further with the advance questions. To implement this change, the 
UPR Pre-sessions would be the ideal platform, as they attract wide state delegation 
attendance. It was also proposed that this could also provide the opportunity for joint advance 
questions to be formulated, as side briefing sessions with numerous government delegations 
take place at the Pre-sessions, creating an environment for collaborations.116  
In terms of the recommendations, three ways to improve the process were suggested. First, 
the recommendations should be thematically grouped together to remove the issue of over-
burdening the state under review, which the troika already does, albeit inconsistently. The 
grouping together of the recommendations could be implemented through a formal change, 
for example, through a review of the UNHRC and its mechanisms, or it could be a simpler 
arrangement of the UNHRC asking the troika before each UPR to ensure it groups similar 
recommendations together.117 Second, the specificity of the recommendations should be 
increased to encourage implementation, which could be implemented via a briefing at the UPR 
Info Pre-sessions.118 Third, recommending states should place more focus on the target 
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audience, including US States and courts, and this could also be addressed through a briefing 
at the UPR Info Pre-sessions.119  
The follow-up to the review also requires remedying, as the reliance upon recommendations 
accepted in the previous review as a means of follow-up is hindering the positive role of the 
UPR. It was suggested that there are three potential ways this could be improved to further all 
three aims of this thesis. First, the state under review should provide responses to accepted 
and noted recommendations, which would require a formal change to the UPR.120 Second, 
engagement with the mid-term reporting should be improved, which would also require a 
formal change to the UPR.121 Third, a new, thematic special procedures mandate could be 
created specifically for the follow-up to the UPR, which would involve the creation of the new 
mandate and the hiring of a Special Rapporteur.122  
Finally, it was argued that the UPR requires more publicity, and there are a number of key 
actors that have the responsibility to do this. These actors include, UN member states, 
Stakeholders, practitioners, academics, courts, and the media.123  
The thesis also noted the potential limitations to these recommendations being realised in 
practice. It noted that, before there can be any implementation of these recommendations, 
they must be transferred from the thesis into the wider world. As such, it was suggested that 
a dialogue must be started, for example, with the OHCHR, the UN member states, and the 
Stakeholders. In the first instance, UPR Info will be approached to gain their expertise on how 
these recommendations can be realised. 
These amendments to the UPR intend to address each of the key aims of this thesis. They 
intend to improve the UPR mechanism generally, encourage US adherence to international 
death penalty standards, and gather evidence to further the abolition of the death penalty 
through the Steikers’ blueprint in the future. 
 
8.2 Limitations of the Research 
Although this thesis has provided an in-depth analysis of the UPR mechanism in the context 
of the abolition of the death penalty in the US, there were limitations to the research. First, 
only two UPR cycles could be analysed, given that the US has only been through two cycles 
of review. Second, in order to provide the required detail of a PhD thesis, only one theme 
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within one UN member state could be analysed, namely the death penalty in the US. Third, 
the findings of this study are limited to the author’s own review and other scholars may have 
identified other themes within the data. Finally, although the reforms argued for in this thesis 
will benefit the UPR mechanism generally, they were formulated within the context of the 
abolition of the death penalty in the US.  
 
8.3 Future Research 
This thesis has provided a detailed analysis of the UPR, and, from this, it has created a number 
of future avenues of research. In the first instance, the recommendations argued for in this 
thesis need to be addressed in practice. To do this, the author will firstly approach UPR Info, 
to discuss the viability of them being realised in practice, and for UPR Info’s expert opinion as 
to how this can be facilitated.124 Thereafter, a dialogue will be created with Stakeholders and 
the OHCHR in order to discuss how the recommendations can be implemented to improve 
the UPR. 
Furthermore, the author will be submitting a Stakeholder Report with the Centre for Human 
Rights at Birmingham City University to the 2020 US UPR. This will build upon the findings of 
this thesis, raising a number of issues articulated within the three capital themes identified.  
As one of the limitations of this research was that only one theme and one state could be 
analysed, the author will be expanding her research on the UPR, and collaborating with other 
scholars. This will include research on the UPR in other states, and on other issues such as 
the right to health, the right to education, and women’s rights. Moreover, the UPR gives rise 
to comparative studies, one such being the use of life without the possibility of parole 
sentencing in the US and UK, and how the UPR approaches this.  
What is clear from this thesis is that further research must be conducted on the UPR. This will 
benefit the mechanism to ensure its effectiveness, both as a human rights mechanism 
generally, and as a vehicle to facilitate the abolition of the death penalty in the US. 
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APPENDIX 
UPR DEATH PENALTY RECOMMENDATIONS RECEIVED BY THE US 
 
2010 
Recommending 
State 
Recommendation Reference125 US Response Reference126 
France ‘Take the necessary 
measures to consider 
lifting the United 
States reservation to 
article 5, paragraph 6 
of the International 
Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights that 
bans the imposition of 
the death penalty for 
crimes committed by 
persons under 18’. 
Para 92.48. Supported. Para 28. 
Uruguay ‘Consider the 
withdrawal of all 
reservations and 
declarations that 
undermine the 
objective and spirit of 
the human rights 
instruments, in 
particular reservation 
to article 6 paragraph 5 
of the International 
Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights that 
bans the imposition of 
the death penalty to 
those who committed 
a crime when they 
were minors’. 
Para 92.49. Supported. Para 28. 
Austria ‘Withdraw the 
reservation to article 6, 
paragraph 5 of the 
International Covenant 
of Civil and Political 
Rights and consider 
further to abolish the 
death penalty in all 
cases’. 
Para 92.50. Noted. Para 30. 
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Mexico ‘Take appropriate 
action to resolve the 
obstacles that prevent 
the full implementation 
of the Avena 
Judgment of the 
International Court of 
Justice and, until this 
occurs, avoid the 
execution of the 
individuals covered in 
said judgment’. 
Para 92.54. Supported. Para 28. 
Sweden ‘A national moratorium 
on the death penalty is 
introduced with a view 
to completely abolish 
the penalty and, before 
such a moratorium is 
introduced, to take all 
necessary measures 
to ensure that any use 
of the death penalty 
complies with 
minimum standards 
under international law 
relating to the death 
penalty such as under 
article 6 and 14 of the 
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights’. 
Para 92.118. Supported in 
part. 
Para 8. 
Russian 
Federation 
‘Consider the 
possibility of 
announcing 
moratorium on the use 
of the death penalty’. 
Para 92.119. Noted. Para 9. 
Various ‘Establish a 
moratorium on the use 
of the death penalty at 
the federal and state 
level as a first step 
towards abolition 
(United Kingdom); 
Establish a 
moratorium on 
executions on the 
entire American 
territory, with a view to 
a definitive abolition of 
the death penalty 
(Belgium); Establish, 
at all levels, a 
moratorium on 
executions with a view 
Para 92.120. Noted. Para 9. 
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to completely abolish 
the death penalty 
(Switzerland); Adopt a 
moratorium on the use 
of the death penalty 
with a view to 
abolishing capital 
punishment in federal 
and national 
legislations (Italy); 
Establish a 
moratorium to the 
death penalty with a 
view to its abolition 
(Uruguay); Impose a 
moratorium on 
executions with a view 
to abolishing the death 
penalty nationwide 
(New Zealand); Work 
towards a moratorium 
on executions with the 
view to abolishing the 
death penalty, in 
conformity with 
General Assembly 
resolution 62/149, 
adopted on 18 
December 2007 
(Netherlands)’. 
Cyprus ‘Take all necessary 
measures in order to 
impose a moratorium 
on the use of the death 
penalty, with a view to 
abolishing it both at the 
federal and State 
levels’. 
Para 92.121. Noted Para 9. 
Various ‘Abolish the death 
penalty and in any 
event, establish a 
moratorium as an 
interim measure 
towards full abolition 
(Australia); Abolish 
capital punishment 
and, as a first step on 
that road, introduce as 
soon as practicable a 
moratorium on the 
execution of death 
sentences (Hungary); 
That steps be taken to 
set federal and state-
level moratoria on 
Para 92.122. Noted. Para 9. 
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executions with a view 
to abolish the death 
penalty nationwide’. 
Slovakia ‘Impose a nationwide 
moratorium on 
executions and 
commute existing 
death sentences to 
imprisonment term 
with a view to abolish 
the capital punishment 
entirely’. 
Para 92.123. Noted. Para 9. 
Turkey ‘Consider abolishing 
death penalty’. 
Para 92.124. Noted. Para 9. 
Germany ‘Abolish the death 
penalty’. 
Para 92.125. Noted. Para 9. 
France ‘Implement at the 
federal level a 
moratorium on 
executions’. 
Para 92.126. Noted. Para 9. 
Various ‘Begin a process 
leading to the ending 
of the death penalty 
punishment (Ireland); 
Pursuing the process 
to abolishing the death 
penalty (Holy See)’. 
Para 92.127. Noted. Para 9. 
Nicaragua ‘Abolish as soon as 
possible the death 
penalty in the 35 
Federal States where 
this brutal practice is 
authorized’. 
Para 92.128. Noted. Para 9. 
Algeria ‘Study the possibility 
for the Federal 
Government of 
campaigning in favour 
of applying the United 
Nations Moratorium on 
the death penalty’. 
Para 92.129. Noted. Para 9. 
Spain ‘Establish a de jure 
moratorium of the 
death penalty at the 
federal level and in the 
military justice, in view 
of its abolition and as 
an example for the 
States that still retain 
it’. 
Para 92.130. Noted. Para 9. 
Denmark ‘That, until a 
moratorium is applied, 
steps be taken to 
restrict the number of 
Para 92.131. Noted. Para 9. 
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offences carrying the 
death penalty’. 
Norway ‘A review of federal 
and state legislation 
with a view to 
restricting the number 
of offences carrying 
the death penalty’. 
Para 92.132. Noted. Para 9. 
Venezuela  ‘Abolish the death 
penalty, which is also 
applied to persons with 
mental disabilities and 
commute those which 
have already been 
imposed’. 
Para 92.133. Noted. Para 9. 
Cuba ‘End the prosecution 
and execution of 
mentally-ill persons 
and minors’. 
Para 92.134. Supported in 
part. 
Para 8. 
Ireland ‘Extend the exclusion 
of death penalty to all 
crimes committed by 
persons with mental 
illness’. 
Para 92.135. Supported in 
part. 
Para 8. 
 
2015 
Recommending 
State 
Recommendation Reference127 US Response Reference128 
Timor-Leste ‘Ratify the Second 
Optional Protocol to 
the International 
Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming 
at the abolition of the 
death penalty’ 
Para 176.10. Noted. Para 22. 
Chile ‘Sign and ratify the 
Second Optional 
Protocol to the 
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights, aiming at the 
abolition of the death 
penalty’. 
Para 176.11. Noted. Para 22. 
Namibia ‘Consider the 
ratification of the 
Second Optional 
Protocol to the 
Para 176.12. Supported. Para 20. 
                                                             
127 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America’ (20 July 2015) UN Doc 
A/HRC/30/12. 
128 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic Review – United States of America Addendum 1’ (14 
September 2015) A/HRC/30/12/Add1. 
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International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights, aiming at the 
abolition of the death 
penalty’. 
Australia ‘Establish a formal 
moratorium on the 
death penalty with a 
view to ratifying the 
Second Optional 
Protocol to the 
International Covenant 
on Civil and Political 
Rights, aiming at the 
abolition of the death 
penalty’. 
Para 176.13. Noted. Para 10. 
Gabon ‘Adhere to 
international legal 
instruments to which it 
is not yet a party, 
particularly the Second 
Optional Protocol to 
the International 
Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, aiming 
at the abolition of the 
death penalty’. 
Para 176.14. Supported in 
part. 
Para 21. 
Various ‘Abolish the death 
penalty in those states 
where it is still used 
(Nicaragua) / Abolish 
the death penalty in all 
states of the Union 
(Ecuador)’. 
Para 
176.165. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Costa Rica ‘Abolish the death 
penalty’. 
Para 
176.166. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Bolivia ‘Abolish the death 
penalty’. 
Para 
176.167. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Austria ‘Continue efforts 
towards abolishing the 
death penalty’. 
Para 
176.168. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Congo ‘Reduce gradually the 
number of persons 
sentenced to death, 
and ensure that efforts 
on this matter are 
pursued’. 
Para 
176.169. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Lithuania ‘Introduce a 
moratorium at the 
federal level with view 
to achieving 
nationwide 
Para 
176.170. 
Noted. Para 10. 
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moratorium of capital 
punishment as a first 
step to abolishing such 
penalty’. 
Luxembourg ‘Establish a federal 
moratorium on the 
death penalty with a 
view to the total 
abolition of the death 
penalty in the United 
States’. 
Para 
176.171. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Nepal ‘Establish a 
moratorium on death 
penalty at the federal 
and states levels with 
a view to ultimately 
achieve nationwide 
legal abolition’. 
Para 
176.172. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Uruguay ‘Establish a 
moratorium on the 
death penalty aiming 
at its complete 
abolition in all states’. 
Para 
176.173. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Argentina ‘Establish a 
moratorium on the 
application of the 
death penalty aimed at 
its abolition and also 
condone the death 
penalty for an 
Argentinian citizen, 
Victor Saldano, who 
has been on death row 
since 1996’. 
Para 
176.174. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Various ‘Impose a moratorium 
on executions with a 
view to abolishing the 
death penalty at the 
federal and state 
levels (Namibia) / 
Institute a moratorium 
on the application of 
the death penalty with 
a view to abolition 
(Togo) / Establish, at 
the federal level, a 
moratorium on 
executions with a view 
to abolishing the death 
penalty (France) / 
Establish an official 
moratorium on the use 
of the death penalty 
(Montenegro) / 
Para 
176.175. 
Noted. Para 10. 
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Establish a 
moratorium on the 
application of the 
death penalty (Spain) / 
Impose a moratorium 
on executions and 
abolish the death 
penalty in all states of 
the United States 
(Turkey) / Ensure the 
establishment of a 
moratorium of the 
death penalty in those 
states that have not 
abolished it yet 
(Chile)’. 
Rwanda ‘Work towards a 
moratorium on 
executions with a view 
of abolishing the death 
penalty’. 
Para 
176.176. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Portugal ‘That federal and state 
authorities impose a 
moratorium on 
executions with a view 
to abolishing the death 
penalty nationwide’. 
Para 
176.177. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Iceland ‘Impose a moratorium 
on executions with a 
view to abolishing the 
death penalty 
nationwide’. 
Para 
176.178. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Ireland ‘Impose a moratorium 
on executions with a 
view to abolishing the 
death penalty 
nationwide’. 
Para 
176.179. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Sweden ‘Introduce a national 
moratorium on the 
death penalty aiming 
at complete abolition 
and take all necessary 
measures to ensure 
that the death penalty 
complies with 
minimum standards 
under international 
law. Exempt persons 
with mental illness 
from execution. 
Commit to ensuring 
that the origin of drugs 
being used is made 
public’. 
Para 
176.180. 
Supported in 
part. 
Para 9. 
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Russian 
Federation 
‘Impose a moratorium 
on the use of the death 
penalty’. 
Para 
176.181. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Azerbaijan ‘Impose at least a 
moratorium on the 
death penalty’. 
Para 
176.182. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Germany ‘Formally establish a 
moratorium on 
executions at the 
federal level while 
engaging with 
retentionist states to 
achieve a nationwide 
moratorium with the 
objective to ultimately 
abolish the death 
penalty nationwide’. 
Para 
176.183. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Netherlands ‘Take all necessary 
steps to work towards 
an immediate 
moratorium on 
execution of the death 
penalty, with a view to 
a complete 
abolishment, in line 
with international 
human rights 
standards such as the 
right to live’. 
Para 
176.184. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Slovakia ‘Take necessary steps 
to introduce a 
moratorium on the use 
of the death penalty at 
the federal and state 
levels’. 
Para 
176.185. 
Noted. Para 10. 
New Zealand ‘Impose a moratorium 
on executions with a 
view to abolishing the 
death penalty for 
federal offences’. 
Para 
176.186. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Estonia ‘Impose a moratorium 
on executions with a 
view to abolishing the 
death penalty 
nationwide, and 
ensure that 
prosecutors in all 
jurisdictions cease 
pursuing death 
sentences’. 
Para 
176.187. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Sierra Leone ‘Continue efforts to 
establish a moratorium 
and eventually abolish 
Para 
176.188. 
Noted. Para 10. 
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capital punishment in 
all states’. 
Italy ‘Take into 
consideration the 
possibility of adopting 
a moratorium of capital 
executions at the state 
and federal levels, 
given that 26 states 
have abolished or 
adopted a moratorium 
on capital executions’. 
Para 
176.189. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Various ‘Consider as a first 
step the application of 
a moratorium on 
executions, both at the 
state and federal 
levels, with a view to 
ultimately abolishing 
the death penalty 
(Cyprus) / Consider 
imposing an official 
moratorium on 
executions toward the 
complete abolition of 
the death penalty in 
the country (Greece)’. 
Para 
176.190. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Holy See ‘Consider introducing 
at the federal level a 
moratorium on the use 
of the death penalty 
with a view to its 
permanent abolition’. 
Para 
176.191. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Uzbekistan ‘Consider adoption of 
a moratorium on the 
death penalty at the 
federal level’. 
Para 
176.192. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Norway ‘A review of federal 
and state legislation to 
restrict the number of 
offences carrying the 
death penalty and 
steps towards federal- 
and state-level 
moratoriums on 
executions with a view 
to its permanent 
abolition’. 
Para 
176.193. 
Noted. Para 10. 
Angola ‘Identify the root 
causes of ethnic 
disparities concerning 
especially those 
sentenced to capital 
punishment in order to 
Para 
176.194. 
Supported Para 8. 
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find ways for eliminate 
ethnic discrimination in 
the criminal justice 
system’. 
France ‘Identify the factors of 
racial disparity in the 
use of the death 
penalty and develop 
strategies to end 
possible 
discriminatory 
practices’. 
Para 
176.195. 
Supported Para 8. 
Spain ‘When continuing to 
implement the death 
penalty, do not apply it 
to persons with 
intellectual 
disabilities’. 
Para 
176.196. 
Supported in 
part. 
Para 9. 
France ‘Ensure that no person 
with a mental disability 
is executed’. 
Para 
176.197. 
Supported in 
part. 
Para 9. 
Belgium ‘Take specific 
measures in follow-up 
to the 
recommendations of 
the Human Rights 
Committee to the 
United States in 2014 
with regards to capital 
punishment such as 
measures to avoid 
racial bias, to avoid 
wrongful sentencing to 
death and to provide 
adequate 
compensation if 
wrongful sentencing 
happens’. 
Para 
176.198. 
Supported in 
part. 
Para 9. 
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 
‘Strengthen the justice 
sector in order to avoid 
imposing the death 
penalty on those 
persons wrongly 
convicted, and 
reconsider the use of 
methods which give 
raise to cruel suffering 
when this punishment 
is applied’. 
Para 
176.199. 
Supported. Para 8. 
Poland ‘Strengthen 
safeguards against 
wrongful sentencing to 
death and subsequent 
wrongful execution by 
Para 
176.200. 
Supported. Para 8. 
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ensuring, inter alia, 
effective legal 
representation for 
defendants in death 
penalty cases, 
including at the 
postconviction stage’. 
Bulgaria ‘Continue the efforts 
on the progress 
towards the 
abolishment of the 
death penalty, based 
on the Department of 
Justice’s review of how 
it is being applied in 
the country’. 
Para 
176.201. 
Noted. Para 10. 
France ‘Commit to full 
transparency on the 
combination of 
medicines used during 
executions by 
injection’. 
Para 
176.202. 
Noted. Para 10. 
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